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Abstract 
China is an economy where its exchange rate system has been under-developed. We 
suspect that when people carry out China studies, the ability to test certain economic 
theories might be hindered under such circumstances. One observation that attracts 
our attention is that the RMB official exchange rates underwent several devaluations 
during the period of rapid economic growth, effectively violating the predictions of 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. It is our intention to test formally whether the 
Chinese data are consistent with the theory. If the data are found not conforming to 
the theory, then the Chinese official exchange rate may not be informative, as it does 
not reflect the economic fundamentals, in this case, the relative price movement or the 
relative productivity changes. 
In many developing countries the transaction volume in black market is much larger 
than that in the official market. We argue that in emerging markets the black market 
exchange rates reflect economic fundamentals much better than the official rates. In 
China, the foreign exchange official and black market co-exist for almost half a 
century with the latter having been an important factor of economic activity. 
We, thereby, raise our main hypothesis: when carrying out developing countries' 
studies, the black market exchange rates are more relevant than the official ones in 
testing economic theory. We partially justify such a claim by providing evidence 
that the two rates do not have a long run relationship in the case of China. We go on 
to test it within the Balassa-Samuelson framework. The results point out strongly 
that the theory receives support when the black market rates are used as the proxy for 
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Part I Introduction 
Chapter 1 	Introduction 
Recent studies have suggested that for planned economies where the nominal 
exchange rate is either pegged, state-determined, or officially corrected, the black 
market-based real exchange rates are shown to provide stronger relationship with the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates than the official exchange rates. In 
their studies of the Pacific Basin currencies, the Greek drachma, the Indian rupee, the 
Iranian rial, and a panel of 16 African currencies respectively, Phylaktis and 
Kassimatis (1994), Kouretas and Zarangas (1998), Baghestani (1997), 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1993) and Nagayasu (1998) have shown that the PPP theory does 
not hold well when official exchange rate data are used; however, it receives empirical 
support when black market exchange rates are used. 
Nagayasu (1998) argues that 'the ability to test for the PPP hypothesis for developing 
countries has been hindered by the frequent changes in these countries' exchange rate 
arrangements, often resulting in long periods of fixed or adjustable official exchange 
rates.' An example under Nagayasu (1998) study is that many African countries 
have shifted their exchange rate regimes more than five times over the 14 years' 
period — these changes in exchange rate arrangements might well make it difficult to 
apply the time series method to individual countries. He asserts that in order to 
avoid such a problem people should instead focus on the black market rates which, by 
definition, are 'more likely to move freely with market forces than the official 
exchange rates.' 
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China is an example where there exists heavy official correction of the overvalued 
exchange rate during the period when the country rapidly transformed from a closed, 
planned economy to an open economy. In fact, RMB was overvalued persistently 
for decades through the late 1980's (see Figure 1.1). 
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Source: Penn World Table 
Figure 1.1 
According to Chou and Shin (1998) 'the official rate was first devalued from 3.2 yuan 
per dollar in the fourth quarter of 1985 to 3.72 yuan in the fourth quarter of 1986. In 
the fourth quarter of 1989, the rate was devalued again to 4.72 yuan per dollar. The 
rate was further devalued to 5.22 yuan per dollar in the fourth quarter of 1990 ... and 
then 5.80 yuan per dollar in 1993.' In January 1994, the official rate was unified 
with the swap rate and was devalued greatly to 8.70 yuan per dollar. 
In terms of the exchange rate regime, a fixed exchange rate regime co-existed with a 
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flexible one during the period from 1979 to 1993. A managed floating systems has 
come into effect since 1994. The representative state rate throughout the period 
1988 to 1993 was the market swap rate2 which then unified with the official rate with 
the latter becoming the state rate instead. 
To conclude, China is an example where the nominal exchange rate is influenced 
heavily by the national authority. It is also an example where there exist frequent 
exchange rate regime shifts. As a result, when people carry out Chinese studies the 
ability to test for certain economic theory might be hindered by the exchange rate data 
and by the type of exchange rate arrangements. 
One example which attracts our attention is that we observe that the RMB official real 
exchange rates underwent several devaluations during the period of rapid economic 
growth (see Figure 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4), effectively violating the predictions of the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis3 that demonstrates a positive relationship between 
growth and real appreciation4. 
1  The rate was allowed to fluctuate within a small range according to the market force. 
2  The swap rate was for non-state-planned trade transactions, and was used by the Chinese firms to 
swap their foreign exchange quotas and/or foreign currencies at a fixed rate, see Phylatis and Girardin, 
2001 for details. 
3 According to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964), when an increase in labour 
productivity in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector in country A is higher than in country B, the 
real exchange rate of country A relative to B will appreciate. 
4 The positive relationship between growth and real exchange rate is a typical feature of the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis. The faster an economy grows, the greater the increase in labour productivity in the tradable sector; 
whereas due to the existence of some particular characteristics (e.g. fixed proportion) of the non-tradable sector, 
the increase in labour productivity within such sector is usually inert even during rapid economic growth. Hence, 
when an economy is experiencing rapid economic growth, its real exchange rate will appreciate. 
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Source: Penn World Table, World Currency Yearbook, World Bank 
Figure 1.2 
Real exchange rates (GDP deflator, 2000=100) 
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Figure 1.4 
On the other hand, for countries with developed exchange rate system, for example, 
Singapore and Japan, the real exchange rates tend to appreciate at the time of rapid 
growth (see Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). It is also true that when we look at average 
real exchange rate changes and average per capita growth over the period 1973 to 
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PER CAPITA GROWTH VS REAL EXCHANGE RATE CHANGE, 1973-1995 
Per capita GDP growth (PPP, 1995 International Dollar) 
Source: 
Growth rate: World Bank World Development Indicators 
RER: Penn World Table, World Bank and World Currency Yearbook 
Figure 1.5 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect is found to hold well in Japan and Singapore and, to a 
much lesser extent, in Italy. China, another high-growth country, experienced a large 
depreciation. 
Figure 1.6 specifies the relationship between average changes in real exchange rate 
and average growth rate from 1973 to 1997. The positive relationship between 
growth and real appreciation is found in Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand and 
Japan and, to a much lesser extent, in France, Italy, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
UK, Australia, Canada, China and India experienced high growth with large 
depreciation, thus appearing to violate the Balassa-Samuelson prediction. Pakistan, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Germany also experienced high growth with real depreciation; 
however, the extent of depreciation was small. 
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Figure 1.6 
`China's depreciation can be understood as an outlier, in that the country rapidly 
transformed from a closed, planned economy to an open economy. The opening also 
meant the correction of the overvalued exchange rate.' (Ito, Isard, and Symansky, 
1997) Thus, it is our intention to test formally whether the Chinese official exchange 
rate data are consistent with the traditional Balassa-Samuelson theory. If the data are 
found not to conform to the predictions of the theory, then perhaps the Chinese 
official exchange rate may not be informative, as it does not reflect well the economic 
fundamentals; in this case, the relative price movement or the relative productivity 
changes. 









economic activity for over half a century (Phylaktis and Girardin 2001). The 
importance of such a market in the Chinese economy is reflected by the considerable 
size of the black market premium and the substantive volume of transactions on the 
market. 
The size of the black market premium  
According to Kiguel and O'Connell (1994), the world-wide observed pattern on the 
size of the average premium throughout the period of 1970 to 1990 is, as follows: 
For most Asian (except China) and few industrialized countries the premium is low, 
less than 10%. In many African and Latin American countries, the premium exceeds 
50% and is considered very large. Yin and Stoever (1994) have studied the Chinese 
black market premium and on the basis of their study we find that the size of the 
premium is moderate to high, reflecting well the pressure of excess demand for 
official foreign exchange and, consequently, the important role of the black market in 
the economy. According to Yin and Stoever (1994), the premium started to climb in 
1975 and averaged 38.2% in 1978, 52.7% in 1979 and reached a peak of 86% in 1980 
as a result of the nation's liberalizing economic policies and rising incomes (and so 
rising demand for foreign goods). Throughout the 1980's, in spite of several policy 
measures attempting to repress the black market for currency stability, namely the 
introduction of the Foreign Exchange Certificate in 1980, the massive government 
purchase of foreign consumer goods using foreign reserves in 1984 and the 
establishment of the Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centers in 1986, on average, the 
black market premium still remained considerably high. In 1988, stimulated partly 
by the hyperinflation, speculation about the devaluation of the official rate during 
negotiations between China and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and 
political upheaval of the democracy movement, the black market premium increased 
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substantially and reached a peak of more than 100% in mid-1989. In recent years, 
with the government's increasing effort to suppress the foreign exchange black market 
for monetary stability the dollar exchange rate has become fairly close to the official 
one (see Figure 1.2). In 1995, the premium fell to only 10%, and remaining at that 
level. 
The volume of transactions  
The estimated figures suggest that the volumes of transactions on the Chinese black 
market exchange are substantive. In 1994, the volume of smuggling via the 
state-owned enterprises is estimated to be 1.22 billion yuan (General Administration 
of Customs). In addition, according to the Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF, nearly 
33% of the Chinese export receipts are not officially reported. Another indication of 
the potential capacity of the Chinese foreign exchange black market is the foreign 
currency deposits made by the Chinese citizens, which were worth U.S.$11 billion at 
the end of March 1994 (Ma 1995), equivalent to the foreign reserves (U.S.$11.7 
billion) held by the state in 1990 (Jianping 1998). 
On the basis of the above facts, we raise our main hypothesis, as follows: When 
carrying out developing countries studies, the official exchange rate may be irrelevant 
whereas the black market exchange rate, which is perceived as a proxy of the 
developing countries' floating rate, is more relevant in testing for economic theory. 
We partially justify such a claim by providing evidence that in the presence of a 
parallel market for dollars, the official rate is irrelevant, merely a government 
bookkeeping convention and unrelated to the parallel rate (Kouretas and Zarangas 
1998). We then go on to test it within the Balassa-Samuelson framework. The 
results suggest that the theory receives empirical support when black market exchange 
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rates are used. The theory, however, does not appear to hold well with the official 
rates. Such a conclusion is insensitive to the choice of theoretical set-up. That is, it 
holds well whenever we choose the relative prices or the relative labour productivity 
to form the basis of our tests. Finally, we find out that equation (I) of the extended 
Asea and Mendoza (1994) model is a good representation of the Chinese 
B alassa-Samuelson effect. 
The thesis is organized, as follows: Part I is the introduction part, which involves the 
economics of the black market exchange rate in developing countries. At the same 
time, we discuss the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the general equilibrium model that 
will motivate our empirical tests in Part III. Part II is the part for data discussion. 
Part III is the empirical evidence part, which explains the results from examining the 
long-run relationship between the two exchange rates, from testing the size of, and 
modelling the Chinese Balassa-Samuelson effect. Part IV concludes. 
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Chapter 2 	The Economics of the Black Market 
Exchange Rates in Developing Countries 
2.1 	The emergence of the black market in developing countries 
When foreign exchange control takes place the foreign exchange black market would 
inevitably develop. When a central bank is unable to meet all the demand for 
foreign currencies at its official exchange rate, those whose demand is price inelastic 
would accept a price higher than the official rate, which, in turn, generates the 
incentive for foreign exchange holders to sell on the black market rather than to the 
bank, as long as the costs of being caught are not prohibitive (Nowak 1985). The 
demand for foreign exchange in the black market mainly comes from uses which the 
controls are trying to restrict whereas the supply of the foreign exchange mainly 
comes from sources of foreign exchange where evasion of the law is easier (Nowak 
1985). 
According to Kiguel and O'Connell (1994), the typical pattern is 'one where the 
economy faces a gradual worsening in the balance of payments (BOP) as a result of 
expansive monetary and fiscal policies that raise inflation and lead to overvaluation of 
the official exchange rate. As the government fails to correct this imbalance through 
a tightening of macroeconomic policies or devaluations of the official rate, it is forced 
to increase restrictions on the private sector's access to foreign exchange at the 
official exchange rate.' In what follows we use the IS/LM approach to illustrate such 
a distinctive pattern. 
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Imagine that an expansionary fiscal policy aimed at support ambitious economic 
development programs cause the IS schedule and thus the aggregate demand (AD) 
function to shift to the right. 
Firms, as they attempt to increase output after demand is stimulated, will face higher 
costs. With these higher costs, the marginal cost (MC) of individual firms rise — and 
given that the MC function of a firm is, effectively, its supply curve, on aggregate the 
supply function in the economy, namely the short run aggregate supply function 
(SAS), begins to shift to the left. Thus, just as the classical or neo-classical school of 
thoughts predicts, stimulating demand will cause inflation. 
The outward shift of the IS schedule causes a rise in the real interest rate, which is 
above the world level, inducing massive capital inflow into the economy, as foreign 
citizens seek to move their wealth to the domestic economy to take advantage of the 
higher rate of return. 
The excess demand for local currency causes the currency to appreciate, which means 
that goods abroad have become less expensive relative to goods at home country. 
This dampens foreigners' demand for exports while simultaneously the demand for 
imports will increase, as they are now relatively cheaper. 
At the same time, higher domestic prices would also drive exports down and raise 
imports. 
Consequently the economy will incur a BOP deficit as the payment made for imports 
exceeds the payment received from exports. 
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As local people want to buy more foreign goods or services, there is an increase in 
domestic demand for foreign currency. Since local people are paying local currency 
for this foreign currency, the supply of local currency in the international market 
would increase. 
The Central Bank is committed to buy back the excess supply of domestic currency at 
some fixed rate, and will begin to run down its foreign reserves. 
Doing so indefinitely will lead to a foreign reserves crisis, as the rising demand for 
import (and so the foreign currency) will continue so long as the currency is 
overvalued and/or inflation persists. 
The nation could devalue — which would boost competitiveness and hence exports, 
and cause the IS to shift to the right. As we illustrated above, however, the attempt 
to increase output would cause inflation. Devaluation may have unpalatable 
consequences for inflation or real wages that governments would like to minimize 
(although such concern is not necessarily warranted). It may not be politically 
acceptable, as Harold Wilson discovered in 1967 and John Major in 1992. 
To avoid being forced to devalue the currency — the government may be forced to 
reverse its initial fiscal stance — i.e. it has to reduce income to a level where the 
economy once again has a balance of payments which is in equilibrium. 
However, when a nation fails to do so it is forced to increase restrictions on the 
private sector's access to foreign exchange at the official exchange rate. In fact, for 
many developing countries foreign exchange controls may appear to 'provide a 
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solution which has immediate and direct effects on BOPs and is less troublesome in 
terms of its social and economic costs... even though controls do nothing to address 
the underlying cause of external imbalances' (Nowak 1985). 
2.2 	The determinants of the black market exchange rates 
The black market for foreign exchange has been analyzed from a number of different 
perspectives. In this section, we first examine the real trade model of the black 
market, and then focus on the portfolio-balance approach and monetary approach, and 
finally discuss the Kamin (1993) non-monetary model, which will motivate our 
empirical work. 
2.2.1 	Real Trade Model 
The real trade model emphasizes 'the impact of high trade taxes on smuggling 
activities and illegal currency transactions' (Agenor, 1992). An economic agent will 
deal in foreign currency for illegal imports if the import tariff is so high that he has to 
purchase foreign exchange at a premium in the parallel market (de Macedo 1987; 
Branson and de Macedo, 1989). However, such a model assumes that the only 
reason to demand foreign currency is to buy illegal imports and so discounts the 
portfolio motive that has been identified as a critical contributor to the demand for 
foreign currency (Agenor, 1992). 
2.2.2 	The Portfolio-Balance Model 
The typical feature of the portfolio-balance model is that the parallel premium is 
determined by the portfolio conditions in short-run and by the trade conditions in 
long-run. The portfolio conditions refer to real money balances and official interest 
rates parity deviation. According to the model, the black market premium will rise if 
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there is an unexpected expansion in the money supply. An increase in the interest 
parity differential in favour of the foreign assets raises the premium in the short-run. 
The trade conditions refer to the real official exchange rates, terms of trade, export tax 
trade, and import tariff rate. The model implies that a real appreciation of the 
official exchange rate or a tightening of import restrictions raises the premium in 
long- run (Kiguel and O'Connell, 1994). 
Overall the Portfolio-Balance Models are well confirmed by real world data (Kiguel 
and O'Connell, 1994). Phylaktis (1996) concludes that 'the depreciation adjusted 
interest rate differential, as well as the intensity of capital restrictions in the case of 
Chile, and the dollar value of local assets valued at the official rate, are found to affect 
the short-run behaviour of the premium, whereas the real exchange rate is found to 
affect the long-run behaviour of the premium.' Ghei and Kiguel (1992) find that the 
portfolio variables and the real exchange rate explain a large degree of the variability 
in the premium. 
However, according to Phylaktis (1996), the model might not be applicable for 
countries where access to credit is controlled. Yin and Stoever (1994) applied the 
model to China over 1975 to 1992 by incorporating three additional dummy variables 
in order to find out the effect of government interventions on the black market. Data 
partially confirm the model that the black market premium is inversely related to the 
real official exchange rate. Data also suggest that the government policy is 
significantly related to major changes in the black market premium. However, 
interest rate differential is found statistically insignificant, effectively violating the 
model. Such a result suggests that interest rate arbitrage is not a major motivation 
for the Chinese black market. 
19 
Jianping (1998) attempts to model the real black market rate as a function of the 
difference between Ml/nominal GNP ratio of China and US, real interest rate 
differential between China and US, and asset adjustments. All three variables are 
found to be statistically significant and only the asset adjustments variable is found 
negatively correlated with the real black market rate. Other variables, such as the 
balance of trade, do not explain the Chinese black market rate. The technical 
problem for Jianping (1998) again lies in the fact that the cointegration tests were not 
performed and so we cannot know whether a valid ECM exists and consequently 
whether the spurious regression problems might occur. 
2.2.3 	The Monetary Model 
According to Blejer (1978), the black market exchange rates are determined by the 
market equilibrium. The demand for the black market foreign currency is positively 
related to the expected rate of appreciation of the foreign currency in the black market. 
The supply of foreign currency to the black market is the determined by the 
differential between the official and parallel rates. The resulting equilibrium 
condition generates a premium that is a function of the differential between the 
domestic and foreign prices. 
A weakness of the monetary approach, according to Phylaktis (1996), is that 'the 
public buy foreign exchange on the black market for the purpose of altering their 
portfolio of financial assets and not for the purpose of buying commodities.' 
The importance of the monetary factors on the behaviour of the black market rate has 
been confirmed by several empirical studies. For example, Phylaktis and Girardin 
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(2001) test the monetary model under the reasonable assumption of no 
interest-bearing assets in China. They go beyond the model by incorporating the 
relative money supply, the relative inflation, Chinese output and US output as 
additional explanatory variables. The black market exchange rate is found to be 
positively related to the market swap rate, relative money supply and US output and 
negatively related to the Chinese output. Relative inflation, however, is found not 
affecting the black market rate in long-run, effectively violating the Blejer (1978) 
model. 
2.2.4 	Kamin (1993) Model 
Kamin (1993) proposes the model of the demand for black market currency, which is 
a derived demand for imported goods. We consider it appropriate in analyzing the 
Chinese black market exchange rate dynamics, because in China, the demand for 
black dollars largely comes from the purchasing of raw materials from abroad by the 
industry due to foreign exchange control. 
The basic set-up of the Kamin (1993) model is, as follows: Producer employs both 
labour and intermediate inputs that must be imported to produce the final goods. Let 
D denote the quantity demanded for imported goods, N denote the quantity of the 
goods produced, PN denote the price of the goods, eb denote the nominal black market 
exchange rate. Arbitrage ensures that the price of the import will be the same, and 
equal to its marginal cost, the black market rate eb. The demand for imports or 
dollars is derived from maximizing producers' profit subject to the 
constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function: 
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Max: 	PN N — eb D — PN L 
s.t. 	N = Da Ll-a 	(0<a <1) 
Then: D = [a / (1-a )] "N (eb / PN) a-1 , (aDtaEb < o, where Eb=eb i PN) 
log Db = bo + log N + b1 log eb -131 log PN 
where 1)0 = (1-a ) log [a / (1-a )]; bi = a — 1. 
This demand equation indicates that a real black market depreciation causes a 
substitution toward increased labour used and hence reduces the demand for dollars 
(Kamin 1993). 
On the other hand, since the major determinant of supply of dollars to the black 
market is the differential between the official and black market rate, thus, the supply 
function of foreign exchange to the black market is: 
log Sb = azi + a1 (log eb - log e0) 
where: eb is the black market exchange rate; 
eo is the official exchange rate. 
Equating demand to supply yields: 
ao + a1 (log eb - log eo) = bo + log N + bi log eb - b1  log PN. 
Rearrange we have: 
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log eb = P1 + P2 log eo + 133 log N + f34 log PN, 
where: pi =(bo — ao) /(at- bi); 
132 = 	/ (al - bi); 
03.1/ (al - b1); 
134=b1 (bl - ai); 
P2+134= 1. 
To enrich our dynamics, we incorporate some additional explanatory variables, 
including US interest rate, and real consumption expenditure (see Data 6.1). When 
US raises interest rate and hence savings, there will be less supply of dollars in the 
international market. This would cause the Chinese black market rate for dollars to 
appreciate. During our sample period, there were lots of Friendship Stores in China, 
especially in big cities, where people could purchase imported cigarettes, wines and 
electronic appliances etc. using foreign currencies. This is due to the nation's 
liberalizing economic policies and rising incomes (and so rising demand for foreign 
goods). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that consumption expenditure has an 
impact on the black market rate. 
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Chapter 3 	Real exchange rate and the Balassa-Samuelson 
Effect 
3.1 	Real exchange rate 
We assume that the world consists of two countries, foreign (China) and domestic 
(US), where consumers only consume two goods, the tradable goods (T) and the 
non-tradable ones (NT). We also assume that the price equation is characterized by 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function, which takes the form of: 
( p y-a 
P = P7'a PN1-cr  = Pi r PT  
- T 
where consumers spend a share a of their income on T goods and a share (1-a) on N 
goods. 
If we define the nominal exchange rate E as the number of units of foreign currency 
per unit of domestic currency (e.g. E = 8.70 RMB / USD) the real exchange rate e 
reads as 
EP * 	P*  





( P N )-a 
PT i  
where * represent the domestic country (US). 
Thus the real exchange rates depend on the real exchange rates for tradable goods 
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EP * 	 P (—IL.), the relative price of non-tradables for foreign country (-2-1- ), and the 
PT 
relative price of non-tradables for domestic country ( 
The real exchange rate measures a country's competitiveness in international trade. 
A fall in the real exchange rate, in other words, a real appreciation of the RMB, 
means that the domestic (US) goods have become less expensive relative to goods 
from foreign country (China). This implies that people in US are now likely to 
start buying less Chinese goods as they have become relatively more expensive to 
them. China has decreased its competitiveness. On the other hand, a rise in the real 
exchange rate or a real depreciation of the RMB means that China has increased its 
competitiveness, because goods abroad have become more expensive relative to 
goods in China, so that the US demand for Chinese exports increases. 
3.2 	The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis 
The main proposition of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is that high productivity 
growth of the tradable sector comparing to the non-tradable sector leads to a rise in the 
relative price of non-tradable, which puts upward pressure on a country's real 
exchange rate. 
The intuition is straightforward. An increase in productivity of the tradable sector 
leads to an increase in the wage rate in the tradable sector. Seeing higher wages in 
the tradable sector, labour move from the non-tradable sector to the tradable 
sector. This increases the supply of the tradable goods in the market and 
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consequently drives down the tradable prices. On the other hand, the supply of the 
non-tradable goods would shrink because of the decrease in labour supply in that 
sector. So the non-tradable prices would go up. As a result, the relative prices of 
non-tradables would increase. Recall that the real exchange rate expression is a 
ratio between the two countries' relative prices of non-tradables, having assumed 
that the PPP holds for the tradables. Thus, when an increase in the relative prices 
of non-tradables in country A is higher than that in country B, the real exchange rate 
of country A relative to B would appreciate. 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect has been illustrated in various different forms among 
which we choose the Kravis, Heston, and Summer (1983) approach as a formal 
statement of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
Kravis, Heston, and Summer (1983) assume that the world consists of two countries, 
the rich and the poor. Each of them uses only labour to produce two goods, the 
tradable goods T and the non-tradable ones N. We use the lower case and upper 
case letters to denote the poor and rich country respectively. Thus the production 
function reads as: 
qT = k T1T  
q N =k"1" 
QT = VI: 
QN = KAI" 
where 
q (Q) is the quantity of the goods produced; 
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k (K) is the average (and marginal) products of labour; 
1(L) is the flow of labour hours. 
Thus, the non-tradable price of the poor country pN is defined as the profits from 
selling those goods divided by the quantity of the goods: 
1w N  pN = —IIN (1+ II) 
where 
w is the wage rate; 
,u is the markup. 
Then 
1N w  
P N = 	(1+,u) k N 1N  
w = 	(1+ id) 
k N  
By the same reasoning, 
PN = W (1+,u) 
K N  
To express poor country's prices in rich country's currency by conversion at the 
exchange rate XR, we have: 
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P N  . w(1+ ,u) 
XR k N XR 
N P 
XR 
Divide — by P N yields 
N P 	w(1+ ,u) 
XR _,  k N XR  
PN 	W (1+ ,u) 
K N  
we 
= 
k N XRW 
Since labor is paid its marginal product under the assumption of perfectly 
competitive labor market where price equals marginal cost, and the wage level in T 
w 
sector determines wages in both sectors, we have —XI? — kT  
W 	K T . 
Thus we have 
N P 
XR . K N kT  
P N k N K T  
Productivity differential is greater in the production of the tradables than that in the 
production of the non-tradables: 
KT > K N  
kT k N  
Thus: 
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P N < p N 
XR 
Finally, because the price of tradables of the poor country is assumed to be the same 
as that of the rich country, and the non-tradable prices are much lower in a poor 
country than in rich countries (Kravis, Heston, and Summer, 1983), this implies a 
tendency for the ratio of the non-tradable to the tradable price to increase with the 
N P 




What Kravis, Heston, and Summer (1983) has obtained from above derivation are, 
as follows: 	That international productivity differentials are greater in the 
production of tradable goods than non-tradable goods allows one to derive the 
proposition that the relative price of non-tradable goods tends to rise in fast growing 
economies. Suppose the economy consists of two countries with high and low 
level of productivity respectively. Under the assumption that labour is paid its 
marginal revenue products and that the internal mobility of labour equalizes the 
wages in two sectors within each country, inter-country wage differences will 
correspond to productivity differentials in the sector of traded goods, if the wage 
level in the tradable sector determines the wage rate in both sectors. 
If we further assume that international differences in productivity are greater in the 
sector of traded goods than in the non-traded goods, we could obtain a proposition 
that the price of non-traded goods is in line with the level of productivity, for 
example, it is lower in country with low level of productivity than in the other. 
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Since we assume that prices of traded goods are equalized in the two countries 
through international exchange, the lower price of non-traded goods in the country 
with low productivity implies a higher relative price of non-traded goods in the 
country with high level of productivity than in the other. Thus the real exchange 
rate of the country with high productivity level will appear to be overvalued. 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect is strictly established on a set of assumptions, for 
example, perfect international mobility of capital stock, PPP holds for traded goods, 
perfect mobility of domestic labour market, etc. However, they are often 
inconsistent with the real world situation. For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
argue that the imperfect international mobility of capital stock would cause the 
demand side of the economy to influence the real exchange rates (whereas 
Balassa-Samuelson effect supports the view that the supply side of the economy, i.e. 
the production function, causes the change in the real exchange rates). Kravis 
(1982) argues that in some less developed countries the PPP for traded goods often 
does not hold. 
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Chapter 4 	Literature Review of the Balassa-Samuelson 
Effect 
Since the thesis is mainly concerned with the tests on the size of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect for the Chinese real exchange rates, previous literatures on 
productivity-based models of the real exchange rates and the econometric methods 
involved in testing the model are the two major topics of the literature review. 
4.1 	Models and Empirical Results 
Previous analysis of productivity-based models of the real exchange rates can be 
broken into three major groups. 
The first group focuses on the link between the relative prices of non-tradables and 
the relative productivities in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 	High 
productivity growth of the tradable sector comparing to the non-tradable sector leads 
to a rise in the relative price of non-tradables (see p.26-27 for the intuition behind 
this proposition). 
The second group starts from the definition of the real exchange rates we described 
in Chapter 3. So the log foreign price equation is: 
Pt = (1—a)PtT + aPtN, 
and the log domestic price equation is: 
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Pt* = (1-13)13tT* NNW 
Thus, the log real exchange rate expression, assuming PPP holds for tradable goods, 
reads as: 
qt = st + pt*— Pt 
= _cit(ptN — pt.r) oc(ptN*_ pt.r*) 	(assuming a= (3) 
How the Balassa-Samuelson works through the price effect is as follows. The 
main proposition of the B-S effect is that high productivity growth of the tradable 
sector comparing to the non-tradable sector leads to a rise in the relative price of 
non-tradables (see p.26-27 for the intuition behind this proposition). Recall that the 
real exchange rate expression, which is a ratio between the two countries' relative 
prices of non-tradable goods (see p.25-26), having assumed that the PPP holds for 
tradable goods. Then, when an increase in the relative prices in country A is higher 
than that in country B, the real exchange rate of country A relative to B will 
appreciate. 
The third groups adopts the Asea and Corden (1994) productivity approach in which 
case 
qt =a1(01‘1*/0T*)atT*—  atN* )] — a[(eNiorr)atT_ atN), 
—a(atT — atN) + a(atT* — atN*) (assume Os are same) 
where 0 is the labour coefficient in a Cobb-Douglas production function and a is 
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log-total factor productivity. 
Different from the above price approach to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, such an 
illustration of the Balassa-Samuelson effect starts from the assumption such that the 
international differences in productivity are greater in the sector of tradable goods 
than in the non-tradable goods, which in turn generates a proposition that the price 
of non-tradable goods is in line with the level of productivity, for example, it is 
lower in country with low level of productivity than in the other (Kravis, Heston and 
Summer 1983). Since we assume that prices of tradable goods are equalized in the 
two countries, the lower price of non-tradable goods in the country with low 
productivity implies a higher relative price of non-tradable goods in the country with 
high level of productivity than in the other (Kravis, Heston and Summer 1983). 
Thus the real exchange rate of the country with high productivity level will appear to 
be overvalued. 
All three regression equations have been exploited extensively. The first approach has 
been examined by Canzoneri (1999), Drine and Rault (2002), and various other studies. 
The second model has been examined by Chinn (2000), Kakkar Vikas and Masao 
Ogaki (1994), etc. The third approach5 has been estimated by Drine and Rault (2003), 
Marston (1990), Micossi and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Strauss (1995), etc. 
Canzoneri (1999) regresses the relative prices of non-tradables on relative 
productivities in the traded and non-traded sectors. Regression evidence from a panel 
of 13 OECD countries suggests that the two variables are cointegrated and that the 
5 Chinn (1996) has provided us an extensive review of the empirical literature on the basis of the 
third approach (see Chinn, 1996, p 4-5). 
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slope of the cointegrating relationship is generally close to 1.0. 	Thus the 
Balassa-Samuelson model well explains the behaviour of the real exchange rates. 
Drine and Rault (2002) estimate the same regression equation for 6 Asian countries, 
namely, India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, from 1983 
to 1998. The expected positive long run relationship between relative prices of 
non-traded goods and productivity differentials is rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. 
According to Chinn (2000) who focuses on China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, and the US, for the period 1970 to 1992, 
`Regressing the real exchange rate on relative price indicates a role for relative prices 
for Indonesia, Japan and Korea. When examining real exchange rates and relative 
productivity differentials, one finds a relationship for Japan, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines.' 
Drine and Rault (2003) also examine the real exchange rate-productivity differential 
relationship using annual data for 20 Latin American countries. The standard time 
series approach rejects the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis for 11 countries out of 20; 
whereas the panel cointegration test confirms the hypothesis for all Latin American 
countries. 
In Marston (1990) the same equation is estimated over the cross section of eleven 
sectors of manufacturing. There are five equations. In the first four equations, the 
United States is compared with other G-5 countries, while in the last equation France is 
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compared with Germany. In each case, the coefficient of the productivity growth term 
is insignificantly different from -1 at the 5% level of significance and is much higher. 
Micossi and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) regress not only the multilateral real exchange rates 
on the productivity growth differentials but also the real exchange rates measured with 
unit labour costs in manufacturing. They find that all the coefficients have the 
expected negative sign except the case of Denmark where productivity differentials do 
not explain the different behaviour of the two real exchange rate indicators. 
Strauss (1995) estimates a cointegrating relationship between the real exchange rate 
and relative productivity for a group of 14 OECD countries with Deutschemark as the 
benchmark. He finds that eight cases are cointegrated at the 10% marginal 
significance level. However, parameter estimates obtained from the Johansen (1988) 
cointegration procedure are not reported, so it is difficult to evaluate the conformity of 
the results with the Balassa-Samuelson model. 
4.2 	Econometric Methods 
Previous econometric methods used to test the size of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
can be broadly classified into two groups. The first group adopts the time series 
regression technique whereas the second group uses the cross-sectional one. 
The strand of literature using time series data includes Hsieh (1982), 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1992), Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1996) and DeLoach (2001). 
Hsieh (1982) argues that one problem with cross-sectional technique is that they do 
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not account for country-specific factors (e.g. tastes that are different across 
countries). When differences in those country-specific factors are large, 
cross-sectional regression leads to poor performance. On the basis of the 
alternative OLS and IV regression, Hsieh (1982) suggests a more favourable 
confirmation of the productivity differential model and so concludes that the time 
series regression is able to explain the variation of the real exchange rate better than 
cross-section regression. 
Likewise, Bahmani-Oskooee (1992) argues that among the time series studies there 
is general support for the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. He employs the 
Engle-Granger cointegration analysis and estimates the productivity differential 
model for six countries. The results show that the real exchange rate and the 
productivity ratio are cointegrated in three of the six countries. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1996) adopts the same model to estimate the 
determinants of the multilateral exchange rates for Korea using the maximum 
likelihood estimation. The results show that in all cases the deviation of PPP from 
the equilibrium exchange rate cointegrate with the relative productivity, supporting 
the Balassa-Samuelson notion. 
DeLoach (2001) again uses the Johansen cointegration technique and provides 
additional confirmation of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
Another strand of literature argues that conventional time series cointegration tests 
have low power against stationarity alternatives in small samples (Drine and Rault 
2003). A good way of improving the power of those tests is by introducing cross- 
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section variation (Drine and Rault, 2002). However, unlike the time series 
regression case, empirical results from cross-sectional regression are mixed. They 
differ by samples and other specifications. 
Officer (1976) estimates the same equation as Hsieh (1982) does. The model is 
estimated for each year from 1950 to 1973 using cross-sectional data from 15 
industrial countries. In none of these years does Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
receive empirical support - productivity differential does not explain much of the 
variation of the real exchange rates across countries. 
Drine and Rault (2003) adopt both the panel cointegration tests (Pedroni, 1995) and 
the Johansen (1988) cointegration tests. Results from the panel tests suggests that 
for all 20 countries under consideration, the long-run relationship between real 
exchange rate and per capita GDP is largely confirmed, and also all coefficients have 
the expected sign in all cases. However, results generated by the time series tests 
show that for 11 out of 20 countries, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot 
be rejected at a 5% level of significance. 
According to Chinn (2000), 'panel regression results are slightly more supportive of 
a relative price view of real exchange rate' as opposed to the time series regression 
results based on his study on a panel of Asia pacific countries for the period 
1970-1992. 
Based on Pedroni (1995) panel cointegration tests and Pedroni (1996) fully modified 
OLS estimation on heterogeneous panels, Canzoneri (1999) is able to provide 
evidence from a panel of 13 OECD countries such that the relative prices of 
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non-traded goods reflect the relative labour productivities in the traded and 
non-traded sectors. 
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Chapter 5 The Balassa-Samuelson Effect: A General 
Equilibrium Approach 
The main theoretical framework on which we base our empirical work on the 
Chinese real exchange rates is the two-country and two-sector general equilibrium 
type of analysis proposed first by Asea and Mendoza (1994). Because Asea and 
Mendoza (1994) model focuses on the long-run balanced growth equilibrium and 
examines the equilibrium prices on the steady state, it implicitly assumes that shocks 
to technologies, and so, the '114Ps, are identical across sectors at the steady state. 
As a result, in the closed-form solutions of the relative prices, the random 
disturbances to technologies of the two sectors cancel each other out. We argue 
that shocks to technologies, and so the TFPs, are heterogeneous across the two 
sectors in real world situation; it is not always necessary to assume a deterministic 
stationary state of the model. In what follows we extend the Asea and Mendoza 
(1994) model on the basis of these relaxed assumptions. In Chapter 8, we are able 
to test the Asea and Mendoza (1994) model restriction that the ItTs are 
homogeneous across sectors, especially to reject it. This justifies our extensions to 
their model. 
5.1 The Households 
5.1.1 Infinitely lived consumers maximize their discounted sum of the 
expected utility 
We assume that the economy consists of infinitely lived consumers, who maximize 
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their discounted sum of the expected utility 
00 
Cr ,C7 ,Lt 
Max 	E[EB` LI (CT ,C7 , Lt)], 	 (1) 
t=o 
where 
U(CT,C7, Lt) is the instantaneous utility; 
Cl and C7 are the consumption expenditures on traded and non-traded goods 
respectively; 
Lt is the flow of leisure hours; 
B = 	is the discount factor whereas p is the subjective discount rate. 
1+ p 
5.1.2 	Special forms of the instantaneous utility function U(C,T ,C7, Lt) 
The instantaneous utility function  
The instantaneous utility function U(CT,C,N ,Lt) has the form of the 
constant-intertemporal-elasticity-of-substitution (or constant-relative-risk-aversion) 
in which case the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility is constant. It is 
assumed log linear in its two arguments: 
U (CT , C 7 , Li) 
= ln U(CT , C7) + co ln L, 
= ln[U(CT, C7 )41 , 	 (2) 
where 
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CO is the elasticity of leisure. 
The CES utility function 
The utility function U(CT,CY ) has the form of constant-elasticity-of substitution, 
which means the elasticity of substitution El cr ,c, between the two types of 
consumption is constant: 
U (CT , C,N ) = [g2(C,T )-# + (1— g2)(CtN )-P ] 	 (3) 
where 
1.t>1, 1100, El T 	=1+ • c c  
S2 is the share of the composite consumption and 042<1. 
The specifications of the utility function (2) and (3) allow us to obtain some specific 
form of the instantaneous utility function: 
U (CT , 	Lt) = {[K2(C,T 	+ (1— 52)(C 
r Lt.  11-,  
1—o' 
where 
a >0 is the inverse of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution. 
5.2 	The Firms 
(4) 
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5.2.1 	TFP and a specific form of the production function 
Suppose that there are two industries in the economy, each containing a large 
number of homogeneous profit-maximizing firms, producing goods T and N subject 
to the constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production functions: 
YT 
= F (KT 	= 0,T (KT )i-crT (N tT )ar 
Ye N = F v , v 	191,1 (K7 )1—aN (N7 )a" 
where 
= T ,N) is the total factor productivity (TFP); 
K: (i = T, N) is the flow of machine hours; 
N: (i = T, N) is the flow of labour hours; 
ait (i = T, N) is the labour shares. 
We assume that technology is subject to random disturbances A; (i = T, N) which (in 
natural logarithm) follow a stationary AR(1) process with a white noise error term. 
We also know that for the economy to have a steady state with constant growth rate 
technology progress must take the labour-augmenting form (Solow, 1963). Hence 
we define the TFP in the following way 
BT  = AT (XT 
	
(5) 




X: (i = T, N) is an index of technology 
such that the production function can thus be incorporated with the 
labour-augmenting technological progress: 
YT = F (KT , )= AT (KT )1-"T (XT )ar 
	
(7) 
YIN = F (K7 , N ) = Ar N (K7 )1-aN (X7 NinaN 
	
(8) 
5.2.2 	Positive marginal product and diminishing marginal productivity 
We assume positive marginal product and diminishing marginal productivity. This 
enables us to conclude that a competitive and profit-maximizing firm would 
continue to hire factor inputs until the marginal product falls to the extent where 
extra revenue equals the costs. That is: 
Pe` MPKi = R: ,(i = T , N) , 
where 
R: (i = T, N) is the rental rate of capital. 
Pi i MPE 	,(i =T,N), 
where 
= T ,N) is the nominal wage rate. 
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Hence we have the following four optimality conditions: 
rT = (KT , ) 
wtr = f2 (KT , 	) 
riN = (KiN , 
WN = f, (Icy , NY) 
RT (-4 	MPICT pt
T 
 
"T  = MP et  PT  
RtN = MPK pNi  
N w t = mpLIN  
<-4 pt Al 
where 
i 	• r 	= T, N) is the real interest rate; 
= T, N) is the real wage. 
5.2.3 	Extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model — equation (I) 
We assume that labour is perfectly mobile across sectors. This ensures that the 
nominal wage rates would be identical in two sectors, i.e. WT = w 
So 
PT  MPL7,. = PN MPIIN . 
Thus: 
Pi N _ N Wet 
PT 
Pt MPLN , 





AN (K y )1-aN (x tAT )aN aN(Ary )aN-i 
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YT 
a T NT 
Y N 
a 	 N N N 
Given that the production function is: 




(ytT )ar (AtT )ar (KT ar (xtTNT
),  
which is equivalent to 
1-ar 	1 	1-ar 
YT 
	
(YT) crT 	(AT )aT (KT)ar (XT N T 
Hence 
1 KT  "T 
T 
=(f 
) (—t-- ) al. X
T 
 • 
N T 	 T 	1 
Similarly, 
N 1-aN 
Y" 	Na K a X N 
i = (1611 	N 	N  yN 








aT (ArT  Yfr X T ()c(1.  f yT 
 
KT  
a7.(9,T )ar ()ar yi T 
(12) N 1-aN 
K — aN(AN )aN X N (-1—) aN yi N 
  
 
aN (19 N YN (--1—) aN t 	yi N 
 
The relative price expression we obtain here is an extended version from equation 
(27) in Asea and Mendoza (1994) since we explicitly assume that shocks to 
technologies are the heterogeneous across the two sectors and so they do not cancel 
each other out in those closed-form solutions for the relative prices of non-tradables. 
We then transform equation (12) into a regression equation. Taking natural 
logarithm of both sides of the equation (12) we obtain: 
lnpN= In cei. + 1  In OtT +1- aT ln( 
T 
 - in aN 1  ln 	1—a" 	 ln(-1—KN ) 
aT aT Yt 	 aN aN Y N  I 
K N 
= (ln cr7. — ln aN ) +(-1  1n BT 1 — —ln OfN  ) + 1—a T 	 ln(
KT 1—a 
T ) 	N ln(--1—) (13) 
aT aN aT 
yi a N yi N 
The cross-section regression equation is then: 
	
K T 	K" 
In 	= 	+ 	+ 82 1n )+8 1nOT +5 1nO N + e (); T Y N 	3 	 Jr 	4 	 jt 	 jt i it 	 it 
(I) 
(j = 1, 	N, t = 1, 	T) 
Since labour productivity is a monotonic transformation of the capital-output ratio 
(see equation 10 and 11), the relative price of non-tradables is in line with the labour 
productivity in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector (Asea and 
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T 
Mendoza, 1994). As a result, the coefficient on 	) needs to be positive, and 
17.0 
K N. 
the coefficient on ln( ft-) needs to be negative, if the Balassa-Samuelson effect6 y .N 
holds. Usually we restrict 83 =- 4, and then we say that the coefficient on 
(In O — In /97,) needs to be positive if the Balassa-Samuelson effect holds. An 
alternative way to test if the theory holds is to run regression equation (I) directly. 
The theory requires 83 to be positive and 64 to be negative. 
5.3 The Budget Constraint 
In the absence of the government sector, the representative household's consumption 
expenditures are financed by the value of total output minus investment plus net 
foreign assets. In other words, the budget constraint of the household is given by 
piT tT + PNCN  





) i — rRtbi+1+ b, (Asea and Mendoza, 1994) 
where 
b is the net foreign assets accumulated by the household; 
R is the inverse of the real gross rate of return paid on international bonds. 
Output 
According to the Euler's Theorem, if the production function has constant returns to 
6 According to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, a faster increase of tradable sector productivity relative 
to the non-tradable sector productivity leads to an increase in relative prices of the non-tradables. 
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scale, then the sum of factor payments equals total output. In addition, since 
capital is the only mobile factor input across borders, the total real returns paid to the 
households includes the ones on the stock of capital in the foreign tradable sector. 
That is, 
YT 
= wiT N IT ± riT KtH + rt 
where 
H and F refers to home country and foreign country, * refers to foreign country. 
So: 
PT 
TytT = wiT A T iT + riT KtH ±rtT* KtF , 
as we assume that the price of the tradables is one. 
For the non-tradable sector, the production function reads as: 
ytiv = w7N7 ÷ r N K N .  
So: 
Fr yt ISI = pr N wiN N IN 
+1'K7. 
Investment 
Investment is the change in the capital stock I. = ylc, —(l— S)K, , where y is the 
nominal interest rate, 6 is the depreciation rate. 
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Then: 
IT =[ricti+ti— (1— 8)1(7 ] + DiK ,F+1 — (1— 8)Kr l 
= PtT  IT , 
as we assume that the price of the tradables is one. 
17 = rK7+1 — (1— 8)1 C 7 
So 
Fr 17 = ye K7+1 — (1— 45)P,N K7 
The budget constraint 
As a result, the budget constraint of the households is given by: 
PrTcT +pNcy 
= (piT ytT _ ptT 1  tT )4_ (ptN KIV _ pth I 1  7 ) _ 7 Rik+i + 
=(riT Ktli + rtT* K 1 + ptIV TiN K  pr )+(wiT N  tT 4.  ptN wy N IN mriT K  tH + T.:Pk K IF + piN rrN icy )+( 
wtT N fT ± ptN wtN N IN ) _r (K  7+1+ K 1E+1+ ptIV K  y+i) + (1 _ 5)(K7 + 
Kr + piN K7 )  
_7(K7+1+ Kr+1+ piN K 7+1) + (1 — 8)(K tlf 4. Kr 4. ptN KV ) _ rgbi+1+1,1 
(Asea and Mendoza, 1994) 	(10) 
50 
5.4 Competitive Equilibrium 
5.4.1 	The households' maximization problem 
Households maximize the discounted sum of the expected utility 
Max 	E fi Br {[a(cr)--# + a - swc," pi i Air/ l'-a 1 
1=0 	 1- o 
subject to the budget constraint: 
Cr +P,Nctiv 
=( reT 1(7 + riT* Kr + ptN riN K y )+( wiT N 	iT + piN wtN N 7 ) 
_ruc1ll+1 + Kr+1+ piNK7+0 + (1 — 8)(K tli + Kr + nAr 
A-  
r, IN \ 
ri 	) —YRtbi+1 + k . 
The Lagrangean 
The Lagrangean is then: 
1 
L=E{±Bt {[Q(CT)-#  + (1— Q)(CiAr )- /1 I P Lt° rcr i 
t=0 	 1— Q 	 t=0 
At [cT + p,N cy 4 
rtT K ilf + rtr* K IF + IT V rtNK	7 x iviT N tr 	+ piN wtN N fill 1_ T 	 ) 
r(Kii,1,1 + KtF+1 + p,"Ki+1 )- 0 - (NC + Kr + p,"KtN) +rRek+i — kill 
The first order conditions 
The first order conditions are 
CT ,Cf l  ,Lt 
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aL  =o act'.  
E[B1 auo ] E(2,) = 0 . acr  




E[Bf —] E(22 P,N ) = 0 . ac() y 
aU(.) 	 2  pN 
acy B 
	
Denoting 	as U2(t), then U2(t) = 	. 
aL =o aLt  
auo 	a 	x7T _ 	ATNN = A.  4-> E[13' 	] — 2,(—w tT Pit 	wt Pit ) 
Since 
T 	 N T W T 	N Wt = 	=W =W Wt = N t piT 
Pt 
then 
wiN =wiN =WIT =W, 
acy 
52 
= _ w At 
 = —WW 
TA _ _wtNAt  
auo 	 2 Denoting 	as U3(t), then U3(t) = --LW . ai, 13, 
The market-clearing conditions  
As a result, the set of market-clearing conditions that Asea and Mendoza (1994)7 
obtain is, as follows: 
U1 (t) — 1 
U 2 (0 Pt" 
U 3(0 
 =W =WT _ 
wT 
U1(t) 
U  3(0_ W = wN 
U 2(0 Fr 	' 
f(K,N ,N,N ) -= Yi N =CtN + I IN =Cibi + rKels11 — (1— 8)K7 	 (17) 





f(K tiv*,N7*)=17,N*.ctiv* +17 *=CtN *+y* K7+1 *-(1-8)1CiN * 	(18) 
f (KT ,N tT).ytT =ctT ± itT =ctT +ric1 1 _ (1 _ o)KfT 
	
(19) 
f(KT *,NT*)=YtT *= CT *+ItT *=CT * + r*KfT+1*--(1-8)Kr* 
	
(20) 
Another set of market clearing conditions 
Another set of market clearing conditions, put forward by Asea and Mendoza 
(1994)8 , is illustrated as follows. On the basis of these general equilibrium 
conditions, it can be shown that the relative price equation (I) and (II) are the proper 
representations of the equilibrium prices8. 
L= EfE Bt U (C,T  , C7 ,Lt)- E 2  t { CT + pt N ctl ..( rtT KtH + rtT* KtF 4. ',t ill rtN K tN )_( wtT N IT 
1=0 	 1=0 
4_ pi N wiN N tN ) + y(KtH+1+ K  tF+1+ pt N K1N+1 ) - (1 _ 8)(Kili + K tF + pi N ..-
n
7 s -,- ) +yRibti -b, 'I 
al, acT =U i(cT , c 7 , Li ) - Ai =0 
aL 









BE[U t(CT+1 ,Ct".1,1 , 4,)] At+i 
Denoting Ul(C,T , C7, Li ) as U1(t) and U ?(C1T+1, C7+1, 4+1) as U1(t+1), then equation 
(23) becomes: 
U1(t) 	_ 
BE[Ui(t +1)] A+1  
(24) 
Differentiating L with respect to 4+1, K7+1 , Kr+1 , IC7+1 respectively yields the following 
results: 
at, =-A,yRt +2t+1 = 0. 
Then: 
/lir& = ilt+1 • 
Substituting (25) into (24) yields: 
yRtUi(t) = BE[U i(t +1)] . 
aL 
7 = At+ ri+.1 	r +0- gmt+, =0 . 
Then 








Substituting (27) into (24) yields: 
yUi(t) = BE[ 	+1)][r,T+1 + (1 — 8 )] • 
aL 	— 	r  A + (1— )2,+1 =o aKtF 	t r t+i — t +1 
Then: 
ilt+1[r,T+1*+(1  - 5)] = Ay • 
Substituting (29) into (24) yields: 
yUi(t) = BE[Ui(t +1)] [reT+1 * +(1— 8)] . 	 (30) 
aKtNil  
aL 	
/Li P1N rti4vi — Air P,N + — 	= 0 . 
Then: 
At+iPt'fli[rti+ (1— 8)] = AtPt N Y 
	
(31) 
Substituting (31) into (24) yields: 




5.5 The long run price of non-tradables 
5.5.1 	Extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model — equation (II) 
From (28) and (32), it follows that in a deterministic stationary equilibrium with 
perfect sectoral capital mobility, the marginal product of capital in the tradable and 
non-tradable sectors are equalized (Asea and Mendoza, 1994). 	That is, 
MPICT = MPKiN : 




P-T [AT (KT )1-"T (XT NT )01 
= AT (xTN )ar aT)(KT 
= ArT  (XT Ntr )aT a-CYT)(Kr )'-°T _r 
= (1- aT )Y,T  (KT 
= 	aT ) I  
By the same reasoning: 
MPK," = (1- aN ) KY IN    
Then MPKT = MPIC,N yields: 
1,
NN = (1-o)- (33) 
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Rearranging (33) we have: 
K7 ,(1—aN ) KT 
YtN 	(1 - aT) yT 
Then substituting (34) into (12) yields: 
N 
Pt — 
1 KT 1-ar  
aT  (OT r (-1-) ar  t 	ytT 
1-aN 	1-aN 
a N (0 iN )aN (1-  aN  ) a, f  KcT \-c-ri -v  
1— aT 	‘' ytT ) 
(34) 
1 — 	 aN-1 
—  aT (Oil. )
ar1 
 1. - a 
( 	" ) al./  
— 
a N ( 97 )6 
1- aT  
" 
1-cer 1-aN 
KT  - - -   t \ cer aN  
ytT , (35) 
Again, the expression we obtain here is an extended version of the relative prices of 
non-tradables (see Asea and Mendoza, 1994: p.251 for a comparison) due to our 
assumption on shocks to technology. 
We then transform equation (35) into a regression equation. Taking natural 
logarithms of both sides of the equation (35) we obtain: 
In AN = (ln aT  —lnaN ) + a" 	—1  [1n(1 — aN ) — Ina— aT )] +(-1 In OT — —1  ln 07) 
aN aT 	aN  
+(1—aT 1—a KT  N 	 ) ln() 
or 	aN 	Yt 
The regression equation is then: 
(36) 
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KT  't 2 	it 73 In O f, + e it In p = ro • + 1 ln() + ln OT  vT 
it 
K,T 
The expected sign of the coefficient on ln(=!-) is vague. However, according to vr 
Asea and Mendoza (1994), if we assume aT > a" then yi should be negative. 
Again, the theory requires 72 to be positive and 73 to be negative. 
5.5.2 	Extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model — equation (III) 
Investment is the change in the capital stock: I, 	l+l , where y is 
the nominal interest rate, .5 is the depreciation rate. At the steady-state, we have: 
K,+1 = Kt . Thus, I, = [y— (1— 8)]K„ at the steady-state. Hence we have the 
following expression: 
,T  






at steady state. 
Substituting (37) into (35) yields 
(37) 
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I T  1 
	
aN-1 	 I-ar 1-aN ar T \ cr7 1_ a N 7r_ T e - ‘-t-0t   N 	v t 	)ar aN a N ( B 
7) 
a N 1— aT 	y—(1-8) (38)  
It is an extended expression for the relative prices of non-tradables, again, based on 
our assumptions on technological shocks (see Asea and Mendoza, 1994, p.252 for a 
comparison). 
We then transform equation (38) into a regression equation. Taking natural 
logarithms of both sides of the equation (38) we obtain: 
In AN = (ln aT  — ln aN ) + aN 	—1  [Ina — aN )— Ina— aT  )] 
aN  
N 	 IT  (1—aT 1- a
N 	 )1n[r (1 a)] ±(
1 
 ln OT 1  ln 0, ) +(1- 
aT 1 - aN 	)1n(-2--) 
aT aN aT aN 	aT aN Y
T 
(39)  
The regression equation is then: 
/1.; 
In pi; =7101  +171 1 n 	) + 712 ln 	+ 77 3 I n OiNt + e ft 	 (III) 
T 
We do not know whether the coefficient on ln( 	is positive or negative. 
Jr 
However, according to Asea and Mendoza (1994), if we assume aT > aN then 
should be negative. Also, the theory requires 172 to be positive and 77 3 to be 
negative. In addition, if rh is indeed less than zero, then the absolute value of 772 
is less than that of rig . 
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5.6 The long run real exchange rates 
5.6.1 	Extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model — equation (V) when utility 
function is CES 
The representative household faces the constrained budget minimization problem for 
unit utility: 
1-.N c,N 




U ( ctT , c tN ).[Q,(ctT )
-
it 




N are the shares of one unit composite consumption (or utility); 
UC is the budget of the household for obtaining one unit of utility. 
The Lagrangean is: 
I, = PtT  CiT + PtN CtN +AI [S2(ctT )-P + (1 — Q)(c7 PI "-1} 
The first order conditions are 
_Li aL 
= 
DT +Ai 1.\__ c, Au( ; ) P + (1- a)(c7ril P 5/ (—,u)(cT IP-1 =0 
aCT 	1 t 	‘ 	 . t 






aL = ptN +2( —  1)[Q(CT )-'t+ (1— s2)(cy )- P ]i-1 a — ax—,u)(cd;')-P-1.0 
P 
1 	 ft-1 F;N = —2(--)[g(cT )-P + (1— n)(c/7)-Pi P (1— ax-pW)-Y-4 	(43) 
/1  
Thus: 
(42) . F;T _ E2 ( CT  
(43) Pi" — 1— E2 ` ;1 7-1  
Hence: 
P N El CT = c s1 [ 	' 	1P+1 :  PT (1— Q) 
and: 
cN _,= T PT  (1— M  1 
i 	
1±+1 
t 	pN g2 
Substituting (44) into (41) we have: 
iN yq Pt N  C2   ,t.-up 	
_1 
fg2(c 
PT  (1— S2) J
1 	







13 T (1- Q)
PtN 	+ (1— SZ)) P =1 , 
which is: 










-P 	Fr 	P 	 1 • 
[n(pN )1+# g-2,1+P ()DT )1+µ (1-,Z)1+µ (1-&-2)] p 
-p 
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator by RpiN )1+ # 	Q)1+# , p yields: 
1 
)1+11 (i_ 
CN 	  1 	# 	 1 	# _1 • 
[E21-Fil (pT )1+ii + 	 g2)1+# (pN )1+# # 
Similarly, substituting (45) into (41) we have: 
{(1-g2)( \-prPiT  E2) 
	
1 
1"-i I L  ptN 	
g2(c .ir 	} P =1 
Then: 
4'{ 	- w[Pir (1 - -  Q)]' 
 p 
PIN Q 	




Thu 	1 	p 	p 	_1 
Ct





Ct 	 -14 	1 	p 	p 	1 
[( PT )1 + p(1-1 1+p (pN )1+p Q1+p g2)] p 
p -p 1 




(pT )1+p n l+p 
C = 	  1 	p 	 1 	p 
[Ql+p (- pT )1+,14 + (1_ Q)1+p (- pN )1+p p 
(47) 
Substituting (46) and (47) into (40) we have: 
1 	 /4 	1 
IDN )1+,u (1-Q)1+,u ± (PT )1+p L-21+p 
UC = 	1t j 	p 	1 	p _1 
[1.-21+p (pT )1+0 + (1_1-2)1+p (p1+1 )1+p 1 p 
1 	,u 	 1 	p 1+,u 
=[Q1+,ti (pT )1+p + (1- g2)1+ (pN )1+,it p 
In the long-run perfect competitive equilibrium, the unit costs of obtaining the 
composite consumption goods should equal the price of the goods such that the no 
profits are made. Hence we have: 
1 	p 	 1 	p l+p 
p(pT pl Ar ) = [Q1+,u (PT )1+p + (1- g2)1+p (pN )1+,11 p 
P*  
We define the real exchange rate as et = E 	, where E is the nominal exchange 
Pt 
rate, * refers to the domestic country (e.g. US). Then we substitute the price 
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et = 	 p l+p 
[g-21+p 	g2)1+p ( piN )1+p p 
1 	 1 	p* l+p* 
[Q *1+ P* 	ga*)1+ P* (P71111 
p* 
equation into the real exchange rate expression and obtain: 
P*  
e = E 
I 	 pt 
1 	p* 	 1 	p* 1+p* 
[c2, *1+,u* (ptT *)1+,41* (1 — 	g2*)1+p* (ptN *)1+,u* 
— E 	1 	 1 	p 1+p 
[Q. 1+p (PT )1+P + g2)1+P (pN )1+14 j p 
	
mu* 1+,u* 	 l+p 
r( 
(PT *•
11+,u* p* v 	Nl+p 
Multiplying the numerator and denominator by 	1 -p* l+p* and 	I -p 1+p 
[(PT * )l+P* P* 	
[(pT )1+,u p 
respectively we obtain: 
1 	 1 
PT * [g2 *1+p* 
+0 1.2*)1+p. ( 
Per * 	1+ irk 
t 	-Fp* 
ptT * 
et = E 	  1 pN P l+p 
ptT [gal+p 4.  a 	( , 	 p  
PT 
We assume that the Law of One Price holds for tradable goods. This means that 
E PT 
T* 
=1. pt  
pN * 	 piN 
Denoting T * 	
* , 	• 	 as piN  ana tN P ptT as p  
Then: 
(Asea and Mendoza, 1994: p.252) (48) 
The equation demonstrates that the real exchange rate et is a function of the 
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relative price of non-tradables of the two countries. 
5.6.2 Extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model — equation (VI) when 
utility function is Cobb-Douglas 
•-•11,  Min UC = PT ctT  + vt ciN 
cr ,c,isi 	. 
subject to: 
u (c  tT , c  tN ) = (c, tT )S2 (c. 7 )1-51 = 1 
The Lagrangean is: 
L = PT c1 4. pt A I cy + 2[(cT )52 (c .7 )1-0 —11 
The first order conditions are: 
aL = 
acT t 	
p pT +2(cini-nsgcT -'=0 e 
piT = _2(c  1 V )1-0 of c,T \2-1 
\ t ) 
ar., N 	1.2 = Pt +2(ctT  ) (1— Q)(c,N  )-'' =0 
Pt" = —A(cT )Q  (1— 52)(c,N  )-Q  
Thus: 
(51) . PT _ gctN  








T N  PtN  c = c 
" PT (1— s2) 
and: 
N 	T P tT 	g2 )  Ct = Ct 	p 
Substituting (e) into (b) we have: 
N g2 
(c)°(--L--)Q ( 	 f(c N )l-Q =1. t 	ptT 
Then: 
c741 '1_,0 =1. PT )0,(1-52 
So: 
1 
C= 	 n 
	
( pr _ y (pt _T )-__n g2__ 	nyn • 




t 	(per rs-2 	 (55) &-ao 
Similarly substituting (54) into (50) we have: 
SI PIT Q 	C2 Q 	Q  =1. (C t
T  ) (-N )













(PT )1-52 (pN )51-1 (1- 01-52 520-1 
Multiplying both the numerator and denominator by (197f-1E21-Q , we have 
(pT )52-1 g21-52 
cT = 	  t 	(pN )52-1 a _ Q)1-52 
(56) 
Substituting (55) and (56) into (49), we have: 
UC = PT (PT P-1  21-g2  + pN (Pr i'l In (1 
 - g2 f 
t 	(pN )S2-1 a _ g2)1-52 	1 	( )Er )-S2 Q51 
= 	(pl.  )52 g-11-52 +  (pN )1-52 a_ 5 2)52 




= (pN )52-1(1_ 5e-52 (PT )-51 I-252 
_ (pN )1-s/  (1-  52f-1 (PT )52 5 2-52 
By the same reasoning, in perfect competitive equilibrium, the costs of obtaining 
one unit of the composite consumption goods should equal the price of the goods. 
Hence we have: 
p(pT , pt N ) = ( pN )1-52 (1 _ 0)52-1 (p1T )52 g2-52 
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We substitute this price equation into the real exchange rate expression e, = 
and obtain: 
P*  
e = E 
Pt 
= E 	t 
p N *)1-s2* (1— Q*)s-1*-1 (PT 12* 0-2*)-S1* 
)1-S2 (1_ g#2-1 (PT )51 c2-S-1 
PT * pN *)1-1-2* (1 — Q*)Q*-1 (PT *)52*-1 (g2*)-S2* — E  t PT (pt N )1-S2 (1 — g-2)52-1(PT )52-1 -52 
( PT  
* 
PpT * 1 	11-Q* (1— gicr*-14-2*)--S2* ptT * 
pN 1 Q 




Since E 	=1, pt  
then: 
e = (1- o*P*-1 w 	13" *)-Q*(;)"'*  ,  
_ 
(SZ+)
-Q*  (1— ge ) Q*-1   (P"*  )1-Q*  
(1— g2P-1 (P iy )" 
*  
= (K2* )-‘1* (1— 	[(S2)-S2 ge-1
3-1 (P7V- Q*  
(Kr )" 
=E 
_ g2)52-1Q-S2 ( p lV )1-Q 
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= {(se P* (1- )1-n-i {(Q)Q (1- Q)1--Q] (AN* 	)1 Q*  
(AN)" 
(Q)n (1— 52)1-cl (/),N*)"* (57) 
(52*  P*  (1— 52* )1_S2*  (P7 )1_n 
The real exchange rate equation we obtain here is different from equation (32) in 
Asea and Mendoza (1994) in terms of the position of the Sts in the equation. 
Nevertheless, it shows that the real exchange rate as a function of the relative price 
of the non-tradables of the two countries. 
We then transform equation (57) into a regression equation9. Taking natural 
logarithm of both sides of equation (57) we obtain: 
In 	= 521n Q + (1 — 52) ln(1 — K2) + (1 — Q*)ln AN* - 52* In 52 * —(1 — 52*)1n(1 — 52*) — (1-52)1n p liv  
= (1— 52)(1n pr — 	 ) 	(assume that 52 = 52* ) 	(58) 
So the corresponding regression equation becomes: 
q ft = 	+ (ln 	— In 	 )+ e ft 	 (IV) 
The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis suggests that the real exchange rate and relative 
price differential are negatively correlated (since a fall of the real exchange rate 
implies an appreciation). Thus if the theory holds, CI should be negative. 
9 In fact, transforming equation (48) leads to the same regression equation. 
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Part II Data 
Chapter 6 	Data 
6.1 	China Data 
Our empirical estimation requires data on relative price of non-tradables, relative 
productivity of the tradable sectors, the PPP exchange rates, the real official and 
parallel exchange rates, relative productivity and price differential between US and 
China, and the sectoral capital-output and investment-output ratios. These 
variables do not exist in ready form, so we need to construct these variables from 
existing sources. 
In the following chapters, we first construct the intermediate variables, namely the 
traded and non-traded GDP deflators, the '1141's, and the real exchange rates, across 
31 Chinese provinces during the period 1980 to 2000, using the database of the 
China Statistical Yearbooks. The chapters also include an explanation of some of 
the basic variables used in constructing the intermediate ones. These variables are 
the real and nominal GDP, investment, capital stock, wages, factor returns, and 
employment for each of the sectors. On the basis of such an intermediate database, 
we then construct our final series explained in Chapter 6.3, for each province in our 
sample. 
6.1.1 	Classification of sectors 
In order to construct the required data, the first issue was to decide which sectors are 
to be considered as tradable and non-tradable. De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf 
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(1994) classify sectors on the basis of 'export shares in output for the whole sample 
of countries, using a cut-off point of 10% to delineate non-tradables.' We follow 
such a classification scheme. The 10% threshold classifies the Chinese agriculture 
(farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery) and industry (excavation, 
manufacturing, production and supply of power, gas and water10) sectors as 
tradables; with the remaining sectors - construction, transportation, storage, postal 
and telecommunications services, wholesale, retail trade and catering services 
classified as non-tradables. 
6.1.2 	Tradable and non-tradable prices 
The sectoral prices (2000=100) (see Data 6.2 and 6.3) are the ratio of the nominal to 
real GDP index both at 2000 constant prices for each sector. The real GDP index at 
2000 prices is calculated through the real index of GDP (preceding year=100) in T, 
N (see Data 6.4 and 6.5) which is obtained through the fractions representing the 
composition of overall GDP and real GDP index by region and by individual sector. 
6.1.3 TFP 
TFP (see Data 6.6 and 6.7), the Solow residuals, are constructed from real GDP, 
capital stock, labour hours (or total employment), and factor returns: 
1n11-1 ; = lnYi - ai InKi — (1-ai) lnLi 
where 	Yi is the real output, i = T, N; 
I° If we consider the industry data as a whole, the industry sector ought to be classified as the 
tradables, according to the classification scheme. Limitation of the China data sources lies in the 
fact that the power, gas, and water supply is always with the industry category. We have practical 
difficulties in subtracting the power, gas, and water supply figure. On the other hand, to achieve 
consistency, we consider the electricity, gas, and water as tradable goods too for the US (see page 76). 
72 
where 	Yi is the real output, i = T, N; 
Ki is the real capital stock, i = T, N; 
1.1 is the total employment, i = T, N; 
1-ai are the returns to capital and labour respectively, i = T, N. 
Real GDP 
Gross output value (see Data 6.8 and 6.9) is the sum of the current value of final 
products produced in a given sector during a given period with the value of 
intermediate goods double counted (China Statistical Yearbook). 
Real investment 
Capital construction investment (see Data 6.10 and 6.11) refers to 'investment in the 
new projects, including construction of a new facility, or an addition to an existing 
facility, and the related activities of the enterprises, institutions or administrative 
units mainly for the purpose of expanding production activity, covering only projects 
each with a total investment of 500,000 RMB yuan and over.' (China Statistical 
Yearbook) 
Real capital stock 
Due to the lack of readily available data on sectoral capital stock, all total capital are 
approximated via investment figures (see Data 6.12 and 6.13) except the one for 
industry from 1993 to 2002, which is readily available and which refers to 'the 
capital received by the industrial enterprises from investors that could be used as 
operational capitals for a long period.' (China Statistical Yearbook) The rate of 
depreciation of the capital stock is assumed to be 0.05 per year. 
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Real wages  
Wages (see Data 6.14 and 6.15) refer to 'the total wage bill of staffs and workers.' 
(China Statistical Yearbook) 
Returns to labour 
Returns to labour are real wages divided by real output (see Data 6.16 and 6.17). 
Total employment 
Due to the lack of readily available data for labour hours, we follow most journal 
articles and use total employment figures as an alternative (see Data 6.18 and 6.19). 
Total employment, according to the definition by the China Statistical Yearbook, is 
`the number of staff and workers, which refers to a literal translation of the Chinese 
term `zhigong' that includes employees of state-owned units in urban and rural areas 
(including government agencies), of collective-owned units in urban areas, of other 
ownership units in urban areas, and of state-collective joint ownership.' 
6.1.4 	RER 
The real exchange rate (see Data 6.23A, B) is defined as ln( 
XRP d ) , where XR is 
P f 
the nominal exchange rate, Pd and P1  are the domestic and foreign GDP deflator 
(US GDP deflator see Data 6.24, China GDP deflator see Data 6.21) respectively. 
Following such definition, an increase of real exchange rate implies depreciation. 
Official exchange rate 
The official exchange rate (see Data 6.20) is the annual average rate that is 
calculated based on monthly averages, in Chinese RMB yuan per U.S. dollar, from 
74 
the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Following such 
a definition, an increase of the nominal exchange rate implies depreciation. 
Black market exchange rate 
The black market exchange rate (see Data 6.20), which is defined as the number of 
units of the Chinese RMB yuan per US dollar, is calculated as an annual average 
based on end of month rate (1985-1993) from the World Currency Yearbook. Due 
to the lack of data from 1993 onwards, we use the official to parallel rate ratio from 
the World Development Indicators to approximate the annual black market exchange 
rate data. 
GDP deflator 
GDP deflator (2000=100) (see Data 6.21) is the ratio of nominal to real GDP index 
(2000=1000). The real GDP index is obtained through the GDP index with the 
preceding year being treated as 100 (see Data 6.22). 
6.2 US data 
The following chapters construct traded and non-traded GDP deflators and the 11-Ps 
for the United States, for the period 1980 to 2000, utilizing OECD STAN database 
for Industrial Analysis. The chapters also include some explanation of some of the 
major variables used in constructing the intermediate ones. These variables include 
nominal and real value added, capital stock, investment, wages, returns to labour, 
and total employment for each of the sectors. From this database we construct the 
final variables in Chapter 6.3. 
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6.2.1 	Classification of sectors 
On the basis of the current STAN industry list, the 10% threshold, according to De 
Gregoria, Giovannini and Wolf's (1994), classifies the US agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, total manufacturing, electricity, gas and 
water supply sectors as tradables with the remaining construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage and communication sectors 
classified as non-tradables. 
6.2.2 	Tradable and non-tradable prices 
The tradable and non-tradable price deflators (see Data 6.24) are constructed by 
dividing the nominal GDP or the nominal value added by the real GDP or the real 
value added for each sector. 
Value added at current and constant prices 
Value added for a particular industry, according to the definition by OECD Annual 
National Accounts, 'represents its contribution to national GDP' and 'is sometimes 
referred to as GDP by industry'. In general, it is calculated as 'the difference 
between production and intermediate inputs. Value added comprise labour costs 
(compensation of employees), consumption of fixed capital, indirect taxes less 
subsidies, and net operating surplus and mixed income.' The data for nominal and 
real value added at 2000 constant prices (see Data 6.24) are from the OECD Annual 
National Accounts — Main Aggregates under the code VALU and VALUK 
respectively. 
6.2.3 TFP 
Traded and non-traded sector '11-4P (see Data 6.24) data are obtained through the real 
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value added, the real capital stock, total employment, and real wages (see Chapter 
6.1.3 for the constructions of TFP and returns to labour). 
Real capital stock 
Due to the lack of readily available data on the value of the capital stock of each 
sector, US total capital value (see Data 6.24) is approximated via gross domestic 
investment figures (see Data 6.24) from the World Development Indicators. The 
rate of depreciation of the capital stock is assumed to be 0.05 per year. 
Real wages  
The real wages (see Data 6.24) comprise of 'wages and salaries of employees paid 
by producers' (OECD STAN database) at 2000 constant prices. The data are from 
the OECD STAN database under the code WAGE. 
Returns to labour 
Returns to labour (see Data 6.24) are the real wages divided by the real value added. 
Total employment 
Total employment (see Data 6.24) refers to 'the number of employees as well as 
self-employed, owner proprietors and unpaid family workers.' (OECD STAN 
database) It is based on 'full-time equivalent jobs, which is defined as total hours 
worked divided by average annual hours worked in full-time jobs, where 
adjustments are made for part-time employment.' (OECD STAN database) The 
annual employment data are the 12-month averages data and are from the OECD 
STAN database under the code EMPN. 
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6.3 Final Variables 
The relative price of non-tradables at 2000 constant prices (see Data 6.25) is the 
difference between the non-tradable and the tradable prices. 
The relative productivity of the tradable sector at 2000 constant price (see Data 6.26) 
is the difference between the tradable and the non-tradable sector TFPs. 
The PPP exchange rate at 2000 constant price (see Data 6.27) is the difference 
between the Chinese tradable prices and the US tradable prices. 
The relative productivity differential between US and China at 2000 constant price 
(see Data 6.28) is the difference between the relative productivity of the tradable 
sector between the two countries. 
The relative price differential between US and China at 2000 constant price (see 
Data 6.29) is the difference between the relative prices of the non-tradables of the 
two countries. 
The sectoral capital-output ratio (see Data 6.30 and 6.31) is the real capital stock 
divided by real output in each sector. 
The investment-output ratio of the tradable sector (see Data 6.32) is the real 
investment divided by real output in that sector. 
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Part III Regression Evidence 
Chapter 7 	The Relationship between China's Official 
and Black Market Exchange Rate 
According to Kiguel and O'Connell (1995), the black market premium, may serve as 
a signal of macroeconomic misalignments. From time to time the central banks 
adjust the official rate so that the severity of the misalignment can be alleviated. 
Thus, it is important to investigate if the two rates have any long run relationship 
(Bahmani-Oskooee, Miteza, and Nasir 2002). In this chapter we attempt to model 
the long-run determination of the Chinese black market exchange rates using 
co-integration techniques by Johansen (1988, 1991), Davidson (1998), and Barassi, 
Caporale, and Hall (2000). 
7.1 	Econometrics methodology discussion - maximum likelihood 
estimation of cointegration vector 
The Granger representation theorem establishes that for a valid Error Correction 
Model (ECM) to exist the vector of variables must co-integrate. The importance of 
this result is that if an ECM model is estimated for a vector of variables that fail to 
co-integrate, then this regression will be liable to the problem of spurious regression 
(Hall, Henry, and Wilcox 1990). 
7.1.1 	The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) System 
We assume that our Data Generation Process (DGP), a vector X, consists of j 
variables with n being endogenous (called a vector Y) and m being weakly 
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exogenous (called a vector Z) with respect to Y. We also assume that our DGP is 
modelled by the VAR of order P that takes the form of: 
Xt = 01 Xt-i + 02 Xt-2 	Xt-p Et, 	= 1, 	T) 
jxl 	jxjjxl 	jxj jxl 	jxj jxl 	jxl 
where 
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Re-parameterising this equation yields the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
that takes the form of: 
	
AXt = F V X — nXt_p + et, 	 (t = 1, , T) 
jxl jxjjxl jxjjxl jxl 
=rvx- a(3'Xt.p + et 
ixr rxj 
where 
1) AXt = (AXIL AX2t, AXit )'; 
3)V X = (AXt.t , AXt_2, 	AXt-p+1) ; 
4) 7c is the long-run or co-integrating matrix and 
re = I - 7E1- 7E2- .. • - itp; 
5) a is the matrix of loading weights; 
6)13 is the matrix of cointegrating vectors; 
7) r representing the number of linearly independent co-integrating vectors that 
exists among the xit's (i = 1, 2, ..., j) is given by the rank of the TC matrix, that is 
the columns of 13. 
7.1.2 	Johansen Procedure 
Johansen (1988, 1991) Procedure begins with the following two regression 
equations: 
A 
AX, = r? vx, + R,, 
R pt = X t_ p - r 2 vx, 
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However the latter regression will result in non-stationary residuals because, 
regressing an I(1) level of term on dynamics still produces non-stationary residuals. 
Since the co-integrating vectors makes the regression involving non-stationary 
variables produce white noise residuals, Johansen Procedure then makes use of the 
co-integrating matrix It and uses canonical correlation to combine those 
non-stationary residuals and make them much like the other stationary residuals 
generated from the first regression. 
Then the likelihood function, in terms of a, p and n, is a function of S2 and sum of 
squared residuals generated from that canonical correlation procedure: 
{ L(c t fi, , S-1) = 	exp — 1 -E (R oe + a/i' R pt )'Q-1 (Rat + afi' Ri„ )1 
2 
(3) 
Hall (1989) provides us a review on the set of maximisation problem on this log 
likelihood function with respect to its arguments. Then, a diagonal matrix D is 
defined. It consists of consists of the ordered eigenvalues A, > >4 that 
satisfies: 
lAs PP—S po Soo1S op l= 0 	 (4) 
The solution to equation (4) generates sets of eigenvalues and the corresponding 
eigenvectors, which are the estimates of all the co-integrating vectors in the system. 
It is a matrix of eigenvectors E such that: 
SPP ED— S 	E (5) 
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where E' S ppE = 1 
The maximum likelihood estimator of the matrix of cointegrating vectors fi is 
given by the first r rows of E. If the eigenvalue is significantly non-zero, then the 
corresponding eigenvector and hence the co-integrating vector is distinct or 
independent, separate from all the others; the corresponding eigenvector 
representing an estimate of this co-integrating vector is a valid estimate. If the 
eigenvalue is significantly zero, then the corresponding eigenvector and hence the 
co-integrating vector is not a distinct one, but another product of earlier ones, which 
are in the system already. 
Testing Ho: Ai = 0, i = r+1, 	, j (where only the first r eigenvalues are non-zero) 
amounts to test the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors in 
the system. The likelihood ratio (LR) test tests hypothesis that there are at most r 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative that the number of cointegrating vectors 
are greater than r: 
A 
trace = —21n Q = —TE ln(1 — ) , r = 0, ..., j-1, 
i=r+1 
where Q is the restricted maximised likelihood / unrestricted maximised likelihood. 
7.1.3 	Extended Davidson's Methodology 
Consider the cointegrated VAR(P), as analysed by Johansen (1988): 
A(L) X1 = et, 
jxj jxl jxl 
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where Xt I(1), A(L)= 	+ A. (L)(1—L) such that A(1) = 	= 7E 
4—> aP' Xt + A. (L)AXt = Et , 
jxr rxj jxl jxj 	jxl 	jxl 
where AXt = Xt -Xt-i. 
When r<j it can be shown that the system incorporates a set of long run relationships 
of the form: 
A(L)Xt = a 
4—> aj3'Xt + A. (L)AXt = Et 
a'aP'Xt = a' (a - (L)AXt) 
P'Xt = (a'a)-1 a' (Et - A. (L)AXt) 
I(0) 	 (both a and AXt are stationary) 
-a'St 
In this model, a collection of I(1) variables is found cointegrated as we have 
illustrated above. 	In such system, r representing the number of linearly 
independent co-integrating vectors that exists among the xit's (i = 1, 2, ... , j) is 
given by the rank of the it matrix, that is the columns of P. 
Note that without restrictions on p we can always scale the matrix of the cointegrating 
relations by post-multiplying it by any non-singular r x r matrix M, to get MP'Xt= M 
St that is observationally equivalent to P'Xt = St with loading matrix aM-1 (Davidson, 
1998). According to Theorem 1 (Davidson, 1994), if a column of j3 (say bi) is 
identified by the rank condition, the OLS regression which includes just the variables 
having unrestricted non-zero coefficients in bi is consistent for bi. Without 
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restrictions on [3 , the usual rank condition might give misleading 1(0) relation. 
What we have obtained from the above illustration is that, if a set of I(1) variables is 
found cointegrated, it does not necessarily follow that the estimated vectors can be 
interpreted as structural. According to Davidson's (1998), a cointegrated relation is 
structural/irreducible if and only if the set of I(1) variables are cointegrated, but 
dropping any of the variables leaves a set that is not cointegrated. Such an 
irreducible cointegration idea was first put forward by Davidson (1988) and later 
extended by Barassi, Caporale, and Hall (2000), who perform cointegration tests on 
pairs of series, in order to rule out those series that are not cointegrated. This would 
leave us a cointegrated relation that is irreducible. Such a method effectively 
eliminates the presence of potentially redundant variables that interact with the other 
cointegrated variables driving the cointegrating regression coefficients towards some 
other elements of the cointegrating space (Barassi, Caporale, and Hall, 2000). 
7.2 Test the number of independent co-integrating vectors 
In Chapter 2.2.4, we discuss the possible determinants of the black market exchange 
rate. We have shown that the black market rate is a function of the official rate, 
real GDP, GDP deflator, real consumption expenditure, and US interest rate. In 
what follows we attempt to empirically model the long-run determination of the 
Chinese black market exchange rate using co-integration techniques by Johansen 
(1988, 1991), Davidson (1998), and Barassi, Caporale, and Hall (2000). 
7.2.1 	Examine properties of the series 
Since it is only possible for I(1) series to co-integrate, we first need to determine the 
85 
order of integration of the time series before any co-integration tests can properly 
begin. To do this, we plot each series and split them into two categories: (1) time 
series that have no obvious structural breaks and no changing in slope; (2) series that 
have obvious breaks and / or changing in slope. We then perform the unit root tests, 
namely, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perronei (PP) tests on 
(1) and (2) respectively. 
7.2.1.1 	Series that have no obvious breaks 
Time series that have no obvious breaks include the GDP deflator, the real GDP, 
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Figure 7.1 
ti The PP test statistics allows the error term to be non-white noise. 
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ORIGINAL TIME SERIES PLOT 
DLCHNIMP2000 






Preliminary inspection of the time series suggests that the data we are dealing with 
might be integrated of order one. When we plot the first-differenced series we find 
that they generally fluctuate around the mean with broadly constant amplitude (see 
Figure 7.2). The sample autocorrelation functions appear to follow a smooth 
pattern at high lags rather than decaying quickly to zero (see Figure 7.3). The 
spectrum appears to have a spike at zero frequency (see Figure 7.4). 
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The formal ADF test results generally confirm our predictions with one exception 
(see Table 7.1). That is, the GDP deflator and the US interest rate series appear to 
be I(1) at 95% level of confidence. However, the real GDP, and the consumption 
expenditure might need to be differenced twice to achieve stationary since the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected by the data at 5% level of significance. 
Table 7.1 	Test for Unit Roots in China GDP deflator 2000, real import 
and consumption expenditure, real GDP, and US interest rate 
Variables 













LCHNPC2000 -3.24 1 -3.60 
LCHNCONS2000 4.19** 4 -3.60 
LCHNGDP2000 -4.76 ** 5 -3.60 
LUSINT -2.76 0 -3.00 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by ** 
2. All series except the US interest rate exhibit an upward trend with a non-zero mean. Thus we 
use the AR (1) model with a constant and time trend as the ADF test model. The US interest rate 
series behaves like a random walk around constant mean. As a result, the AR (1) model with a 
constant would be the proper ADF test model. 
7.2.1.2 Series that have one break and/or changing slope 
Provided that the official exchange rate series has changing slope, whereas the black 
market exchange rate exhibits one structural break and changing slope, we apply the 
PP test on these two time series. The test results (see Table 8.6 and 8.7) suggest that 
both series are I(1) at 95% level of confidence. 
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7.2.2 	Johansen procedure 
Having obtained confirmation that among our variables of interest, the Chinese 
official and black market exchange rate, the GDP deflator, and the US interest rate 
are integrated of order one, we proceed by performing the Johansen's (1988, 1991) 
maximum likelihood based cointegration tests to assess the co-integrating rank of 
the system. 
As can be seen from Figure 7.1, the four series generally move with one another, 
however, from just looking at the graph it is not possible to say whether they are 
cointegrated. To begin with the formal LR test, we first add a restricted constant in 
the co-integrating space since the black market exchange rate series is not trended; it 
looks like a random walk without drift. Both the Schwarz Bayesian criterion 
(SBC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggest a VAR of order 1. Also, 
in such a situation, the residuals of the individual equations in the VAR do not have 
serial correlation. The results of the LR tests are summarised as follows. 
Table 7.2 Johansen Likelihood Ratio Test 
TEST OF r= SMALL SAMPLE 
LR TEST 
95% CRITICAL VALUE 
0 62.28 53.48 
1 30.17 34.87 
2 12.68 20.18 
3 3.51 9.16 
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The LR test that there is at most zero co-integrating vectors easily rejects the null 
hypothesis, so we know that there is at least one co-integrating vector. The 
likelihood ratio test that there is at most one cointegrating vector is below the 95% 
critical value. So there is clearly one cointegrating vector. 
7.2.3 	Extended Davidson's Methodology 
In order to establish the number of irreducible cointegrated relations, we apply 
Johansen's (1988, 1991) LR tests for each pair of the series. We add a restricted 
constant in the co-integrating space for tests with LCHNBXRAT and LUSINT as 
dependent variables, since these series are not trended; we add a constant in data 
space (i.e. an unrestricted constant) for tests with LCHNXRAT, LCHNPC2000 
as dependent variables, since these time series exhibit trend. 











LCHNBXRAT - LCHNXRAT 0 14.30 20.18 2 
LCHNBXRAT - LCHNPC2000 0 24.78** 20.18 1 
LCHNBXRAT - LUSINT 0 18.14* 20.18 1 
LCHNXRAT - LCHNPC2000 0 14.51 17.86 2 
LCHNXRAT - LUSINT 0 12.34 17.86 2 
LCHNPC2000-LUSINT 0 18.82** 17.86 1 
Significance at the 95% and 90% levels is denoted by ** and * respectively 
The trace eigenvalue statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
cointegration (namely that r=0) for the pair of variables involving LCHNBXRAT, 
LCHNPC2000, and LUSINT. 
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Table 7.4 Pairwise cointegration tests summary 
LCHNBXRAT LCHNXRAT LCHNPC2000 LUSINT 
LCHNBXRAT _ not-co co-inte co-inte 
LCHNXRAT _ not-co not-co 
LCHNPC2000 _ co-inte 
LUSINT _ 
The conclusions we obtain are as follows. If we find that pairwise cointegration 
holds between each pair of the series, then the rank of the whole five-variable 
system is four (4-1=3). In fact the rank of the system is two (3-1=2) because direct 
cointegration does not hold in the tests involving LCHNXRAT, but does hold 
among the pair of LCHNBXRAT, LCHNPC2000, and LUSINT. Thus, we can rule 
out the possibility that LCHNXRAT is involved in any of the structural relations. 
Recall that we obtain a rank of one as suggested by the Johansen LR test on the 
whole system X. Here, the Extended Davidson's Methodology suggests a rank of 
two for the system, which in turn confirms the importance of testing for 
irreducibility as a diagnostic, in order to achieve a correct identification of the 
structural relations between the series involved in a system. 
7.3 Specify a proper dynamic structure 
Having achieved a suitable co-integrating model of the long-run determination of 
black market exchange rate, we now attempt to build a proper dynamic structure of 
it. We follow the usual practice by specifying a high-order dynamic model and 
nest down from such a general model to a parsimoniously encompassing 
representation of the data. 
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As the sample size is small we add one lag only to each of the independent variables 
and one dummy to capture the structural break in 1989 and to reduce the ARCH 
effect. The regression equation is then: 
DLCHNBXRAT = DLCHNBXRATt_i + DLCHNPC2000t_1 + DLUSINTt-i 
+ LCHNBXRAT(-1) + LCHNPC2000(-1) + LUSINT(-1) + DUMMY 
The OLS results are summarised as follows: 
Table 7.5 OLS regression output 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DLCHNBXRAT_1 0.33 0.22 1.50 0.17 
Constant 3.81 1.87 2.04 0.07 
DLCHNPC2000_1 -1.42 0.86 -1.65 0.13 
DLUSINT_1 1.26 0.59 2.14 0.06 
LCHNBXRAT_1 -0.99 0.11 -0.81 0.44 
LCHNPC2000_1 -0.23 0.18 -1.30 0.23 
LUSINT_1 -1.35 0.72 -1.89 0.09 
DUMMY 0.36 0.16 2.19 0.06 
Sigma 0.13 RSS 0.16 
R^2 0.75 F(7,9) = 3.83 [0.03]* 
Log-likelihood 15.47 DW 2.13 
No. of observations 17 no. of parameters 8 
Mean (DLCHNBXRAT) 0.08 Var (DLCHNBXRAT) 0.04 
Under the assumption that the estimated slope coefficient has a student-t distribution 
with n-k=17-8=9 degrees of freedom, we reject the hypothesis that the true slope is 
zero if the absolute value of the t-value of the estimated slope coefficient is greater 
than 1.833 using a 90% confidence interval. We drop the statistically insignificant 
variables and finally obtain the following dynamic structure: 
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DLCHNBXRAT = 3.81 +1.26DLUSINTt_1 - 1.35LUSINTt-1  
The result suggests that in short-run, when the US raises its interest rate by 1%, the 
Chinese black market rate for US dollars would appreciate by 1.26%. This is 
consistent with our predictions — when there is less supply of US dollars on the 
international market due to the increase of the US interest rate, the Chinese black 
market rate for dollars will increase. However, in long-run, the data suggest that a 
1% increase of the US interest rate will cause the black market rate for dollars in 
China to fall by 1.35% on average. 
Finally, the reason why only the US interest rate affects the exchange rate in this 
model might come from the small sample problem, although we tried to avoid such 
a problem by adding only one lag to each of the independent variables. 
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Chapter 8 	The Size of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
There are four major components of the Balassa-Samuelson theory. The first is 
that a faster increase of tradable goods productivity than of non-tradable ones leads 
to an increase in relative prices of non-tradable. The second is that the PPP holds 
for tradable goods. The third component, which is based on the previous two 
assumptions, says that high productivity growth of the tradable sector comparing to 
the non-tradable sector causes a rise in the relative price of non-tradables, which 
puts upward pressure on a country's real exchange rate. Different from the above 
price approach to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the fourth component of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect starts from the assumption such that the international 
differences in productivity are greater in the sector of tradable goods than in the 
non-tradable goods, which in turn generates a proposition that the service prices are 
lower in country with low level of productivity (Kravis, Heston and Summer 1983). 
Thus the real exchange rate of the country with high productivity level will appear to 
be overvalued. We apply the Chinese data and examine these components in 
Chapters 8.1 to 8.4 respectively. 
8.1 Relative prices and relative productivities 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 contain the unit root test results for the relative prices of 
non-traded goods and relative productivities. There is no evidence against the null 
hypothesis of a unit root when we look at each province individually. As far as the 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1995) panel unit root test is concerned, which we have 
applied to a model with a constant, for all 30 Chinese provinces, the unit root 
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hypothesis cannot be rejected for both variables. 
Having confirmed that both relative prices and relative productivities are integrated 
of order one, we proceed with our tests by looking at their cointegrating relationship. 
Table 8.3 contains the results of the unit root tests on the residuals from regressing 
relative prices on relative productivities. The tests based on individual province 
data yield mixed evidence. The two PP tests provide no evidence against the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% level of significance, whereas the ADF tests 
reject the null hypothesis for 9 out of 30 provinces. 	The results from the panel 
tests again provide mixed evidence on whether relative prices and relative 
productivities are cointegrated. We are not able to confirm the existence of a 
significant long-run relationship between the two variables when we look at the 
panel results with a constant in the regression. On the other hand, the evidence of 
cointegration from the panel regression with a time trend is strong. However, it 
becomes less favourable when we further include common time dummies in the 
regression. 
In Tables 8.4 and 8.5, we test the stronger prediction of the Balassa-Samuelson model 
that the slope in the cointegrating relationship is 1.0. This can be done by imposing 
such a restriction and then testing for a unit root in the difference between relative 
prices and relative productivities. The tests carried out on the data for each province 
individually and for the whole 30 provinces are consistent, both pointing out the 
existence of a unit root in the difference at the 5% level of significance. 
To test such a stronger prediction of the Balassa-Samuelson model that the slope in 
the cointegrating relationship is 1.0 we could also do a t-test on the slope coefficient 
96 
(see Table 8.5). The individual t-tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that the 
slope is 1.0 at the 5% level of significance for all provinces. The panel test results, 
with or without common time dummies, also do not support such a unitary 
theoretical relationship between relative prices and relative productivities. Except 
for the case of Shandong, the estimated slope coefficients are far from 1.0 - the fully 
modified (panel) OLS slope estimates being only of -0.20 (-0.14). Finally, 
according to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, a faster increase of the tradable sector 
productivity than of the non-tradable ones leads to an increase in relative prices of 
the non-tradables. However, such a positive relationship between relative prices 
and relative productivities is not well confirmed by our data, since almost all of the 
estimated slope coefficients are negative. 
8.2 Purchasing power parity in traded goods 
Tables 8.6, 8.7, and 8.8 contain the results of the unit root tests on the parallel, the 
official, and the PPP exchange rates respectively. We find no evidence against the 
null hypothesis of a unit root for any of the series by looking at both the PP, ADF and 
panel unit root tests. We, therefore, proceed with our cointegration tests assuming 
that both the nominal and PPP exchange rates for all our provinces are 1(1). 
The panel tests provide evidence that the nominal and PPP exchange rates are 
cointegrated (see Tables 8.9 and 8.10). Almost all six joint tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level of significance when a trend or a trend 
with common time dummy is included in the cointegration regression; regressions 
with a constant generate relatively less favourable results towards cointegration. 
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Tests based on data from individual provinces yield mixed evidence yet the 
conclusion is apparent. The two PP tests provide no evidence against the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% level of significance. However, for the official 
(parallel) exchange rate case, the ADF tests reject the null hypothesis for 16 (30) out 
of 30 provinces. Clearly, it is the black market exchange rate that moves more 
closely with the PPP exchange rate. 
The results in Tables 8.9 and 8.10 suggest that the nominal and PPP exchange rates 
are cointegrated. We then go on to test whether the slope in their cointegrating 
relationship is 1.0. If so, then PPP holds in the long run for traded goods. This can 
be done by restricting the slope coefficient to unity and then testing if the difference 
between the nominal and the PPP exchange rate contains a unit root (see Tables 8.11 
and 8.13). The tests using the data from each province provide no evidence against 
the null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level of significance. The joint tests point to 
confirm such a conclusion. Thus, although the nominal exchange rate and PPP are 
cointegrated, the differences between them appear to be non-stationary. 
An alternative way to test whether the PPP holds for traded goods is to estimate the 
slope on the PPP exchange rate directly (see Tables 8.12 and 8.14). 	Consistent with 
the results in Tables 8.11 and 8.13, both individual t-tests and the panel group FMOLS 
tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that the slope is 1.0. The magnitudes of 
estimated slope coefficients remain much far from 1.0. Hence, although the nominal 
and PPP exchange rates are cointegrated, they seem to have a non-unitary theoretical 
relationship. 
We find that the magnitudes of the t-value for f3=1.0 differ significantly between the 
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official and parallel cases with the latter indicating a t-value much smaller than the 
other and much closer to the critical value. In this sense, the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis holds better with the black market exchange rate. 
8.3 Real exchange rate and relative productivity differential 
Tables 8.15, 8.16, and 8.17 report the unit root tests for the real parallel and official 
exchange rates and relative 11-4P differences. Both individual and joint tests are in 
favour of the unit root hypothesis for all three variables. Thus, we go on to explore 
their cointegrating relationship having assumed that each of them contains a 
stochastic trend. 
The hypothesis of the existence of a long run relationship between the real exchange 
rate and relative productivity differential is largely confirmed by the panel 
cointegration tests at a 5% level of significance (see Tables 8.18 and 8.19). The 
cointegration regression with a constant generates the strongest results; when a trend 
or a trend with common time dummy is included, around 5 out of 7 test statistics are 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level of significance. 
On the other hand, residual-based cointegration tests on individual province data yield 
mixed evidence. The theoretical long-run relationship between the real exchange 
rate and productivity differential is rejected at a 5% level of significance by the two 
PP tests. However, the ADF tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for 
0(15) out of 30 provinces for the official (parallel) exchange rate case. 
We conclude that the two sets of panel cointegration tests perform equally well for 
the two cases we consider. The difference is that, when we look at individual 
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province results, the hypothesis of the existence of a long-run relationship between 
the real parallel exchange rate and relative productivity differential is largely 
confirmed at a 5% level of significance. Clearly, it is the real black market 
exchange rates that move closely with the relative productivity differential not the 
real official exchange rate. 
According to Balassa-Samuelson predictions, we would expect the coefficient on the 
relative productivity differential to be negative since a fall of RER implies an 
appreciation. Tables 8.20 and 8.21 show the individual and panel data estimates of 
the slope of the cointegrating relation between the real official and parallel exchange 
rate and the relative productivity differential. In terms of individual t-tests on the 
estimated slope, in both cases the answer as to whether the slope coefficients are 
statistically significant remains vague at the 5% level of significance. On the other 
hand, the panel group FMOLS test generates a strong result which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the slope is statistically insignificant at the 10% level for the black 
market case (see Table 8.21). In addition, the estimated coefficients have the 
expected sign for all considered provinces. Thus, a significant and negative 
relationship between real exchange rate and relative productivity differential implied 
by the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is well confirmed by the black market 
exchange rate data. On the other hand, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis seems 
not to be working well with the official exchange rate data. The panel results in 
Table 8.20 suggest that the estimated coefficient on the relative productivity 
differential is statistically insignificant and close to 0 — thus, the relative productivity 
differential does not have any explanatory power in explaining variation of the real 
official exchange rate for the full panel of Chinese provinces we consider. 
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8.4 Real exchange rate and relative prices differential 
Table 8.22 reports the unit root tests results on the relative price differential between 
the US and China. There is no evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
both when we consider each individual province and use the whole panel to carry out 
joint tests. 
Tables 8.23 and 8.24 report the results of the unit root tests on the residuals from 
regressing the real parallel and official exchange rate on relative price differentials. 
The hypothesis of the existence of a long-run relationship between the two variables 
is largely confirmed at a 5% level of significance by the panel tests. By looking at 
individual province results, we are able to provide evidence that a significant long-
run relationship between the real exchange rate and relative price differential exists in 
24(5) out of 30 provinces for the black (official) exchange rate case. 
We conclude that, according to Table 8.23 and 8.24, the panel tests perform equally 
well for the two co-integrating cases we consider. The difference is that, again, 
when we look at individual province results the hypothesis of the existence of a 
long-run relationship between the real parallel exchange rate and relative price 
differential is largely confirmed at a 5% level of significance. Clearly relative 
price differential doesn't well account for the long-run movement of the real official 
exchange rate. 
Next we examine one of the key components of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis — 
the real exchange rate and relative price differential are negatively correlated since a 
fall of RER implies an appreciation. Tables 8.25 and 8.26 show the results of the 
individual t-test and panel group FMOLS estimates on the slope of the relative price 
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differential. The results suggest significant and negative slope coefficients for both 
cases. Thus we are able to provide evidence of a long-run negative relationship 
between the real official (and parallel) exchange rate and relative price differential. 
On average, the fully modified (panel) OLS slope estimate is -3.14 (-1.07) for the 
black market case, much greater than -2.99 (-0.53) for the official rate case in 
absolute value. In this sense, the Balassa-Samuelson effect appears to be explained 
much better by the black market exchange rate data. 
8.5 	General equilibrium framework 
In this chapter, we attempt to model the Chinese Balassa-Samuelson effect on the 
basis of the extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) approach; and because changes in 
China's exchange rates regimes make it difficult to conduct research using a 
standard time series method, we make use of the panel data method to sidestep such 
a problem. 
According to Baltagi (1995), the panel data method has increased precision of 
regression estimates, the ability to control for individual fixed effects, and the ability 
to model temporal effects without aggregation bias. Concerning the performance 
of estimators when the panel consists of non-stationary data, Zellner (1969) and 
Malinvaud (1956) argue that the pooled time series estimators will provide 
consistent estimators of the mean effects. However, Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
suggest that aggregate time series estimators may perform very poorly if the micro 
relationships are cointegated but with different cointegrating vectors. Hall and 
Urga (1999) argue that when T is small and N is large, the GMM estimator is an 
efficient estimator, especially when taking the first differences or orthogonal 
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deviations to eliminate the fixed effects. 
8.5.1 	Static panel data estimation 
Tables 8.27 to 8.34 provide estimates of equations (I), (II), and (HI) based on the 
pooled (total) regression, the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) regression 
using individual dummies in the OLS regression, the within estimates replacing y 
and W by subtracting the means of each time series, the between estimates replacing 
y and W by the individual means, the feasible generalised least squares (GLS) 
estimates replacing y and W by deviations from weighted time means, and the 
maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) obtained by iterating the GLS procedure (see 
Baltagi 1995)12. 
In these static panel regression models, equation (I) performs quite well. The 
Balassa-Samuelson proposition is well supported by the data in the Total, LSDV, 
Within-groups, GLS using within/between groups, GLS using OLS residuals, and 
MLE models of equation (I) — all coefficients are statistically significant and of the 
correct signs in these six static panel data models. However, the corresponding 
residuals do not pass the diagnostic tests so well. Although they fail the AR(1) test, 
which is what we want to see, they do not pass the AR(2) tests. As a result, the 
corresponding regression results are not reliable. The only vector of residuals that 
pass the diagnostic tests are the ones generated by the OLS on differences. However, 
12 The linear model is given by: y1  = 	y + 21 + 	+ vll 	(t=1,....,T, 1=1,....,N), 
where X1 is the time effect, 	is the fixed individual effect, x11 is a kx 1 vector of time-varying 
explanatory variable assumed to be strictly exogenous, vi, is a vector of the independently and 
identically distributed errors. Stacking the data for an individual according to time, and then 
stacking all individuals, and combining the data into W= [X:D] yields y = Wfi + v . 
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the resulting slope coefficients 6; and 83 are not statistically different from zero. 
In 6 out of the 8 regression models the coefficients on the two sectors' TFP are 
significant and of the expected signs when estimating equation (II). However, the 
coefficient on the capital-output ratio of the tradable sector remains positive in all 
cases, which contradicts the predictions of the theory. 
When estimating equation 	we find that the coefficient of the non-tradable 
sector TFP remains significant and negative in almost all cases. However, all other 
coefficient estimates are of the wrong sign. In addition, the residuals generated 
from the eight static panel regression do not pass the AR(2) tests and so the 
regression results are not reliable. 
We conclude that equation (I) is generally a reasonable empirical representation of 
the Balassa-Samuelson model. Recall that the Asea and Mendoza (1994) model 
implicitly assumes that the '11APs are identical across sectors at the steady state. Here, 
we are able to test the Asea and Mendoza (1994) model restriction that the TFPs are 
homogeneous, especially to reject it. This justifies our extensions to their model. 
The results from estimating equation (H) and (III) are less favourable in terms of the 
expected signs of the coefficients. One thing that we should be aware of is that the 
residuals in all cases do not pass the diagnostic tests so well. 
8.5.2 	Dynamic panel data estimation 
We estimate equations (I), (II) and (HI) in levels, using one-step and two-step GMM 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and combined GMM estimation (Arellano and Boyer, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The standard errors and tests are based on the 
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robust variance matrix. To select the proper lag length, we estimate equations with 
different combinations of the lag structure of the xi,t matrix. Among our various 
experiments, we choose to look at the results where the residuals pass both the 
Sargan test13 so that the instruments are exogenous and AR(2) test but fail the AR(1) 
test14. 
For equation (I) we choose the results generated by the two-step GMM estimation 
with one lag on LpNLpT2000, LkTLyT, and LtN2000, and two lags on LkNLyN and 
LtT2000 (see Table 8.35). With this specification of instrument in GMM estimators, 
the residuals pass both the Sargan test and AR(2) test but fail the AR(1) test. The 
estimated coefficients all have the expected signs; although the ones on the 
capital-output ratio and the '11-4) of the tradable sector remain insignificant. Again, 
because Asea and Mendoza (1994) model focuses on the long-run balanced growth 
equilibrium, it implicitly assumes that the TFPs are homogeneous across sectors at the 
steady state. Here, the data are able to support our extended model where such 
restrictions are rejected. 
We follow the same lag selection procedure described above to regress equations (II) 
and (III) using one-step and two-step GMM estimation. The optimal regression 
results are shown in Table 8.35. The only estimated coefficient that is consistent 
13 The Sargan (1958, 1988) test tests the over-identifying restrictions. That is, if AN is optimal for 
any given Z,, then under the null hypothesis that the instruments in Z are exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated 
N n 	 N 	A 
with the individual effect ), the test statistic is Ev,*tzi)AN(Ezi'v,*)-zr2 
=, 	i=1 
14 If the AR(1) model is mean-stationary, then Ayi, are uncorrelated with iii, which suggests that 
Ay,,_, can be used as instruments in the levels equations (see Arellano and Boyer, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) 
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with the theoretical predictions is the one on non-tradable sector TFP, which appears 
to be negative and significant throughout the two cases. All other coefficients, such 
as the ones on capital-output ratio (11 ) in equation (II) and investment-output ratio 
(ih) in equation (III) do not have the expected negative sign; the coefficient on the 
tradable sector TFP appears to be either insignificant (p-value=0.19) in equation (II) 
or negative (-0.04) in equation (III). 
For the combined GMM estimation the regression results for the three equations we 
consider are remarkably similar to the previous GMM estimation (see Table 8.36). 
For equation (I), the estimated coefficients have the correct signs; although 50% of 
the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Regressions on (II) and (III) 
generate less favourable results. Two out of the three estimated coefficients in 
equation (II) appear to be statistically insignificant. When looking at equation (III), 
the coefficients are all significant; however, we obtain a positive coefficient on 
investment-output ratio and a negative coefficient on tradable sector TFP. 
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Part IV Conclusion 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
First, the Johansen cointegration approach is applied and one cointegrating vector 
between the Chinese official rate, the parallel RMB-US dollar exchange rate, the 
GDP price deflator, the import expenditure, and the US interest rate is found. 
Second, by further applying the Extended Davidson's Methodology, we are able to 
rule out the possibility that the official exchange rate and the real import are 
involved in any of the structural relations. The rank of the system is in fact two. 
Such a result is important as it suggests no relation between the Chinese black 
market and official exchange rate. This implies a significant discrepancy between 
them; the long-run movements of the parallel market rate cannot be predicted by the 
movements of the official rate. Policy implication arising from this is that in the 
presence of a black market, the official rate is irrelevant, merely a government 
bookkeeping convention. The result also suggests that the Kamin (1993) model is 
not a valid framework to analyse the long-run movements of the parallel RMB-US 
dollar exchange rate. Third, the resulting ECM model suggests that the US interest 
rate has a small negative effect on the Chinese black market exchange rate in the 
long-run. 
The first key component of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis postulates that the 
productivity differential between tradable and non-tradable sectors and relative 
prices are positively correlated. Both the Engle and Granger two-step and the 
panel cointegration tests do not provide strong evidence of the existence of a long 
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run relationship between these two variables. The estimated slope coefficient on 
relative prices appears to be negative. 
The second assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is that the PPP holds 
for traded goods. All panel cointegration tests suggest that the nominal exchange 
rate, both official and parallel, and PPP exchange rates are cointegrated, thus 
providing strong support for the long-run PPP hypothesis in the full panel of the 
Chinese provinces, although the price coefficients appear to be different from unity. 
The individual province ADF tests are able to confirm a stronger long-run 
relationship in the parallel exchange rate-price relationship than in the official 
exchange rate-price relationship. 	This implies the absence of persistently 
over-valued or under-valued Chinese black market rates. This contrasts with the 
official exchange rates that tend to be chronically over-valued, which can be seen 
from the large black market premium. Hence, from a policy perspective, central 
banks in developing countries should use the black market exchange rate as a signal 
for real exchange rate misalignment and hence, in the formulation of economic 
policies. 
Another key component of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is that the real 
exchange rates are negatively correlated to the relative productivity differential. The 
panel cointegration tests perform equally well for the two cases we consider, namely, 
the real parallel exchange rate-productivity relationship and the real official exchange 
rate-productivity relationship. However, the individual time series results point out 
that clearly it is the real black market exchange rates that move closely with the 
relative productivity differential, not the real official exchange rates. 
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In terms of individual t-tests on the estimated slope of the cointegrating relation 
between the real official and parallel exchange rates and relative productivity 
differential, in both cases the answer, as to whether the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant, remains vague. However, the panel group FMOLS is able 
to confirm a negative significant relationship between the real parallel exchange 
rates and relative productivity differential implied by the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis with 90% level of confidence. 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect implies a long-run negative relationship between the 
real exchange rate and relative price differential. The panel tests perform equally 
well for the two co-integrating cases we consider. The difference is that, again, 
when we look at individual province results, the hypothesis of the existence of a 
long-run relationship between the real parallel exchange rates and relative price 
differential is largely confirmed at a 95% level of confidence. Clearly relative 
price differential does not statistically account for the long-run movement of the real 
official exchange rate. 
With both individual t-test and panel group FMOLS on the slope coefficient, we are 
able to put in evidence a negative relationship between the two types of real 
exchange rates and relative price differential. On average, the fully modified 
(panel) OLS slope estimate is -3.14 (-1.07) for the black market case, much greater 
than -2.99 (-0.53) for the official rate case in absolute value. In this sense, the 
Chinese Balassa-Samuelson effect appears to be explained much better by the black 
market exchange rate data. 
The reason why the black market exchange rate, as opposed to the official rate, 
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better reflect economic fundamentals lies in the fact that the Chinese official rate is 
state determined. Even in the recent floating period, the rate is merely allowed to 
fluctuate within a small range according to the market force. In other words, the 
fluctuation between the yuan and the dollar is relatively small. On the other hand, 
as the black market exchange rates are entirely market-determined, the band of 
fluctuation is much larger. 
The implication arising from our empirical findings is that in the presence of a large 
parallel market for foreign exchange, we should use the black market exchange rate 
when carrying out economic studies as it moves more closely with economic 
fundamentals. Such a conclusion is important as it raises questions regarding the 
appropriate interpretations of the official exchange rate literature in some developing 
economies. 
In general, all panel cointegration tests are able to provide evidence that the 
traditional Balassa-Samuelson effect holds in contemporary Chinese economy, either 
in the form of nominal exchange rate-price, real exchange rate-relative price 
differential, or real exchange rate-relative productivity differential relationship. We 
then go on to model the effect using the two-country, two-sector general equilibrium 
type of approach. Both the static and dynamic panel regression suggests that 
equation (I) of the extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model is a reasonable 
empirical representation of the Chinese Balassa-Samuelson effect. The static panel 
data model seems mis-specified as it left out all the dynamics and the best results are, 
as expected, from the dynamic one. This can be seen by looking at the resulting 
Sargan tests which suggest that the instruments are exogenous. In fact, Hall and 
Urga (1999) show that when T is small and N is large, the GMM estimator is an 
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efficient estimator, especially when taking the first differences or orthogonal 
deviations to eliminate the fixed effects. 
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Data 6.1 
YEAR LUSINT LCHNBXRAT LCHNXRAT LCHNPC2000 LCHNIMP2000 LCHNCONS2000 LCHNGDP2000 
1981 2.09 0.71 0.53 3.51 2.40 4.36 9.59 
1982 1.92 0.81 0.64 3.54 2.34 4.42 9.67 
1983 2.01 0.87 0.68 3.55 2.50 4.52 9.77 
1984 2.00 0.99 0.84 3.57 2.83 4.64 9.91 
1985 2.00 1.11 1.08 3.63 3.50 4.80 10.06 
1986 1.86 1.39 1.24 3.69 3.62 4.87 10.14 
1987 1.89 1.48 1.31 3.73 3.66 4.97 10.25 
1988 1.97 1.92 1.31 3.84 3.79 5.10 10.36 
1989 1.99 2.45 1.33 3.91 3.79 5.14 10.40 
1990 2.01 2.60 1.57 3.98 3.87 5.13 10.44 
1991 1.81 2.43 1.67 4.05 4.09 5.20 10.52 
1992 1.82 2.15 1.71 4.11 4.31 5.32 10.66 
1993 1,70 2.30 1.75 4.27 4.43 5.39 10.78 
1994 1.70 2.27 2.15 4.45 4.75 5.49 10.90 
1995 1.87 2.23 2.12 4.58 4.73 5.62 11.00 
1996 1.89 2.16 2.12 4.64 4.71 5.74 11.10 
1997 1.87 2.16 2.12 4.65 4.73 5.81 11.18 
1998 1.82 2.15 2.11 4.63 4.73 5.89 11.25 
1999 1.81 2.22 2.11 4.60 4.92 5.98 11.32 









US 3-month LIBOR % 
China black market exchange rate 
China official exchange rate 
China GDP deflator 2000=100 
China import expenditure 2000=100 (100,000,000 RMB) 
China consumption expenditure 2000=100 (100,000,000 RMB) 
China GDP 2000=100 (100,000,000RMB) 
Data 6.2 	China tradable prices (2000=100) - LpT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 2.51 2.67 2.74 2.32 3.22 3.33 3.47 3.63 3.96 4.26 4.23 4.24 4.29 4.30 4.37 4.61 
Tianjin 2.27 2.43 2.60 2.78 3.04 3.14 3.23 3.46 3.76 4.02 4.16 4.29 4.47 4.41 4.47 4.61 
Hebei 1.82 1.99 2.16 2.38 2.62 2.77 2.90 3.06 3.39 3.78 3.93 4.15 4.31 4.40 4.49 4.61 
Shanxi 2.33 2.49 2.62 2.60 3.00 3.16 3.29 3.37 3.73 4.04 4.24 4.40 4.52 4.52 4.55 4.61 
Inner Mongolia 2 22 - 2.37 2.47 2.81 2.86 3.01 3.14 3.29 3.58 3.84 4.00 4.17 4.34 4.41 4.50 4.61 
Liaoning 2.16 2.32 2.49 2.68 2.87 2.97 3.11 3.26 3.62 3.93 4.04 4.17 4.31 4.33 4.41 4.61 
Jilin 2.44 2.58 2.69 2.95 3.07 3.16 3.35 3.45 3.71 3.99 4.12 4.21 4.33 4.36 4.48 4.61 
Heilongjiang 2.42 2.60 2.80 2.93 3.10 3.17 3.40 3.46 3.66 3.96 4.15 4.24 4.37 4.35 4.39 4.61 
Shanghai 2.52 2.69 2.79 2.94 3.10 3.21 3.36 3.52 3.81 4.07 4.28 4.28 4.39 4.45 4.49 4.61 
Jiangsu 1.91 2.12 2.36 2.57 2.75 2.91 3.00 3.17 3.66 4.01 4.22 4.25 4.32 4.38 4.46 4.61 
Zhejiang 1.40 1.62 1.85 2.08 2.27 2.40 2.50 2.73 3.14 3.56 3.91 4.03 4.20 4.30 4.38 4.61 
Anhui 2.07 2.25 2.46 2.66 2.83 2.94 3.05 3.07 3.47 3.86 4.21 4.38 4.55 4.51 4.54 4.61 
Fujian 1.35 1.52 1.72 2.00 2.22 2.43 2.52 2.77 3.18 3.66 3.86 4.04 4.21 4.36 4.45 4.61 
Jiangxi 2.41 2.56 2.70 2.93 3.09 3.27 3.37 3.49 3.82 4.29 4.22 4.31 4.47 4.51 4.54 4.61 
Shandong 1.82 1.98 2.12 2.40 2.71 2.91 3.03 3.21 3.69 4.06 4.14 4.24 4.34 4.38 4.45 4.61 
Henan 2.01 2.16 2.32 2.56 2.79 2.92 3.03 3.15 3.56 3.86 4.19 4.33 4.43 4.49 4.52 4.61 
Hubei 2.04 2.24 2.39 2.60 2.77 2.89 2.95 3.03 3.35 3.76 4.06 4.24 4.43 4.51 4.55 4.61 
Hunan 2.07 2.23 2.39 2.62 2.76 2.89 2.97 3.12 3.41 3.74 3.97 4.22 4.37 4.43 4.50 4.61 
Guangdong 1.44 1.63 1.84 2.12 2.38 2.57 2.72 2.97 3.33 3.70 4.01 4.15 4.29 4.38 4.46 4.61 
Guangxi 2.20 2.32 2.50 2.77 3.01 3.08 3.21 3.36 3.70 4.15 4.42 4.54 4.69 4.52 4.53 4.61 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.66 2.81 2.96 3.06 3.19 3.59 4.00 4.21 4.37 4.40 4.45 4.51 4.61 
Sichuan (Chq) 2.42 2.57 2.70 2.92 3.11 3.27 3.35 3.49 3.85 4.25 4.37 4.37 4.47 4.51 4.57 4.61 
Guizhou 2.43 2.58 2.73 3.00 3.17 3.28 3.37 3.51 3.71 3.96 4.16 4.29 4.38 4.45 4.51 4.61 
Yunan 2.28 2.39 2.50 2.76 2.91 3.16 3.31 3.45 3.73 4.01 4.27 4.38 4.49 4.53 4.53 4.61 
Tibet 3.46 3.07 2.88 3.04 3.15 3.37 3.60 3.67 3.67 3.72 4.21 4.34 4.36 4.40 4.51 4.61 
Shaanxi 2.51 2.68 2.83 3.04 3.22 3.39 3.46 3.60 3.86 4.12 4.28 4.35 4.42 4.40 4.51 4.61 
Gansu 2.32 2.48 2.64 2.79 2.98 3.13 3.23 3.36 3.60 3.93 4.16 4.20 4.34 4.42 4.44 4.61 
Qinghai 2.41 2.59 2.74 2.99 3.19 3.33 3.42 3.49 3.73 4.06 4.23 4.18 4.30 4.39 4.46 4.61 
Ningxia 2.24 2.43 2.60 2.77 3.02 3.24 3.36 3.44 3.68 3.99 4.22 4.25 4.39 4.41 4.47 4.61 
Xinjiang 2.23 2.38 2.58 2.81 3.02 3.18 3.36 3.49 3.76 4.07 4.40 4.33 4.39 4.41 4.41 4.61 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.3 	China nontradable prices (2000=100) - LpN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 2.27 2.44 2.64 2.84 2.93 3.05 3.12 3.11 3.45 3.78 3.96 4.21 4.32 4.47 4.55 4.61 
Tianjin 2.78 2.93 3.03 3.23 3.33 3.62 3.69 3.39 3.31 3.75 3.94 4.11 4.25 4.39 4.52 4.61 
Hebei 2.37 2.53 2.63 2.85 2.82 3.07 3.16 3.21 3.40 3.65 3.84 4.12 4.28 4.38 4.49 4.61 
Shanxi 2.81 2.99 3.15 3.29 3.33 3.45 3.56 3.53 3.59 3.94 4.05 4.22 4.35 4.49 4.57 4.61 
Inner Mongolia 2.64 2.87 3.01 3.19 3.32 3.51 3.57 3.41 3.63 3.78 3.89 4.11 4.20 4.30 4.42 4.61 
Liaoning 2.42 2.55 2.78 3.00 3.03 3.27 3.32 3.45 3.72 3.95 4.03 4.14 4.24 4.37 4.48 4.61 
Jilin 2.73 2.86 3.14 3.26 3.21 3.63 3.38 3.33 3.67 3.83 3.97 4.18 4.26 4.36 4.45 4.61 
Heilongjiang 2.69 2.78 2.75 3.18 3.42 3.55 3.38 3.48 3.66 3.86 3.97 4.13 4.27 4.38 4.46 4.61 
Shanghai 2.48 2.66 2.87 3.06 3.04 3.25 3.38 3.28 3.27 3.82 3.99 4.18 4.37 4.46 4.50 4.61 
Jiangsu 2.03 2.19 2.41 2.53 2.54 2.83 2.96 2.68 2.97 3.44 3.70 4.17 4.25 4.37 4.49 4.61 
Zhejiang 1.66 1.82 2.09 2.38 2.41 2.59 2.60 2.49 2.83 3.23 3.54 4.13 4.22 4.30 4.44 4.61 
Anhui 2.58 2.68 2.83 3.08 3.05 3.29 3.30 2.97 3.20 3.58 3.76 4.17 4.27 4.39 4.51 4.61 
Fujian 1.91 2.16 2.24 2.57 2.71 2.73 2.91 2.68 3.21 3.58 3.80 4.11 4.27 4.42 4.51 4.61 
Jiangxi 2.58 2.76 2.88 3.07 3.22 3.38 3.36 3.04 3.26 3.54 3.75 4.10 4.16 4.32 4.47 4.61 
Shandong 2.36 2.49 2.65 2.88 2.84 3.11 3.21 2.81 3.04 3.46 3.69 4.20 4.32 4.42 4.53 4.61 
Henan 2.66 2.84 2.90 3.24 3.25 3.42 3.47 3.15 3.28 3.51 3.74 4.13 4.30 4.40 4.48 4.61 
Hubei 2.48 2.69 2.85 3.03 2.95 3.12 3.18 3.14 3.33 3.59 3.83 4.12 4.24 4.35 4.49 4.61 
Hunan 2.53 2.67 2.85 3.13 3.07 3.22 3.34 3.05 3.29 3.66 3.83 4.24 4.34 4.44 4.51 4.61 
Guangdong 2.33 2.49 2.66 2.91 3.03 3.13 3.20 3.01 3.38 3.60 3.91 4.18 4.33 4.44 4.52 4.61 
Guangxi 2.45 2.62 2.79 2.98 2.97 3.12 3.11 3.18 3.60 3.86 4.02 4.32 4.41 4.48 4.56 4.61 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 2.68 2.95 3.24 3.39 3.57 3.23 3.77 4.14 4.13 4.22 4.41 4.46 4.57 4.61 
Sichuan (Chq) 2.29 2.45 2.60 2.89 2.95 3.13 3.24 2.94 3.15 3.46 3.65 4.13 4.29 4.44 4.52 4.61 
Guizhou 2.87 3.07 3.09 3.31 3.37 3.51 3.56 3.46 3.61 3.74 3.83 4.03 4.17 4.26 4.48 4.61 
Yunan 2.24 2.42 2.46 2.59 2.61 2.86 2.98 2.90 3.17 3.57 3.70 4.10 4.26 4.39 4.56 4.61 
Tibet 2.99 4.19 3.28 3.65 3.54 3.99 3.88 3.52 3.39 3.27 3.45 3.84 4.13 4.33 4.64 4.61 
Shaanxi 2.62 2.79 2.89 3.20 3.25 3.43 3.54 3.26 3.44 3.69 3.82 4.09 4.25 4.39 4.48 4.61 
Gansu 2.86 2.96 3.25 3.41 3.61 3.81 3.82 3.55 3.52 3.72 3.87 4.26 4.35 4.46 4.52 4.61 
Qinghai 3.08 3.28 3.38 3.56 3.47 3.62 3.65 3.47 3.56 3.75 3.91 4.18 4.28 4.40 4.50 4.61 
Ningxia 2.75 2.91 2.98 3.15 3.19 3.40 3.55 3.43 3.45 3.62 3.76 4.04 4.24 4.37 4.50 4.61 
Xinjiang 2.19 2.32 2.47 2.68 2.83 3.07 3.23 3.11 3.33 3.60 3.77 3.99 4.11 4.29 4.37 4.61 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.4 	China real GDP index for tradable sector (preceding year=100) 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000* 
Beijing 109.67 100.26 110.19 115.26 112.18 104.90 108.41 112.86 111.62 112.83 109.47 106.11 107.27 108.69 110.99 110.63 
Tianjin 114.49 109.01 106.55 114.82 106.78 103.92 105.77 109.14 112.24 113.60 113.57 113.55 111.23 107.32 110.50 110.75 
Hebei 110.22 105.02 109.81 114.82 109.65 104.56 106.12 113.30 118.71 115.21 114.09 112.96 111.94 110.37 108.75 108.74 
Shanxi 110.45 100.29 100.25 122.58 111.59 105.81 100.18 114.07 113.23 110.46 111.30 112.17 110.31 110.27 104.20 108.46 
Inner Mongolia 106.78 101.71 108.08 114.02 112.99 109.34 107.51 107.82 110.22 108.66 112.53 116.44 108.82 108.28 106.28 108.12 
Liaoning 111.62 108.29 108.83 113.58 108.49 104.27 104.77 111.42 115.20 111.14 109.96 109.06 108.27 108.94 107.69 108.29 
Jilin 108.84 104.75 119.11 113.08 112.32 114.77 102.12 112.79 114.04 113.20 113.93 114.72 105.02 110.19 106.73 107.40 
Heilongjiang 109.53 108.88 103.47 108.50 105.95 113.54 99.87 105.63 107.69 108.83 109.90 110.97 109.10 107.38 106.59 107.46 
Shanghai 109.36 101.61 103.70 108.82 107.55 104.14 106.42 113.36 115.80 113.66 112.23 110.79 110.29 107.92 108.65 109.53 
Jiangsu 114.05 109.27 108.09 118.10 112.14 105.72 108.20 129.58 119.09 117.81 114.43 111.07 110.68 109.59 109.72 109.99 
Zhejiang 116.49 111.12 110.56 115.60 109.81 104.36 115.94 122.71 125.44 121.28 117.13 112.81 110.93 109.18 109.73 110.34 
Anhui 115.18 110.23 106.96 111.52 109.73 105.88 98.90 123.24 124.66 122.04 117.95 114.47 112.50 106.58 107.30 106.50 
Fujian 112.50 108.24 113.34 123.00 120.29 106.48 117.30 121.66 128.62 125.48 120.11 114.77 113.56 110.98 109.69 108.64 
Jiangxi 108.86 106.90 110.37 113.14 112.09 106.09 108.04 117.36 115.77 116.80 115.15 113.11 110.19 106.12 106.43 106.73 
Shandong 113.60 108.32 119.13 121.54 112.59 107.10 112.44 121.51 119.21 114.23 112.93 111.63 109.23 110.15 110.14 110.20 
Henan 108.60 107.03 113.51 111.58 108.19 104.55 106.48 118.65 111.45 114.06 114.04 114.16 109.72 108.36 107.55 109.17 
Hubei 112.25 104.98 108.53 110.28 107.80 102.24 105.15 114.06 114.21 115.85 114.46 113.04 112.65 108.83 107.45 108.61 
Hunan 109.29 107.87 110.31 109.38 108.73 104.11 106.81 110.97 112.34 110.86 111.42 111.96 110.12 107.62 106.83 108.04 
Guangdong 112.74 109.42 118.32 124.08 117.93 111.10 120.63 124.36 126.44 119.76 115.26 110.56 110.75 110.33 109.00 109.96 
Guangxi 107.64 110.28 112.07 108.72 104.33 109.63 111.28 125.78 126.84 118.97 114.76 110.78 109.92 109.99 106.90 104.99 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 111.71 115.96 116.24 109.58 115.72 124.69 127.49 114.67 109.33 104.28 106.89 108.53 109.93 109.39 
Sichuan (Chq) 110.29 105.41 109.36 113.38 109.39 103.77 108.35 115.63 115.01 110.21 109.78 109.33 110.06 108.71 103.93 108.09 
Guizhou 113.09 108.21 109.39 110.82 107.41 104.42 107.92 109.55 108.86 107.59 107.73 107.86 108.12 106.86 106.65 107.32 
Yunan 108.39 104.62 112.74 113.44 117.28 110.44 105.26 108.86 109.50 111.66 110.43 109.18 108.51 107.14 106.20 105.72 
Tibet 61.27 85.47 109.67 107.44 111.08 110.48 105.29 106.28 108.92 110.11 105.56 100.60 107.54 107.12 109.35 106.82 
Shaanxi 112.37 106.74 108.93 113.14 112.96 104.87 110.82 112.01 114.49 108.63 110.17 111.76 109.20 110.75 107.01 108.14 
Gansu 109.66 106.89 102.27 112.60 108.26 106.10 106.28 108.04 111.74 109.37 109.85 110.39 105.58 107.77 106.04 107.65 
Qinghai 112.96 110.90 109.52 112.48 112.52 102.57 101.48 104.57 108.85 106.43 107.02 107.61 107.83 108.49 106.68 107.13 
Ningxia 112.31 109.28 103.86 115.88 113.32 101.95 101.51 109.87 110.80 106.05 109.24 112.44 106.33 108.49 107.80 109.48 
Xinjiang 111.89 109.66 108.99 112.50 109.77 110.03 111.97 108.73 108.79 110.65 108.36 106.03 112.15 106.92 105.46 107.47 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Note: *We assume that the industry and construction sector grow at the same rate each year. 
Data 6.5 	China real GDP index for nontradable sector (preceding year=100) 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000* 
Beijing 112.14 107.74 109.69 111.33 110.12 108.20 105.55 114.54 112.73 113.80 112.79 111.82 111.47 110.70 109.33 111.12 
Tianjin 105.53 104.17 106.10 108.02 98.26 95.96 107.44 116.00 111.91 115.45 115.34 115.23 113.17 112.27 109.24 110.66 
Hebei 111.12 107.17 110.99 115.65 117.80 101.05 119.48 111.20 118.12 114.28 113.94 113.62 112.90 110.87 109.22 110.31 
Shanxi 118.51 113.39 106.87 106.39 102.12 107.65 112.27 104.46 110.95 108.00 108.61 109.24 110.95 107.08 106.85 106.87 
Inner Mongolia 121.79 111.53 104.27 107.80 105.64 92.95 113.09 118.31 112.11 112.58 110.06 107.58 111.36 111.70 110.01 111.82 
Liaoning 115.96 116.46 112.21 114.28 119.20 96.64 104.09 111.01 114.69 111.53 109.91 108.31 109.40 107.86 108.84 109.78 
Jilin 115.15 116.40 101.38 109.28 121.19 77.28 115.28 124.66 111.87 115.85 114.03 112.19 116.23 107.95 109.84 111.93 
Heilongjiang 103.61 108.75 134.93 110.00 109.46 84.02 120.95 106.77 107.83 108.64 109.09 109.55 112.19 111.21 109.49 111.42 
Shanghai 110.77 105.50 111.21 111.32 114.19 101.37 102.98 113.39 113.83 115.54 116.16 116.82 116.78 113.54 112.51 112.59 
Jiangsu 118.97 114.35 118.17 128.29 129.03 100.66 103.49 119.90 124.75 113.54 113.67 113.95 113.85 112.75 110.23 111.25 
Zhejiang 123.90 119.59 115.98 111.93 112.46 95.68 116.68 112.31 118.97 117.93 114.91 111.90 110.91 111.37 110.10 111.83 
Anhui 116.16 118.85 117.11 108.64 112.83 91.24 108.36 123.29 113.63 120.99 116.68 112.39 111.96 111.28 110.06 110.26 
Fujian 111.64 99.17 107.64 101.21 101.89 104.73 110.36 135.63 122.91 117.02 116.36 115.87 115.53 111.39 110.03 110.31 
Jiangxi 113.23 108.08 109.19 118.81 116.77 96.93 110.57 122.43 114.62 116.82 115.29 113.75 113.87 112.58 110.25 109.99 
Shandong 112.56 112.12 110.82 114.26 123.12 91.37 112.40 122.54 118.66 120.06 116.51 112.93 114.18 111.66 109.78 110.65 
Henan 115.69 109.89 121.84 109.04 112.28 102.06 116.59 112.01 111.69 114.57 113.89 113.24 111.82 109.36 109.02 109.68 
Hubei 114.15 105.67 106.10 103.15 101.94 100.41 108.91 109.61 116.00 114.13 113.63 113.14 113.37 112.85 109.86 110.63 
Hunan 112.76 110.78 111.65 109.58 113.81 100.80 110.26 119.32 116.55 111.09 112.16 113.24 111.77 111.22 110.69 110.64 
Guangdong 112.70 107.93 109.86 108.72 109.74 104.27 116.83 124.44 118.83 117.77 114.01 110.30 109.63 109.25 109.72 111.82 
Guangxi 113.75 108.18 106.46 110.71 112.12 97.57 117.15 121.82 119.09 113.43 111.22 109.03 107.48 107.35 109.20 111.19 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 114.02 115.24 114.08 106.62 108.50 133.96 117.11 108.78 107.09 105.47 106.44 108.06 107.10 108.17 
Sichuan (Chq) 113.36 109.05 114.17 108.08 109.02 102.62 106.41 117.45 115.59 113.14 111.68 110.23 109.88 109.39 108.76 110.30 
Guizhou 113.61 106.45 121.67 112.76 110.89 100.30 108.91 106.63 113.12 110.20 109.95 109.70 109.73 110.71 110.86 110.50 
Yunan 112.35 106.96 113.09 121.31 124.19 106.14 114.19 120.46 117.69 113.66 113.23 112.77 111.22 109.58 108.74 109.11 
Tibet 127.64 43.42 122.22 106.11 130.91 99.64 143.41 110.94 107.95 125.70 129.04 132.44 116.43 115.68 110.66 112.96 
Shaanxi 108.89 104.89 108.62 105.14 105.42 100.69 103.75 109.81 111.26 108.04 107.89 107.76 110.71 106.03 110.08 110.25 
Gansu 125.92 130.88 115.83 126.00 120.78 103.15 108.60 113.65 111.48 112.16 112.57 112.96 112.35 110.92 111.29 109.73 
Qinghai 110.04 102.27 103.00 103.25 109.68 105.05 111.39 111.29 111.58 110.52 110.07 109.57 110.22 109.26 109.77 111.28 
Ningxia 115.16 112.36 118.62 114.43 117.05 103.73 108.02 105.57 109.68 111.36 109.96 108.55 109.23 108.74 110.05 110.85 
Xinjiang 109.75 109.29 109.52 115.14 117.18 101.10 122.49 124.75 116.27 111.06 109.16107.23 109.29 107.92 110.43 110.14 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Note: *We assume that the industry and construction sector grow at the same rate each year. 
Data 6.6 	China tradable sector TFP at 2000 prices - LtfpT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.78 0.88 1.02 0.97 1.41 1.48 1.61 1.73 0.85 1.64 2.00 1.98 1.42 1.29 1.25 1.29 
Tianjin 0.74 0.86 0.98 1.17 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.36 1.67 1.88 2.35 2.37 1.55 1.41 1.40 1.36 
Hebei 1.04 1.15 1.28 1.45 1.57 1.61 1.68 1.79 1.80 1.42 2.37 2.55 2.07 2.09 2.07 2.06 
Shanxi -0.15 -0.03 0.09 0.27 0.47 0.56 0.60 0.70 1.45 1.64 1.90 2.13 1.80 1.83 1.65 1.54 
Inner Mongolia 0.10 0.24 0.37 0.61 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.87 1.31 1.51 1.74 1.82 1.62 1.66 1.54 1.48 
Liaoning 1.05 1.17 1.28 1.43 1.49 1.49 1.53 1.62 1.59 1.66 2.13 2.14 1.73 1.81 1.70 1.72 
Jilin 0.85 0.97 1.12 1.27 1.35 1.43 1.45 1.52 1.45 1.59 1.92 1.97 1.59 1.65 1.55 1.63 
Heilongjiang 0.47 0.63 0.72 0.86 0.97 1.04 1.11 1.17 1.45 1.59 1.94 2.03 1.76 1.69 1.78 1.49 
Shanghai 0.62 0.72 0.82 0.96 1.06 1.10 1.23 1.43 1.55 1.60 2.25 2.16 1.28 1.14 1.09 1.08 
Jiangsu 1.32 1.47 1.62 1.84 1.92 1.99 2.06 2.31 1.83 2.16 3.21 3.08 1.98 1.93 1.93 1.96 
Zhejiang 1.51 1.67 1.84 2.06 2.14 2.17 2.31 2.49 2.02 2.23 3.36 3.31 2.25 2.18 2.14 2.32 
Anhui 0.82 0.96 1.09 1.29 1.41 1.47 1.48 1.63 1.33 2.00 2.74 2.70 2.09 2.13 2.05 2.03 
Fujian 0.61 0.73 0.88 1.14 1.31 1.37 1.49 1.68 1.97 1.95 3.04 3.11 1.82 1.95 2.01 1.99 
Jiangxi 0.76 0.90 1.04 1.24 1.35 1.42 1.50 1.64 1.95 2.26 2.32 2.44 2.09 2.14 2.09 1.99 
Shandong 0.92 1.03 1.18 1.41 1.56 1.65 1.75 1.91 1.99 2.13 2.66 2.70 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.05 
Henan 0.73 0.88 1.05 1.22 1.35 1.42 1.47 1.61 1.84 1.97 2.47 2.63 1.28 2.09 2.05 2.08 
Hubei 0.89 1.02 1.17 1.34 1.46 1.51 1.57 1.63 0.78 1.89 2.36 2.45 2.09 2.10 2.08 2.05 
Hunan 1.31 1.44 1.57 1.73 1.81 1.85 1.86 1.92 1.80 2.05 2.50 2.60 2.27 2.48 2.44 2.44 
Guangdong 0.83 0.97 1.14 1.40 1.54 1.56 1.69 1.83 0.39 1.61 3.04 2.99 1.66 1.60 1.65 1.69 
Guangxi 0.97 1.12 1.27 1.46 1.59 1.69 1.77 1.92 1.76 1.83 2.46 2.44 1.60 2.01 1.96 1.90 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.87 0.96 1.50 1.54 2.17 2.01 1.44 1.44 1.28 1.29 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.89 1.00 1.13 1.34 1.43 1.48 1.52 1.61 1.74 1.95 2.36 2.39 1.82 1.82 1.73 1.68 
Guizhou 0.73 0.84 0.95 1.15 1.24 1.29 1.33 1.38 1.46 1.52 1.88 1.92 1.69 1.70 1.65 1.65 
Yunan 0.54 0.66 0.81 1.02 1.18 1.32 1.37 1.45 1.59 1.77 2.11 2.15 1.76 1.71 1.66 1.64 
Tibet -0.45 -0.39 -0.27 -0.18 -0.03 0.08 1.01 0.16 1.20 1.11 1.36 1.28 1.05 0.97 0.70 0.40 
Shaanxi 0.60 0.73 0.85 1.03 1.14 1.19 1.25 1.32 1.57 1.64 1.87 1.88 1.65 1.65 1.57 1.40 
Gansu 0.55 0.69 0.77 0.91 1.03 1.08 1.12 1.19 1.35 1.56 1.70 1.81 1.56 1.68 1.60 1.55 
Qinghai -0.28 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.19 1.07 1.28 1.32 1.30 1.04 1.03 0.98 1.00 
Ningxia -0.08 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.47 0.54 0.58 0.69 1.13 1.31 1.47 1.60 1.38 1.33 1.30 1.38 
Xinjiang 0.27 0.43 0.52 0.61 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.72 1.29 1.41 1.86 1.75 1.59 1.44 1.30 1.30 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.7 	China nontradable sector TFP at 2000 prices - LtfpN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.76 0.88 0.97 1.13 1.20 1.39 1.44 1.59 1.62 1.82 1.92 1.87 1.86 1.71 1.69 1.76 
Tianjin 0.54 0.66 0.76 0.90 0.97 1.06 1.21 1.24 1.37 1.50 1.61 1.66 1.59 1.30 1.19 1.16 
Hebei 0.97 1.10 1.20 1.38 1.40 1.45 1.56 1.59 1.69 1.70 1.59 1.49 1.29 1.04 0.86 0.79 
Shanxi 0.28 0.41 0.50 0.62 0.72 0.83 0.92 0.98 1.12 1.21 1.22 1.15 1.07 0.88 0.77 0.72 
Inner Mongolia 0.92 1.04 1.13 1.26 1.33 1.39 1.48 1.51 1.51 1.59 1.59 1.55 1.40 1.16 0.93 0.82 
Liaoning 0.72 0.86 0.95 1.12 1.21 1.24 1.34 1.47 1.58 1.66 1.67 1.60 1.46 1.22 1.09 1.07 
Jilin 1.52 1.65 1.73 1.87 1.93 1.89 2.03 2.10 1.94 1.94 2.05 2.02 1.89 1.47 1.24 1.07 
Heilongjiang 0.90 1.04 1.17 1.24 1.30 1.31 1.45 1.50 1.50 1.53 1.61 1.54 1.44 1.26 1.14 1.07 
Shanghai 0.93 1.05 1.17 1.32 1.40 1.45 1.57 1.73 1.94 1.93 1.94 1.80 1.62 1.40 1.35 1.33 
Jiangsu 1.14 1.26 1.39 1.56 1.58 1.59 1.65 1.64 1.73 1.79 1.77 1.80 1.66 1.48 1.35 1.28 
Zhejiang 1.05 1.18 1.32 1.52 1.58 1.57 1.66 1.63 1.76 1.79 1.73 1.75 1.60 1.41 1.30 1.23 
Anhui 1.00 1.13 1.24 1.38 1.44 1.46 1.51 1.58 1.60 1.70 1.63 1.62 1.53 1.31 1.16 1.01 
Fujian 0.87 0.99 1.11 1.26 1.35 1.39 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.45 1.31 1.20 1.12 1.00 0.89 0.89 
Jiangxi 1.65 1.76 1.83 2.03 2.07 2.02 2.03 1.95 1.80 1.74 1.71 1.60 1.39 1.02 0.98 0.91 
Shandong 0.42 0.55 0.69 0.92 0.99 1.03 1.20 1.14 1.20 1.33 1.38 1.47 1.44 1.23 1.07 0.99 
Henan 1.06 1.20 1.35 1.51 1.59 1.66 1.78 1.69 1.65 1.69 1.71 1.68 1.58 1.36 1.20 1.10 
Hubei 1.05 1.17 1.27 1.39 1.45 1.52 1.57 1.57 1.65 1.63 1.63 1.58 1.50 1.27 1.07 0.97 
Hunan 1.39 1.52 1.65 1.81 1.84 1.88 1.94 1.89 1.83 1.75 1.72 1.61 1.47 1.24 1.11 0.98 
Guangdong 0.22 0.36 0.50 0.72 0.86 0.90 1.08 1.12 1.30 1.31 1.21 1.09 1.02 0.95 0.90 0.87 
Guangxi 0.75 0.89 1.02 1.20 1.25 1.29 1.38 1.45 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.26 1.07 0.83 0.69 0.61 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.05 2.29 1.92 1.62 1.60 1.01 1.06 1.00 0.68 0.47 0.12 0.01 -0.07 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.96 1.09 1.22 1.40 1.49 1.57 1.63 1.62 1.66 1.67 1.65 1.65 1.53 1.24 1.06 0.93 
Guizhou 0.98 1.11 1.26 1.37 1.45 1.54 1.64 1.68 1.69 1.78 1.78 1.74 1.58 1.24 1.03 0.90 
Yunan 0.66 0.81 0.95 1.12 1.22 1.30 1.39 1.44 1.46 1.45 1.48 1.45 1.30 1.03 0.86 0.70 
Tibet -0.18 -0.18 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.53 0.37 0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.42 
Shaanxi 0.94 1.07 1.19 1.34 1.43 1.49 1.51 1.56 1.60 1.64 1.65 1.55 1.39 1.10 0.90 0.80 
Gansu 1.58 1.71 1.79 1.92 1.99 1.98 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.21 2.16 2.05 1.83 1.52 1.19 1.01 
Qinghai 0.50 0.63 0.78 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.23 1.34 1.39 1.42 1.33 1.23 1.04 0.89 0.56 
Ningxia 0.63 0.77 0.88 1.01 1.07 1.17 1.21 1.19 1.25 1.24 1.30 1.11 0.97 0.75 0.60 0.53 
Xinjiang 0.82 0.97 1.06 1.12 1.16 1.24 1.35 1.44 1.51 1.49 1.43 1.34 1.18 0.89 0.77 0.93 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.8 	China gross output value of the nontradable sector (2000 constant 
prices) (100,000,000 Yuan) - LyN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 2.44 2.40 2.42 2.43 2.42 2.40 2.38 2.46 2.44 2.45 2.45 2.44 2.43 2.43 2.41 2.43 
Tianjin 1.70 1.69 1.71 1.73 1.63 1.61 1.72 1.80 1:76 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.77 1.76 1.74 1.75 
Hebei 2.62 2.59 2.62 2.66 2.68 2.53 2.69 2.62 2.68 2.65 2.65 2.64 2.64 2.62 2.61 2.62 
Shanxi 1.75 1.71 1.65 1.65 1.60 1.66 1.70 1.63 1.69 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.69 1,65 1.65 1.65 
Inner Mongolia 1.50 1.42 1.35 1.38 1.36 1.23 1.43 1.47 1.42 1.42 1.40 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.40 1.42 
Liaoning 2.81 2.82 2.78 2.80 2.84 2.63 2.71 2.77 2.80 2.78 2.76 2.75 2.76 2.74 2.75 2.76 
Jilin 1.66 1.67 1.53 1.61 1.71 1.26 1.66 1.74 1.63 1.67 1.65 1.64 1.67 1.60 1.61 1.63 
Heilongjiang 2.08 2.12 2.34 2.14 2.13 1.87 2.23 2.11 2.12 2.12 2.13 2.13 2.16 2.15 2.13 2.15 
Shanghai 2.64 2.59 2.64 2.64 2.67 2.55 2.57 2.66 2.67 2.68 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.66 2.65 2.66 
Jiangsu 3.45 3.41 3.45 3.53 3.53 3.29 3.31 3.46 3.50 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.40 3.38 3.39 
Zhejiang 3.38 3.34 3.31 3.27 3.28 3.12 3.32 3.28 3.34 3.33 3.30 3.27 3.27 3.27 3.26 3.27 
Anhui 2.13 2.15 2.14 2.06 2.10 1.89 2.06 2.19 2.11 2.17 2.13 2.10 2.09 2.09 2.07 2.08 
Fujian 2.41 2.29 2.37 2.31 2.32 2.35 2.40 2.60 2.51 2.46 2.45 2.45 2.44 2.41 2.39 2.40 
Jiangxi 1.63 1.58 1.59 1.67 1.66 1.47 1.60 1.70 1.64 1.66 1.64 1.63 1.63 1.62 1.60 1.60 
Shandong 3.09 3.08 3.07 3.10 3.18 2.88 3.09 3.17 3.14 3.15 3.12 3.09 3.10 3.08 3.06 3.07 
Henan 2.48 2.43 2.53 2.42 2.45 2.35 2.49 2.45 2.44 2.47 2.46 2.46 2.44 2.42 2.42 2.42 
Hubei 2.48 2.40 2.40 2.38 2.36 2.35 2.43 2.44 2.49 2.48 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.44 2.45 
Hunan 2.30 2.28 2.29 2.27 2.31 2.19 2.28 2.36 2.33 2.29 2.30 2.31 2.29 2.29 2.28 2.28 
Guangdong 3.33 3.29 3.30 3.29 3.30 3.25 3.37 3.43 3.38 3.37 3.34 3.31 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.32 
Guangxi 1.80 1.75 1.73 1.77 1.78 1.64 1.83 1.87 1.84 1.79 1.77 1.75 1.74 1.74 1.76 1.77 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.59 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.38 
Sichuan (Chq) 3.00 2.96 3.00 2.95 2.96 2.90 2.93 3.03 3.02 2.99 2.98 2.97 2.96 2.96 2.95 2.97 
Guizhou 0.95 0.88 1.02 0.94 0.92 0.82 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Yunan 1.87 1.82 1.87 1.94 1.97 1.81 1.88 1.94 1.91 1.88 1.88 1.87 1.86 1.84 1.84 1.84 
Tibet -0.98 -2.06 -1.03 -1.17 -0.96 -1.23 -0.87 -1.12 -1.15 -1.00 -0.97 -0.95 -1.08 -1.08 -1.13 -1.11 
Shaanxi 1.62 1.58 1.62 1.59 1.59 1.54 1.57 1.63 1.64 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.64 1.59 1.63 1.63 
Gansu 1.20 1.24 1.12 1.20 1.16 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.08 1.06 
Qinghai -0.17 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.17 -0.22 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 
Ningxia 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
Xinjiang 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.60 1.62 1.47 1.66 1.68 1.61 1.57 1.55 1.53 1.55 1.54 1.56 1.56 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.9 	China gross output value of the tradable sector (2000 constant 
prices) (100,000,000 Yuan) - LyT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 3.41 3.32 3.41 3.46 3.43 3.36 3.40 3.44 3.42 3.44 3.41 3.37 3.38 3.40 3.42 3.42 
Tianjin 3.56 3.51 3.49 3.56 3.49 3.46 3.48 3.51 3.54 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.53 3.49 3.52 3.52 
Hebei 4.58 4.53 4.58 4.62 4.58 4.53 4.54 4.61 4.66 4.63 4.62 4.61 4.60 4.58 4.57 4.57 
Shanxi 3.38 3.28 3.28 3.48 3.39 3.33 3.28 3.41 3.40 3.38 3.38 3.39 3.37 3.37 3.32 3.36 
Inner Mongolia 3.00 2.95 3.01 3.06 3.05 3.02 3.00 3.01 3.03 3.01 3.05 3.08 3.01 3.01 2.99 3.01 
Liaoning 4.63 4.60 4.61 4.65 4.60 4.57 4.57 4.63 4.66 4.63 4.62 4.61 4.60 4.61 4.60 4.60 
Jilin 3.40 3.36 3.49 3.44 3.43 3.45 3.33 3.43 3.44 3.44 3.44 3.45 3.36 3.41 3.38 3.38 
Heilongjiang 3.81 3.80 3.75 3.80 3.78 3.85 3.72 3.77 3.79 3.80 3.81 3.82 3.81 3.79 3.78 3.79 
Shanghai 4.28 4.20 4.22 4.27 4.26 4.23 4.25 4.31 4.33 4.31 4.30 4.29 4.28 4.26 4.27 4.28 
Jiangsu 5.28 5.24 5.23 5.32 527 5.21 5.23 5.41 5.33 5.31 5.29 5.26 5.25 5.24 5.24 5.25 
Zhejiang 5.19 5.14 5.14 5.18 5.13 5.08 5.18 5.24 5.26 5.23 5.19 5.16 5.14 5.12 5.13 5.13 
Anhui 4.09 4.05 4.02 4.06 4.04 4.01 3.94 4.16 4.17 4.15 4.12 4.09 4.07 4.02 4.02 4.01 
Fujian 4.26 4.22 4.27 4.35 4.33 4.20 4.30 4.34 4.39 4.37 4.32 4.28 4.27 4.24 4.23 4.22 
Jiangxi 3.28 3.27 3.30 3.32 3.31 3.26 3.28 3.36 3.35 3.35 3.34 3.32 3.30 3.26 3.26 3.26 
Shandong 5.11 5.06 5.16 5.18 5.10 5.05 5.10 5.18 5.16 5.11 5.10 5.09 5.07 5.08 5.08 5.08 
Henan 4.46 4.45 4.50 4.49 4.46 4.42 4.44 4.55 4.49 4.51 4.51 4.51 4.47 4.46 4.45 4.46 
Hubei 4.45 4.39 4.42 4.43 4.41 4.36 4.39 4.47 4.47 4.48 4.47 4.46 4.46 4.42 4.41 4.42 
Hunan 4.17 4.15 4.18 4.17 4.16 4.12 4.14 4.18 4.19 4.18 4.19 4.19 4.17 4.15 4.14 4.15 
Guangdong 5.27 5.24 5.32 5.37 5.32 5.26 5.34 5.37 5.39 5.33 5.30 5.25 5.26 5.25 5.24 5.25 
Guangxi 3.31 3.33 3.35 3.32 3.28 3.33 3.34 3.46 3.47 3.41 3.37 3.34 3.33 3.33 3.30 3.28 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.83 1.77 1.83 1.90 1.92 1.82 1.77 1.72 1.75 1.76 1.77 1.77 
Sichuan (Chq) 4.32 4.28 4.31 4.35 4.31 4.26 4.30 4.37 4.36 4.32 4.32 4.31 4.32 4.31 4.26 4.30 
Guizhou 2.69 2.65 2.66 2.67 2.64 2.61 2.65 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.64 2.65 2.65 2.64 2.63 2.64 
Yunan 3.14 3.10 3.18 3.18 3.22 3.16 3.11 3.14 3.15 3.17 3.16 3.15 3.14 3.13 3.12 3.11 
Tibet -0.95 -0.61 -0.36 -0.39 -0.35 -0.36 -0.41 -0.40 -0.37 -0.36 -0.40 -0.45 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.39 
Shaanxi 3.09 3.04 3.06 3.10 3.10 3.02 3.08 3.09 3.11 3.06 3.07 3.09 3.06 3.08 3.04 3.05 
Gansu 2.85 2.82 2.78 2.88 2.84 2.82 2.82 2.84 2.87 2.85 2.85 2.86 2.81 2.83 2.82 2.83 
Qinghai 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.14 1.14 1.05 1.04 1.07 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.09 
Ningxia 1.35 1.32 1.27 1.38 1.36 1.25 1.25 1.33 1.34 1.29 1.32 1.35 1.30 1.32 1.31 1.32 
Xinjiang 2.74 2.72 2.71 2.74 2.72 2.72 2.74 2.71 2.71 2.72 2.70 2.68 2.74 2.69 2.68 2.70 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.10 	China investment of the tradable sector (2000 constant prices) 
(100,000,000 Yuan) - LiT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.56 -0.64 -0.67 -0.69 -0.19 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.51 -0.06 
Tianjin 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.74 0.71 0.02 0.22 0.65 0.48 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.50 
Hebei 0.92 1.05 1.25 1.32 1.00 0.93 0.85 1.07 1.03 0.87 0.95 1.02 1.07 1.02 0.76 0.84 
Shanxi 1.13 0.95 0.85 0.89 0.57 0.62 0.77 0.80 0.66 0.40 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.34 0.28 0.41 
Inner Mongolia 0.54 0.30 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.23 0.38 0.64 0.75 0.61 0.42 0.34 0.24 0.00 -0.60 -0.27 
Liaoning 1.05 1.19 1.38 1.36 1.32 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.46 1.28 1.22 1.04 0.91 0.75 0.51 0.56 
Jilin 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.14 -0.23 -0.23 -0.07 0.26 0.43 0.44 0.70 0.73 0.43 0.10 -0.07 0.00 
Heilongjiang 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.87 0.59 0.68 0.49 0.61 0.71 0.49 0.57 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.35 0.26 
Shanghai 0.99 1.00 1.16 1.29 1.15 1.05 0.77 0.59 0.86 0.71 1.02 1.34 1.33 1.40 1.12 0.85 
Jiangsu 1.24 1.33 1.46 1.45 1.02 0.83 0.96 1.07 0.76 0.66 0.60 0.94 1.11 1.22 0.91 0.87 
Zhejiang 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.79 0.70 0.69 0.84 0.70 0.74 0.69 1.06 1.12 1.09 0.94 0.80 
Anhui 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.26 0.21 0.35 0.62 0.51 0.34 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.03 -0.14 
Fujian 1.06 1.21 1.39 1.07 0.66 0.60 0.76 0.74 0.65 0.47 0.53 0.25 0.33 0.49 0.41 0.29 
Jiangxi -0.07 -0.20 -0.25 -0.36 -0.36 -0.42 -0.43 -0.41 -0.39 -0.61 -0.40 -0.44 -0.76 -0.76 -0.53 -0.34 
Shandong 1.47 1.62 1.86 1.80 1.41 1.32 1.25 1.27 1.03 1.05 1.10 1.20 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.13 
Henan 1.06 0.97 0.94 1.06 0.95 0.71 1.05 0.99 0.73 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.86 0.70 0.78 
Hubei 0.93 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.40 0.52 0.62 1.13 1.25 1.34 1.42 1.29 1.05 1.03 0.88 0.97 
Hunan 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.48 0.64 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.11 0.04 -0.24 -0.15 0.01 
Guangdong 1.90 1.99 2.14 1.62 1.80 2.02 1.91 1.96 2.02 2.30 1.85 1.71 1.43 1.44 1.50 1.20 
Guangxi -0.28 -0.36 -0.42 -0.47 -0.67 -0.75 -0.57 -0.25 0.07 -0.05 -0.27 -0.60 -0.77 -0.30 -0.16 0.00 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.19 -0.76 -0.94 -0.92 -0.67 -0.31 -0.22 -0.19 -0.42 -0.76 -0.92 -0.73 -0.80 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.77 0.77 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.74 0.75 0.91 1.03 0.95 0.78 0.86 
Guizhou -0.65 -0.61 -0.48 -0.61 -0.72 -0.56 -0.44 -0.38 -0.41 -0.47 -0.67 -0.38 -0.36 -0.65 -0.91 -0.66 
Yunan 0.01 -0.14 -0.24 -0.41 -0.46 -0.52 -0.31 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.18 -0.29 -0.16 -0.15 
Tibet -3.18 -2.97 -3.06 -3.18 -3.18 -2.80 -2.50 -2.22 -2.13 -1.84 -1.88 -2.31 -2.08 -2.24 -2.40 -2.22 
Shaanxi -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.19 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.23 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.01 
Gansu -0.16 -0.11 0.02 0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.42 -0.41 -0.34 0.00 -0.09 -0.18 -0.26 -0.25 
Qinghai -0.67 -0.53 -0.31 -0.39 -0.94 -1.14 -1.09 -0.97 -0.76 -1.11 -1.18 -0.58 -0.65 -0.65 -0.86 -1.09 
Ningxia -0.79 -0.72 -0.56 -1.02 -1.33 -1.26 -1.14 -1.28 -1.52 -1.54 -1.76 -1.33 -1.28 -1.38 -1.16 -1.20 
Xinjiang 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.39 0.40 0.89 0.87 0.72 0.36 0.54 0.56 0.68 0.81 0.75 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.11 	China investment of the nontradable sector (2000 constant prices) 
(100,000,000 Yuan) - LiN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -0.25 -0.33 -0.35 -0.94 -0.86 -0.84 -0.51 -0.06 0.12 0.00 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.14 -0.65 -0.92 
Tianjin -1.10 -1.03 -0.88 -1.10 -1.46 -1.69 -1.71 -1.15 -0.89 -0.67 -0.90 -0.96 -0.58 -0.20 -0.42 -0.64 
Hebei -0.59 -0.59 -0.49 -0.54 -0.63 -1.01 -0.67 -0.51 -0.11 0.24 0.44 0.38 0.58 0.74 0.78 0.64 
Shanxi -0.72 -0.79 -0.81 -1.17 -1.26 -1.31 -1.43 -0.85 -0.88 -0.59 -0.25 -0.46 -0.44 -0.10 -0.16 -0.35 
Inner Mongolia -1.45 -1.60 -1.64 -1.88 -2.37 -2.41 -1.30 -0.52 -0.54 -0.66 -0.96 -0.99 -0.87 -0.58 -0.27 -0.25 
Liaoning 0.10 -0.01 -0.16 -0.16 -0.46 -0.71 -0.55 -0.23 -0.13 0.07 -0.11 -0.06 0.43 0.72 0.58 0.21 
Jilin -1.97 -2.14 -2.32 -1.83 -1.98 -2.54 -1.78 -1.34 -0.69 -0.72 -1.62 -0.95 -0.90 -0.32 -0.13 -0.25 
Heilongjiang -0.80 -0.76 -0.53 -0.81 -1.03 -1.35 -0.64 -0.54 -0.24 -0.13 -0.31 -0.32 -0.02 0.16 0.14 0.17 
Shanghai -0.55 -0.43 -0.36 -0.62 -0.82 -1.10 -1.05 -0.83 -0.17 0.29 0.07 0.36 0.41 0.32 0.30 -0.10 
Jiangsu -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.21 0.05 0.86 0.97 0.82 0.89 0.62 0.70 0.89 0.87 0.80 
Zhejiang -0.02 -0.17 -0.32 -0.30 -0.49 -0.33 0.01 0.42 0.91 1.05 1.02 0.69 0.68 0.88 0.86 0.93 
Anhui -1.18 -1.26 -1.34 -1.46 -1.46 -1.52 -1.10 -0.64 -0.84 -0.26 -0.03 -0.48 -0.47 -0.15 -0.15 0.02 
Fujian -0.68 -0.88 -0.83 -0.95 -0.96 -0.75 -0.68 0.01 0.31 0.56 0.64 0.57 0.38 0.25 0.19 -0.04 
Jiangxi -2.42 -2.22 -1.97 -2.43 -2.33 -2.09 -1.83 -0.94 -0.39 -0.26 -0.25 -0.55 -0.17 0.03 -0.46 -0.57 
Shandong 0.20 -0.01 -0.28 -0.37 -0.52 -0.75 -0.17 0.89 0.99 0.69 0.64 0.31 0.27 0.82 0.91 0.81 
Henan -1.03 -1.41 -1.58 -1.45 -1.99 -1.89 -1.34 -0.52 0.23 0.41 0.23 -0.04 -0.07 0.32 0.31 0.57 
Hubei -0.82 -0.86 -0.77 -0.80 -1.16 -0.97 -0.40 -0.02 0.37 0.33 0.11 -0.14 -0.02 0.37 0.55 0.40 
Hunan -1.41 -1.61 -1.66 -1.61 -1.80 -1.85 -1.21 -0.35 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.00 -0.16 0.19 0.15 0.27 
Guangdong 0.90 0.53 0.14 -0.08 0.34 0.44 -0.65 1.75 1.65 1.90 1.77 1.49 1.14 1.09 1.07 1.15 
Guangxi -1.12 -1.47 -1.84 -1.63 -1.82 -1.88 -1.20 -0.72 -0.32 -0.22 -0.26 -0.08 -0.15 0.14 -0.04 -0.19 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.25 -1.80 -1.84 -1.64 -0.91 -0.48 -0.68 -1.08 -0.76 -0.84 -0.47 -0.67 -0.88 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.81 -0.26 -0.43 -0.79 
Guizhou -0.77 -1.01 -1.00 -1.17 -1.13 -1.24 -0.68 -0.16 0.06 0.42 0.49 0.36 0.41 0.95 0.76 0.82 
Yunan -1.71 -1.98 -1.99 -2.18 -2.25 -2.78 -2.30 -1.58 -1.34 -1.26 -1.13 -1.28 -1.25 -0.48 -0.70 -0.66 
Tibet -1.64 -3.11 -2.53 -2.80 -2.60 -2.65 -2.07 -0.85 0.03 0.15 -0.02 -0.11 0.14 0.45 0.14 0.39 
Shaanxi -2.33 -2.65 -2.83 -2.86 -3.05 -2.52 -2.24 -1.76 -1.43 -1.86 -1.70 -1.67 -2.17 -1.65 -1.30 -1.33 
Gansu -1.71 -1.85 -2.11 -2.14 -2.41 -2.20 -1.59 -1.63 -0.81 -0.74 -0.76 -0.74 -0.52 0.09 0.13 0.07 
Qinghai -2.93 -2.88 -2.71 -2.74 -2.52 -2.54 -2.41 -1.94 -1.80 -1.75 -2.01 -1.67 -1.18 -0.89 -0.42 -0.35 
Ningxia -2.23 -2.63 -2.99 -3.11 -3.53 -2.87 -2.78 -2.61 -1.79 -2.15 -2.21 -2.23 -2.04 -1.75 -1.79 -0.89 
Xinjiang -2.40 -2.45 -2.42 -2.67 -2.91 -2.87 -2.48 -1.86 -1.74 -1.51 -1.72 -1.68 -1.42 -1.27 -1.18 -1.13 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.12 	China capital stock value of the tradable sector (2000 constant 
prices) (100,000,000 Yuan) - LkT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 3.01 2.85 2.78 3.23 2.33 2.23 2.10 2.00 2.89 2.07 1.73 1.77 2.40 2.52 2.57 2.48 
Tianjin 3.19 3.04 2.89 2.73 2.52 2.49 2.52 2.44 2.13 1.91 1.44 1.42 2.22 2.32 2.36 2.39 
Hebei 3.91 3.76 3.64 3.49 3.30 3.21 3.13 3.06 3.06 3.41 2.42 2.21 2.67 2.62 2.61 2.62 
Shanxi 4.12 3.96 3.83 3.86 3.46 3.31 3.22 3.19 2.31 2.06 1.80 1.54 1.84 1.77 1.91 2.06 
Inner Mongolia 3.53 3.38 3.27 2.94 2.90 2.78 2.70 2.64 2.12 1.89 1.66 1.58 1.70 1.61 1.69 1.75 
Liaoning 4.04 3.90 3.77 3.63 3.51 3.49 3.43 3.37 3.36 3.24 2.75 2.70 3.09 2.99 3.07 3.04 
Jilin 3.03 2.90 2.82 2.59 2.49 2.43 2.28 2.28 2.33 2.16 1.85 1.83 2.13 2.04 2.09 1.98 
Heilongjiang 3.96 3.79 3.61 3.50 3.35 3.30 3.10 3.07 2.75 2.57 2.21 2.11 2.34 2.39 2.30 2.55 
Shanghai 3.99 3.83 3.76 3.65 3.53 3.47 3.34 3.21 3.09 2.99 2.29 2.39 3.28 3.37 3.44 3.45 
Jiangsu 4.23 4.04 3.84 3.70 3.54 3.41 3.37 3.26 3.65 3.28 2.18 2.29 3.40 3.43 3.43 3.39 
Zhejiang 3.95 3.74 3.53 3.34 3.19 3.11 3.06 2.91 3.39 3.12 1.92 1.93 2.98 3.02 3.07 2.88 
Anhui 3.58 3.40 3.22 3.04 2.90 2.81 2.75 2.79 3.05 2.33 1.53 1.52 2.11 2.01 2.10 2.10 
Fujian 4.05 3.90 3.75 3.51 3.31 3.13 3.09 2.92 2.61 2.58 1.43 1.31 2.62 2.44 2.37 2.37 
Jiangxi 2.92 2.77 2.63 2.42 2.28 2.14 2.07 1.99 1.61 1.26 1.24 1.11 1.43 1.28 1.35 1.44 
Shandong 4.47 4.32 4.23 4.01 3.75 3.61 3.54 3.43 3.29 3.10 2.58 2.52 3.18 3.19 3.19 3.15 
Henan 4.06 3.91 3.76 3.55 3.37 3.27 3.22 3.17 2.84 2.71 2.19 2.03 3.37 2.50 2.53 2.51 
Hubei 3.92 3.72 3.59 3.41 3.25 3.15 3.12 3.14 3.99 2.80 2.29 2.17 2.50 2.45 2.45 2.48 
Hunan 3.23 3.08 2.94 2.75 2.65 2.58 2.58 2.54 2.66 2.35 1.88 1.74 2.04 1.79 1.82 1.83 
Guangdong 4.90 4.73 4.56 4.29 4.10 4.00 3.94 3.80 5.27 3.93 2.41 2.41 3.76 3.81 3.74 3.70 
Guangxi 2.72 2.61 2.43 2.18 1.96 1.92 1.83 1.77 1.93 1.76 1.08 1.05 1.87 1.48 1.51 1.56 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.81 1.70 1.58 1.52 1.46 0.74 0.57 -0.13 -0.04 0.57 0.55 0.72 0.68 
Sichuan (Chq) 3.77 3.63 3.51 3.33 3.19 3.09 3.08 3.02 2.85 2.56 2.14 2.13 2.71 2.68 2.72 2.81 
Guizhou 2.34 2.20 2.08 1.85 1.72 1.67 1.66 1.62 1.49 1.44 1.06 0.99 1.23 1.18 1.22 1.23 
Yunan 3.01 2.89 2.78 2.53 2.38 2.15 2.05 1.99 1.84 1.65 1.28 1.22 1.63 1.65 1.69 1.71 
Tibet -0.19 0.20 0.37 0.19 0.07 -0.13 -0.29 -0.27 -1.27 -1.13 -1.53 -1.45 -1.15 -1.08 -0.81 -0.54 
Shaanxi 2.94 2.77 2.65 2.47 2.33 2.21 2.19 2.11 1.83 1.70 1.47 1.49 1.70 1.70 1.76 1.95 
Gansu 2.84 2.69 2.56 2.46 2.31 2.22 2.18 2.11 1.96 1.69 1.52 1.42 1.61 1.45 1.50 1.54 
Qinghai 2.33 2.17 2.06 1.87 1.69 1.57 1.51 1.47 0.54 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.41 
Ningxia 2.21 2.04 1.90 1.75 1.50 1.31 1.24 1.20 0.67 0.42 0.29 0.19 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.31 
Xinjiang 3.37 3.22 3.03 2.82 2.64 2.55 2.46 2.50 1.88 1.74 1.21 1.39 1.63 1.73 1.86 1.78 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.13 	China capital stock value of the nontradable sector (2000 constant 
prices) (100,000,000 Yuan) - LkN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 2.74 2.58 2.40 2.19 2.10 1.98 1.96 2.04 1.85 1.68 1.62 1.52 1.56 1.56 1.54 1.53 
Tianjin 1.89 1.75 1.68 1.51 1.42 1.14 1.08 1.40 1.53 1.20 1.11 1.03 1.06 1.16 1.20 1.23 
Hebei 2.40 2.25 2.17 1.98 2.03 1.80 1.75 1.75 1.70 1.66 1.75 1.71 1.84 2.02 2.15 2.21 
Shanxi 2.28 2.10 1.96 1.82 1.77 1.65 1.55 1.61 1.59 1.35 1.40 1.35 1.36 1.41 1.49 1.57 
Inner Mongolia 1.55 1.32 1.19 1.02 0.88 0.68 0.71 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.90 0.94 1.02 1.13 1.17 
Liaoning 3.10 2.96 2.74 2.54 2.51 2.27 2.23 2.15 1.96 1.86 1.88 1.87 1.96 2.08 2.15 2.13 
Jilin 1.03 0.90 0.62 0.55 0.63 0.22 0.52 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.68 0.89 1.09 1.17 
Heilongjiang 2.19 2.11 2.16 1.76 1.55 1.43 1.65 1.62 1.57 1.53 1.54 1.51 1.55 1.65 1.74 1.77 
Shanghai 2.44 2.28 2.11 1.95 1.98 1.77 1.66 1.79 1.89 1.60 1.62 1.69 1.75 1.85 1.96 1.95 
Jiangsu 2.97 2.82 2.63 2.53 2.54 2.29 2.23 2.64 2.53 2.28 2.26 2.02 2.15 2.28 2.36 2.41 
Zhejiang 2.97 2.81 2.55 2.28 2.27 2.13 2.19 2.39 2.30 2.22 2.22 1.92 2.07 2.24 2.31 2.36 
Anhui 1.81 1.71 1.57 1.33 1.37 1.15 1.20 1.59 1.41 1.24 1.31 1.08 1.15 1.26 1.34 1.46 
Fujian 2.31 2.07 1.99 1.69 1.58 1.61 1.49 1.85 1.59 1.61 1.74 1.74 1.81 1.84 1.90 1.91 
Jiangxi 0.57 0.42 0.35 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.62 0.74 0.82 0.93 0.82 1.06 1.21 1.22 1.21 
Shandong 3.20 3.07 2.90 2.67 2.70 2.42 2.35 2.85 2.76 2.47 2.38 2.02 2.04 2.18 2.31 2.40 
Henan 1.96 1.77 1.70 1.37 1.35 1.18 1.16 1.56 1.65 1.70 1.68 1.49 1.50 1.65 1.79 1.91 
Hubei 2.18 1.98 1.85 1.70 1.79 1.64 1.67 1.82 1.84 1.79 1.73 1.58 1.62 1.75 1.87 1.94 
Hunan 1.58 1.43 1.26 1.00 1.07 0.94 0.90 1.33 1.38 1.33 1.43 1.29 1.38 1.53 1.66 1.77 
Guangdong 3.90 3.72 3.53 3.27 3.16 3.08 2.99 3.35 3.17 3.22 3.15 3.06 3.02 3.02 3.04 3.06 
Guangxi 1.88 1.70 1.52 1.33 1.33 1.18 1.23 1.25 1.07 1.08 1.15 1.14 1.27 1.47 1.56 1.64 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.25 -1.42 -1.03 -0.74 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.46 0.60 0.63 0.84 0.91 0.99 
Sichuan (Chq) 2.80 2.64 2.48 2.20 2.15 1.98 1.93 2.32 2.25 2.16 2.16 1.86 1.95 2.16 2.33 2.46 
Guizhou 0.66 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.14 -0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.64 0.68 0.78 
Yunan 2.09 1.90 1.84 1.69 1.65 1.41 1.33 1.54 1.54 1.34 1.38 1.17 1.29 1.50 1.58 1.77 
Tibet 0.30 -0.91 -0.02 -0.38 -0.27 -0.68 -0.49 -0.04 0.26 0.48 0.44 0.22 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.16 
Shaanxi 1.53 1.36 1.26 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.73 1.06 1.02 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.98 1.21 1.41 1.51 
Gansu 0.29 0.20 -0.06 -0.17 -0.32 -0.47 -0.41 -0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 0.21 0.55 0.80 
Qinghai 0.43 0.22 0.11 -0.09 -0.04 -0.17 -0.19 0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.18 -0.36 -0.32 -0.25 -0.18 0.12 
Ningxia 0.04 -0.12 -0.18 -0.34 -0.37 -0.55 -0.64 -0.38 -0.24 -0.17 -0.12 -0.21 -0.17 -0.03 0.07 0.22 
Xinjiang 2.15 2.02 1.88 1.67 1.53 1.29 1.16 1.36 1.27 1.16 1.17 1.11 1.25 1.38 1.47 1.42 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.14 	China real wages of the nontradable sector (2000 constant prices) 
(100,000,000 Yuan) - LwN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.53 0.57 0.78 0.65 0.70 0.76 0.63 0.65 0.47 0.42 0.48 
Tianjin -0.54 -0.53 -0.50 -0.52 -0.50 -0.73 -0.64 -0.21 0.03 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.16 -0.46 -0.58 -0.61 
Hebei 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.44 0.45 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.32 0.15 -0.06 -0.18 -0.24 
Shanxi -0.39 -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.36 -0.35 -0.36 -0.21 -0.10 -0.21 -0.16 -0.28 -0.40 -0.62 -0.69 -0.67 
Inner Mongolia -0.36 -0.43 -0.44 -0.46 -0.51 -0.60 -0.51 -0.16 -0.19 -0.13 -0.15 -0.27 -0.39 -0.67 -0.86 -1.01 
Liaoning 0.89 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.72 0.80 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.70 0.62 0.32 0.17 0.07 
Jilin -0.16 -0.13 -0.28 -0.19 -0.06 -0.41 -0.02 0.18 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.41 -0.51 -0.69 
Heilongjiang 0.28 0.35 0.52 0.25 0.09 0.06 0.39 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.34 0.27 0.09 0.04 -0.06 
Shanghai 0.41 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.35 0.69 0.96 0.71 0.73 0.63 0.46 0.23 0.31 0.25 
Jiangsu 1.10 1.10 1.01 1.09 1.14 0.95 0.94 1.40 1.38 1.19 1.12 0.76 0.71 0.54 0.42 0.33 
Zhejiang 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.74 0.81 0.69 0.81 1.08 1.11 1.07 0.99 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.28 0.18 
Anhui -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 0.41 0.26 0.19 0.18 -0.10 -0.15 -0.39 -0.56 -0.68 
Fujian 0.18 0.09 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.42 0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.14 -0.18 -0.37 -0.49 -0.49 
Jiangxi -0.57 -0.59 -0.58 -0.55 -0.64 -0.69 -0.57 -0.10 -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.30 -0.32 -0.69 -0.75 -0.89 
Shandong 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.45 0.48 1.05 1.04 0.86 0.83 0.39 0.32 0.13 0.03 0.03 
Henan 0.07 0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.53 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.45 0.32 0.16 0.07 0.09 
Hubei 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.46 0.40 0.48 0.64 0.74 0.67 0.61 0.39 0.32 0.09 -0.07 -0.18 
Hunan 0.11 0.12 0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.48 0.34 0.40 0.08 -0.02 -0.24 -0.26 -0.35 
Guangdong 1.05 1.05 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.00 1.11 1.52 1.55 1.59 1.44 1.23 1.09 0.95 0.90 0.86 
Guangxi -0.29 -0.30 -0.33 -0.32 -0.26 -0.34 -0.22 -0.11 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.47 -0.58 -0.72 -0.85 -0.89 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 -2.68 -2.03 -2.02 -1.95 -2.04 -1.18 -1.74 -1.53 -1.42 -1.62 -1.87 -2.17 -2.26 -2.29 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.74 0.81 0.73 0.75 1.15 1.14 1.06 1.04 0.64 0.57 0.34 0.28 0.22 
Guizhou -1.18 -1.22 -1.11 -1.19 -1.15 -1.18 -1.11 -0.87 -0.91 -0.75 -0.68 -0.70 -0.80 -0.90 -1.12 -1.18 
Yunan -0.21 -0.22 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 -0.12 0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.03 -0.22 -0.28 -0.40 -0.57 -0.56 
Tibet -2.95 -3.98 -2.95 -3.29 -3.18 -3.62 -3.45 -3.03 -2.86 -2.53 -2.41 -2.60 -2.94 -3.06 -3.38 -3.39 
Shaanxi -0.37 -0.38 -0.34 -0.48 -0.43 -0.51 -0.51 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 -0.12 -0.28 -0.41 -0.56 -0.61 -0.64 
Gansu -0.90 -0.84 -1.00 -1.01 -1.10 -1.21 -1.11 -0.66 -0.52 -0.40 -0.48 -0.79 -0.87 -1.06 -1.12 -1.07 
Qinghai -1.98 -2.02 -1.97 -2.04 -1.91 -1.98 -1.95 -1.65 -1.58 -1.62 -1.65 -1.83 -1.90 -2.05 -2.17 -2.27 
Ningxia -2.30 -2.29 -2.24 -2.23 -2.19 -2.23 -2.29 -2.01 -1.82 -1.77 -1.68 -1.94 -2.05 -2.20 -2.30 -2.23 
Xinjiang -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.21 -0.32 -0.33 -0.06 -0.07 -0.18 -0.24 -0.38 -0.44 -0.67 -0.76 -0.60 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.15 	China real wages of the tradable sector (2000 constant prices) 
(100,000,000 Yuan) - LwT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.47 0.49 0.55 1.16 0.41 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.32 0.33 0.52 0.62 0.65 0.58 0.55 0.41 
Tianjin 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.23 0.11 0.16 0.10 
Hebei 1.57 1.58 1.55 1.54 1.43 1.39 1.36 1.34 1.24 1.11 1.15 0.99 0.83 0.63 0.56 0.49 
Shanxi 0.77 0.79 0.79 1.01 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.31 0.12 0.09 0.10 
Inner Mongolia 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.39 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.07 -0.12 -0.23 -0.32 
Liaoning 1.91 1.93 1.88 1.90 1.83 1.84 1.80 1.77 1.58 1.49 1.54 1.42 1.28 1.11 0.99 0.84 
Jilin 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.61 0.70 0.58 0.33 0.19 0.10 
Heilongjiang 1.39 1.38 1.32 1.34 1.31 1.31 1.19 1.22 1.16 1.04 1.07 1.04 0.88 0.78 0.80 0.57 
Shanghai 1.14 1.15 1.19 1.22 1.21 1.19 1.20 1.28 1.22 1.12 1.11 1.15 1.00 0.85 0.90 0.84 
Jiangsu 1.98 1.95 1.84 1.87 1.77 1.71 1.73 1.75 1.52 1.41 1.41 1.43 1.37 1.20 1.14 1.06 
Zhejiang 1.85 1.81 1.72 1.71 1.61 1.56 1.58 1.49 1.36 1.23 1.04 0.96 0.83 0.63 0.57 0.41 
Anhui 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.93 0.71 0.61 0.55 0.45 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.08 
Fujian 1.22 1.22 1.15 1.11 1.06 0.99 1.06 1.02 0.86 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.46 0.42 0.35 
Jiangxi 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.10 -0.09 0.21 0.24 0.10 -0.27 -0.20 -0.31 
Shandong 1.77 1.79 1.78 1.79 1.61 1.58 1.56 1.52 1.24 1.17 1.40 1.36 1.32 1.21 1.19 1.14 
Henan 1.33 1.36 1.33 1.28 1.20 1.21 1.19 1.23 1.02 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.83 0.69 0.63 0.59 
Hubei 1.43 1.41 1.39 1.38 1.31 1.29 1.34 1.40 1.26 1.12 1.03 0.91 0.72 0.53 0.47 0.41 
Hunan 1.23 1.25 1.22 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.01 0.91 0.88 0.63 0.46 0.26 0.23 0.15 
Guangdong 2.39 2.38 2.30 2.20 2.16 2.08 2.12 2.08 1.94 1.82 1.74 1.64 1.54 1.43 1.39 1.30 
Guangxi 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.13 -0.06 -0.14 -0.24 -0.40 -0.32 -0.32 -0.31 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.60 -0.61 -0.63 -0.63 -0.64 -0.97 -1.16 -1.17 -1.33 -1.36 -1.53 -1.58 -1.67 
Sichuan(Chq) 1.28 1.32 1.31 1.34 1.27 1.24 1.28 1.24 1.08 0.93 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.83 0.75 0.80 
Guizhou -0.24 -0.21 -0.23 -0.32 -0.36 -0.29 -0.28 -0.27 -0.38 -0.31 -0.34 -0.42 -0.45 -0.60 -0.63 -0.64 
Yunan 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.17 -0.20 -0.18 
Tibet -4.16 -3.58 -3.26 -3.42 -3.40 -3.62 -2.35 -3.70 -3.49 -3.39 -3.74 -3.62 -3.60 -3.63 -3.74 -3.83 
Shaanxi 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Gansu 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.10 -0.02 -0.18 -0.30 -0.37 
Qinghai -1.07 -1.06 -1.09 -1.24 -1.34 -1.43 -1.45 -1.45 -1.43 -1.60 -1.60 -1.48 -1.60 -1.78 -1.81 -2.00 
Ningxia -0.99 -0.99 -1.04 -1.03 -1.10 -1.21 -1.23 -1.18 -1.27 -1.34 -1.29 -1.24 -1.30 -1.37 -1.44 -1.49 
Xinjiang 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.44 0.34 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.14 -0.08 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.16 	China returns to labour of the tradable sector - 1-alphaT 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Tianjin 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Hebei 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Shanxi 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Inner Mongolia 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Liaoning 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Jilin 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Heilongjiang 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Shanghai 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Jiangsu 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Zhejiang 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Anhui 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Fujian 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Jiangxi 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Shandong 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Henan 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Hubei 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Hunan 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Guangdong 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Guangxi 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Guizhou 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Yunan 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Tibet 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Shaanxi 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Gansu 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Qinghai 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Ningxia 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Xinjiang 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.17 	China returns to labour of the nontradable sector - 1-alphaN 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Tianjin 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Hebei 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Shanxi 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Inner Mongolia 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 
Liaoning 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Jilin 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.10 
Heilongjiang 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 
Shanghai 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Jiangsu 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Zhejiang 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Anhui 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Fujian 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Jiangxi 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.08 
Shandong 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Henan 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Hubei 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Hunan 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Guangdong 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Guangxi 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Guizhou 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.12 
Yunan 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Tibet 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.10 
Shaanxi 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 
Gansu 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Qinghai 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.12 
Ningxia 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.11 
Xinjiang 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.12 
Source: China Stafstical Yearbook 
Data 6.18 	China log of the number of staffs and workers of tradable sector 
(100,000,000 persons) - LemT 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -4.16 -4.16 -4.16 -4.16 -4.13 -4.09 -4.08 -4.11 -4.17 -4.15 -4.18 -4.22 -4.26 -4.47 -4.53 -4.62 
Tianjin -4.22 -4.22 -4.22 -4.22 -4.21 -4.20 -4.17 -4.18 -4.18 -4.19 -4.19 -4.23 -4.26 -4.64 -4.66 -4.70 
Hebei -3.59 -3.54 -3.50 -3.46 -3.45 -3.43 -3.41 -3.40 -3.37 -3.40 -3.40 -3.43 -3.48 -3.71 -3.78 -3.85 
Shanxi -3.92 -3.89 -3.86 -3.82 -3.81 -3.79 -3.77 -3.75 -3.74 -3.73 -3.76 -3.77 -3.81 -4.02 -4.07 -4.12 
Inner Mongolia -4.16 -4.13 -4.10 -4.06 -4.04 -4.00 -3.97 -3.96 -3.97 -3.97 -3.98 -4.00 -4.06 -4.30 -4.39 -4.45 
Liaoning -2.91 -2.89 -2.88 -2.87 -2.86 -2.84 -2.83 -2.83 -2.86 -2.87 -2.87 -2.91 -2.95 -3.38 -3.49 -3.58 
Jilin -3.71 -3.67 -3.64 -3.63 -3.60 -3.59 -3.59 -3.58 -3.54 -3.58 -3.61 -3.63 -3.67 -4.05 -4.14 -4.24 
Heilongjiang -3.11 -3.07 -3.04 -3.02 -3.01 -2.99 -2.99 -2.99 -2.97 -2.98 -3.01 -3.07 -3.12 -3.47 -3.55 -3.65 
Shanghai -3.55 -3.54 -3.54 -3.54 -3.55 -3.55 -3.54 -3.57 -3.63 -3.69 -3.72 -3.80 -3.91 -4.19 -4.28 -4.37 
Jiangsu -3.15 -3.11 -3.07 -3.03 -3.05 -3.03 -3.02 -3.02 -3.02 -3.04 -3.03 -3.06 -3.10 -3.35 -3.42 -3.49 
Zhejiang -3.76 -3.72 -3.69 -3.66 -3.70 -3.69 -3.66 -3.69 -3.71 -3.74 -3.78 -3.83 -3.90 -4.14 -4.24 -4.35 
Anhui -3.92 -3.87 -3.83 -3.79 -3.77 -3.76 -3.73 -3.71 -3.77 -3.76 -3.71 -3.75 -3.78 -4.03 -4.09 -4.16 
Fujian -4.34 -4.30 -4.27 -4.23 -4.23 -4.20 -4.16 -4.10 -4.08 -4.05 -4.11 -4.11 -4.09 -4.18 -4.21 -4.21 
Jiangxi -4.00 -3.96 -3.93 -3.90 -3.90 -3.89 -3.86 -3.84 -3.84 -3.84 -3.86 -3.88 -3.91 -4.27 -4.36 -4.45 
Shandong -3.44 -3.38 -3.33 -3.26 -3.25 -3.20 -3.15 -3.13 -3.12 -3.10 -3.03 -3.05 -3.05 -3.22 -3.25 -3.29 
Henan -3.55 -3.51 -3.48 -3.44 -3.42 -3.41 -3.37 -3.35 -3.34 -3.32 -3.30 -3.28 -3.32 -3.48 -3.54 -3.60 
Hubei -3.44 -3.40 -3.37 -3.35 -3.34 -3.33 -3.32 -3.30 -3.30 -3.33 -3.32 -3.35 -3.37 -3.65 -3.73 -3.82 
Hunan -3.73 -3.68 -3.64 -3.61 -3.61 -3.58 -3.56 -3.55 -3.56 -3.57 -3.56 -3.59 -3.62 -3.98 -4.03 -4.11 
Guangdong -3.31 -3.26 -3.21 -3.35 -3.33 -3.29 -3.24 -3.22 -3.26 -3.27 -3.21 -3.25 -3.28 -3.42 -3.47 -3.53 
Guangxi -4.42 -4.38 -4.34 -4.32 -4.31 -4.29 -4.27 -4.24 -4.27 -4.26 -4.27 -4.29 -4.33 -4.50 -4.57 -4.64 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.05 -5.05 -5.06 -5.05 -5.08 -5.08 -5.15 -5.19 -5.26 -5.29 -5.54 -5.58 -5.62 
Sichuan (Chq) -3.25 -3.21 -3.18 -3.15 -3.13 -3.12 -3.09 -3.08 -3.08 -3.09 -3.09 -3.10 -3.14 -3.44 -3.53 -3.62 
Guizhou -4.75 -4.72 -4.69 -4.69 -4.67 -4.64 -4.61 -4.61 -4.72 -4.65 -4.68 -4.70 -4.69 -4.89 -4.96 -5.03 
Yunan -4.49 -4.47 -4.45 -4.44 -4.42 -4.40 -4.37 -4.36 -4.36 -4.39 -4.40 -4.40 -4.43 -4.56 -4.64 -4.69 
Tibet -7.88 -8.00 -8.14 -8.11 -8.14 -8.17 -8.14 -8.11 -8.15 -8.18 -8.22 -8.18 -8.15 -8.22 -8.27 -8.36 
Shaanxi -4.13 -4.10 -4.07 -4.05 -4.02 -4.00 -3.98 -3.98 -3.97 -4.01 -4.00 -4.02 -4.04 -4.29 -4.31 -4.37 
Gansu -4.64 -4.60 -4.56 -4.52 -4.50 -4.46 -4.41 -4.40 -4.41 -4.41 -4.43 -4.44 -4.47 -4.63 -4.76 -4.84 
Qinghai -5.97 -5.94 -5.92 -5.93 -5.91 -5.89 -5.89 -5.91 -5.84 -5.91 -5.90 -5.93 -6.00 -6.20 -6.33 -6.56 
Ningxia -5.87 -5.83 -5.79 -5.76 -5.71 -5.70 -5.66 -5.63 -5.63 -5.64 -5.62 -5.65 -5.64 -5.78 -5.85 -5.89 
Xinjiang -4.21 -4.19 -4.17 -4.16 -4.14 -4.11 -4.08 -4.07 -4.02 -4.05 -4.04 -4.07 -4.09 -4.22 -4.28 -4.41 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.19 	China log of the number of staffs and workers of nontradable 
sector (100,000,000 persons) - LemN 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -4.57 -4.53 -4.49 -4.45 -4.46 -4.33 -4.27 -4.22 -4.33 -4.33 -4.31 -4.33 -4.29 -4.42 -4.49 -4.52 
Tianjin -4.93 -4.94 -4.95 -4.95 -4.95 -4.96 -4.95 -4.89 -4.91 -4.92 -4.96 -4.96 -4.97 -5.31 -5.40 -5.51 
Hebei -4.20 -4.17 -4.13 -4.10 -4.10 -4.08 -4.04 -4.01 -4.02 -4.03 -4.08 -4.06 -4.13 -4.34 -4.43 -4.51 
Shanxi -4.61 -4.57 -4.53 -4.53 -4.52 -4.50 -4.48 -4.45 -4.50 -4.51 -4.50 -4.52 -4.55 -4.77 -4.85 -4.88 
Inner Mongolia -4.70 -4.67 -4.64 -4.62 -4.63 -4.60 -4.56 -4.52 -4.52 -4.58 -4.61 -4.65 -4.72 -5.08 -5.23 -5.35 
Liaoning -3.79 -3.75 -3.71 -3.67 -3.69 -3.69 -3.66 -3.63 -3.61 -3.64 -3.64 -3.69 -3.73 -4.18 -4.32 -4.42 
Jilin -4.43 -4.40 -4.36 -4.34 -4.32 -4.30 -4.25 -4.22 -4.26 -4.30 -4.32 -4.36 -4.39 -4.81 -4.89 -4.97 
Heilongjiang -3.92 -3.93 -3.94 -3.91 -3.92 -3.89 -3.85 -3.83 -3.91 -3.93 -3.94 -3.95 -3.96 -4.32 -4.39 -4.47 
Shanghai -4.46 -4.45 -4.44 -4.44 -4.46 -4.46 -4.44 -4.43 -4.50 -4.50 -4.50 -4.54 -4.56 -4.81 -4.88 -5.00 
Jiangsu -3.94 -3.90 -3.87 -3.85 -3.86 -3.84 -3.81 -3.81 -3.81 -3.80 -3.81 -3.81 -3.83 -4.03 -4.11 -4.22 
Zhejiang -4.51 -4.48 -4.46 -4.42 -4.42 -4.44 -4.39 -4.37 -4.31 -4.29 -4.27 -4.27 -4.31 -4.47 -4.57 -4.66 
Anhui -4.35 -4.32 -4.29 -4.27 -4.27 -4.28 -4.26 -4.24 -4.32 -4.35 -4.37 -4.34 -4.34 -4.59 -4.67 -4.74 
Fujian -4.86 -4.85 -4.84 -4.85 -4.86 -4.85 -4.83 -4.79 -4.80 -4.81 -4.84 -4.84 -4.83 -5.02 -5.15 -5.18 
Jiangxi -4.81 -4.79 -4.78 -4.73 -4.75 -4.75 -4.71 -4.68 -4.66 -4.66 -4.68 -4.67 -4.66 -5.00 -5.07 -5.14 
Shandong -4.19 -4.15 -4.12 -4.06 -4.07 -4.06 -4.00 -3.92 -3.93 -3.93 -3.95 -3.93 -3.95 -4.15 -4.23 -4.29 
Henan -4.14 -4.09 -4.04 -4.01 -4.00 -3.99 -3.94 -3.91 -3.88 -3.84 -3.82 -3.81 -3.81 -4.01 -4.09 -4.10 
Hubei -4.12 -4.10 -4.08 -4.05 -4.06 -4.04 -4.00 -3.97 -3.94 -3.96 -3.96 -3.98 -3.98 -4.29 -4.37 -4.48 
Hunan -4.40 -4.38 -4.36 -4.33 -4.33 -4.31 -4.28 -4.24 -4.24 -4.24 -4.23 -4.22 -4.23 -4.58 -4.65 -4.73 
Guangdong -3.80 -3.79 -3.77 -3.82 -3.82 -3.81 -3.76 -3.71 -3.63 -3.64 -3.65 -3.67 -3.70 -3.89 -3.98 -4.08 
Guangxi -4.84 -4.84 -4.84 -4.83 -4.84 -4.87 -4.83 -4.79 -4.74 -4.76 -4.78 -4.80 -4.84 -5.01 -5.13 -5.22 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.43 -6.41 -6.35 -6.34 -6.12 -6.34 -6.06 -6.07 -6.15 -6.18 -6.56 -6.65 -6.73 
Sichuan (Chq) -3.74 -3.73 -3.72 -3.68 -3.69 -3.68 -3.65 -3.63 -3.61 -3.64 -3.64 -3.66 -3.68 -3.93 -4.00 -4.12 
Guizhou -5.14 -5.15 -5.15 -5.15 -5.17 -5.13 -5.11 -5.08 -5.17 -5.13 -5.18 -5.14 -5.16 -5.32 -5.43 -5.44 
Yunan -4.94 -4.94 -4.94 -4.94 -4.93 -4.93 -4.89 -4.87 -4.86 -4.83 -4.86 -4.86 -4.87 -4.96 -5.04 -5.12 
Tibet -7.50 -7.50 -7.49 -7.53 -7.63 -7.66 -7.67 -7.63 -7.71 -7.85 -7.78 -7.80 -7.85 -7.93 -8.04 -8.14 
Shaanxi -4.70 -4.68 -4.67 -4.66 -4.66 -4.66 -4.63 -4.62 -4.64 -4.67 -4.69 -4.66 -4.67 -4.92 -4.98 -5.01 
Gansu -5.21 -5.19 -5.18 -5.19 -5.20 -5.17 -5.08 -5.05 -5.05 -5.12 -5.14 -5.14 -5.17 -5.36 -5.48 -5.49 
Qinghai -6.25 -6.24 -6.24 -6.24 -6.27 -6.25 -6.23 -6.21 -6.33 -6.36 -6.36 -6.36 -6.39 -6.58 -6.67 -6.79 
Ningxia -6.63 -6.61 -6.60 -6.58 -6.57 -6.53 -6.50 -6.48 -6.45 -6.45 -6.43 -6.50 -6.48 -6.62 -6.72 -6.77 
Xinjiang -5.15 -5.14 -5.14 -5.11 -5.13 -5.07 -5.03 -5.01 -5.02 -5.06 -5.10 -5.13 -5.15 -5.29 -5.41 -5.39 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.20 	China official and black market exchange rate (in RMB/USD) 
Year LCHNXRAT LCHNBXRAT 
1980 0.40 0.66 
1981 0.53 0.71 
1982 0.64 0.81 
1983 0.68 0.87 
1984 0.84 0.99 
1985 1.08 1.11 
1986 1.24 1.39 
1987 1.31 1.48 
1988 1.31 1.92 
1989 1.33 2.45 
1990 1.57 2.60 
1991 1.67 2.43 
1992 1.71 2.15 
1993 1.75 2.30 
1994 2.15 2.27 
1995 2.12 2.23 
1996 2.12 2.16 
1997 2.12 2.16 
1998 2.11 2.15 
1999 2.11 2.22 
2000 2.11 2.28 
Source: 
LCHNXRAT 	International Financial Statistics 
LCHNBXRAT 	World Currency Yearbook 
World Development Indicator 
Data 6.21 	China GDP deflator (2000=100) 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 11.09 11.70 12.88 15.82 19.55 21.27 24.77 28.45 34.49 42.76 55.57 66.25 73.95 82.02 88.32 100.00 
Tianjin 14.28 15.70 17.61 15.10 18.84 19.79 33.53 24.88 32.31 42.87 54.11 65.17 74.46 82.61 89.04 100.00 
Hebei 8.22 8.88 10.21 12.05 15.45 16.85 20.02 23.79 30.90 40.95 53.82 65.44 75.60 82.70 90.05 100.00 
Shanxi 12.62 14.05 15.42 16.18 21.97 24.85 28.37 32.84 41.18 51.17 64.48 77.27 87.83 96.31 94.00 100.00 
Inner Mongolia 9.88 10.90 12.04 16.31 19.67 20.74 22.16 29.73 37.70 48.48 59.75 68.39 78.47 85.15 92.11 100.00 
Liaoning 12.38 13.74 15.90 17.03 21.03 22.45 28.09 30.66 40.83 51.65 60.85 67.84 76.76 83.63 89.94100.00 
Jilin 13.17 13.84 15.83 18.30 22.58 22.82 26.99 29.81 38.15 49.12 61.70 70.49 79.42 85.66 92.54100.00 
Heilongjiang 11.11 12.69 13.79 15.57 18.45 20.21 23.76 26.91 37.19 49.48 61.14 72.32 81.90 87.00 89.69 100.00 
Shanghai 12.59 14.19 16.11 14.75 16.46 17.52 26.94 23.60 32.02 41.99 52.53 62.51 72.57 81.53 89.12 100.00 
Jiangsu 9.72 10.70 12.97 11.80 15.62 16.23 25.49 21.85 32.02 44.89 57.59 68.98 76.89 83.61 90.11 100.00 
Zhejiang 7.58 8.49 10.43 11.09 14.61 14.81 19.95 21.10 28.79 40.88 55.56 67.67 76.79 83.32 89.70 100.00 
Anhui 9.64 11.10 13.18 16.31 19.45 20.95 23.61 24.44 31.51 43.94 62.46 72.87 84.42 92.14 95.88100.00 
Fujian 5.01 5.32 6.21 8.08 10.92 12.16 13.42 18.28 25.28 38.67 52.37 62.52 73.17 83.48 90.13 100.00 
Jiangxi 9.43 10.64 12.36 15.12 18.64 21.44 22.41 26.89 34.29 43.69 56.74 72.13 82.93 92.28 98.17 100.00 
Shandong 7.96 8.57 10.04 10.97 14.93 16.36 22.01 24.31 30.34 43.07 56.66 68.72 77.36 83.62 89.98 100.00 
Henan 9.17 9.61 10.87 13.87 16.85 18.26 20.99 23.98 30.59 41.64 55.72 68.48 78.71 85.38 90.22100.00 
Hubei 10.33 11.39 13.11 14.21 17.47 19.75 21.85 24.37 31.84 41.67 53.32 67.04 78.01 85.81 91.04 100.00 
Hunan 9.22 10.31 12.09 15.56 18.26 19.95 20.29 26.20 33.36 45.06 58.44 69.40 79.74 86.89 90.72 100.00 
Guangdong 6.81 6.92 8.10 10.01 14.06 15.17 18.75 21.56 30.25 40.84 53.72 67.55 75.87 82.42 88.69 100.00 
Guangxi 8.27 9.13 10.59 14.26 17.77 19.21 19.21 28.60 38.58 56.02 72.89 80.55 87.96 91.27 94.89 100.00 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 8.29 13.94 17.29 18.21 16.95 27.19 44.77 62.04 73.24 77.96 80.57 85.01 91.06 100.00 
Sichuan (Chq) 10.03 11.03 12.56 15.84 18.91 21.52 23.09 28.08 35.83 48.67 62.54 73.62 82.49 89.38 95.69 100.00 
Guizhou 11.28 12.65 14.45 20.94 24.63 26.70 24.47 34.39 41.40 52.53 64.10 71.67 79.56 84.86 92.04 100.00 
Yunan 8.04 8.54 9.40 12.67 16.34 19.96 18.90 30.57 38.60 47.82 59.45 74.03 82.35 91.01 94.83 100.00 
Tibet 11.19 10.64 9.87 17.79 18.78 20.91 20.66 28.95 32.09 36.93 44.23 53.29 64.42 77.07 89.72 100.00 
Shaanxi 24.95 27.93 13.92 17.48 21.60 23.58 25.09 32.79 38.90 49.40 60.22 70.01 78.15 83.12 90.13 100.00 
Gansu 12.01 13.88 15.96 18.11 22.03 24.55 28.28 31.97 36.87 45.23 55.66 70.81 79.61 88.05 95.09 100.00 
Qinghai 11.49 12.74 14.03 20.43 24.66 26.41 23.09 33.68 41.34 52.81 63.27 69.87 76.62 83.49 91.11 100.00 
Ningxia 9.96 11.70 13.64 17.60 21.26 24.31 25.78 31.64 38.97 51.17 64.36 67.76 81.01 86.64 91.82 100.00 
Xinjiang 7.03 7.96 9.42 13.20 16.29 18.29 19.79 28.22 36.36 48.18 60.02 68.00 75.04 82.55 86.57 100.00 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.22 	China index of GDP (preceding year=100) 
Region 1985** 1986** 1987** 1988** 1989* 1990* 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 97.80 105.50 113.20 116.10 104.40 105.38 107.50 111.60 112.10 113.50 112.40 109.20 109.60 109.80 110.23 110.98 
Tianjin 103.20 106.80 110.40 116.20 101.60 102.52 106.00 111.70 112.10 114.30 114.90 114.30 112.10 109.30 110.04 110.77 
Hebei 102.20 107.70 113.20 116.80 104.30 104.65 109.00 115.60 117.70 114.90 113.90 113.50 112.50 110.70 109.15 109.47 
Shanxi 103.10 105.40 107.70 120.10 104.50 105.09 103.30 113.80 112.20 109.40 111.10 111.00 110.50 109.00 105.10 107.78 
Inner Mongolia 100.80 104.00 107.20 112.70 102.30 108.16 107.50 111.00 110.60 110.10 109.10 112.70 109.70 109.60 107.76 109.66 
Liaoning 107.00 109.70 112.40 115.10 102.30 100.30 105.50 112.10 114.90 111.20 107.10 108.60 108.90 108.30 108.22 108.94 
Jilin 99.30 107.50 115.70 113.90 95.90 103.45 104.80 112.20 112.80 114.30 109.70 113.70 109.20 109.00 108.14 109.16 
Heilongjiang 109.10 108.70 108.30 110.00 105.00 104.45 103.90 106.80 107.60 108.80 109.60 110.50 110.00 108.30 107.45 108.20 
Shanghai 105.00 106.00 107.00 110.70 103.00 103.45 107.00 114.90 114.90 114.30 114.10 113.00 112.70 110.10 110.19 110.77 
Jiangsu 112.20 116.00 119.80 123.70 101.40 104.40 106.50 126.00 120.70 116.50 115.40 112.20 112.00 111.00 110.12 110.64 
Zhejiang 115.90 117.70 119.50 119.70 99.40 103.96 115.40 119.00 122.00 120.00 116.70 112.70 111.10 110.10 110.02 111.03 
Anhui 114.50 113.10 111.70 112.00 104.80 103.17 96.30 116.80 121.00 120.70 114.30 114.40 112.70 108.50 108.10 108.27 
Fujian 102.20 109.60 117.00 122.40 106.50 107.01 114.70 120.30 125.20 121.70 115.20 115.40 114.50 111.40 110.00 109.47 
Jiangxi 109.30 110.30 111.30 114.60 105.10 104.88 108.20 114.80 113.70 117.00 114.50 113.40 111.50 108.20 107.80 107.99 
Shandong 105.50 111.50 117.50 123.90 104.00 105.34 113.90 116.90 118.50 116.30 114.20 112.20 111.20 110.80 110.14 110.50 
Henan 99.70 108.30 116.90 113.30 104.40 104.50 107.00 113.70 115.80 113.80 114.80 113.90 110.40 108.70 108.05 109.45 
Hubei 104.80 108.20 111.60 112.40 102.50 102.52 104.50 114.10 114.30 115.20 114.60 113.20 113.00 110.30 108.27 109.26 
Hunan 108.20 110.10 112.00 110.80 103.60 103.96 107.80 112.40 113.10 111.00 110.90 112.60 110.80 109.10108.25 108.98 
Guangdong 99.80 111.80 123.80 125.90 107.00 111.32 117.30 122.00 122.30 119.10 114.90 110.70 110.60 110.20 109.46 110.83 
Guangxi 105.70 109.00 112.30 110.20 102.90 107.00 112.70 118.30 121.20 116.00 115.30 110.30 108.10 109.10107.71 107.27 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 112.00 112.50 105.40 109.46 112.40 140.20 120.90 111.90 104.30 104.80 106.70 108.30 108.55 108.75 
Sichuan (Chq) 104.60 108.20 111.80 113.70 102.80 103.70 107.70 112.60 113.90 111.10 110.00 110.10 110.20 109.10 105.60 109.00 
Guizhou 107.00 108.60 110.20 110.40 104.60 104.24 109.90 108.10 109.90 108.50 107.50 108.90 109.00 108.50 108.35 108.65 
Yunan 98.10 105.10 112.10 116.00 105.80 108.71 106.60 110.90 110.60 111.60 111.20 110.40 109.40 108.00 107.22 107.12 
Tibet 77.90 93.20 108.50 106.00 108.40 108.92 101.60 107.10 108.20 115.60 117.90 113.20 111.30 110.20 109.64 109.41 
Shaanxi 107.30 109.10 110.90 113.40 103.30 104.34 110.90 108.20 113.30 108.50 109.00 110.20 109.20 109.10 108.35 109.03 
Gansu 113.30 111.50 109.70 117.10 108.80 105.54 106.50 109.90 111.60 110.40 109.90 111.50 108.50 109.20 108.35 108.71 
Qinghai 102.40 105.10 107.80 111.20 101.20 103.72 104.70 107.40 109.60 108.20 108.00 108.60 109.00 109.00108.16 108.96 
Ningxia 115.50 111.90 108.30 111.80 108.40 103.79 105.10 108.60 110.10 108.20 109.00 118.10 107.60 108.50 108.70 109.76 
Xinjiang 109.90 110.40 110.90 113.50 105.90 109.22 113.90 113.10 110.30 110.90 110.30 106.40 111.00 107.30 107.07 108.22 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Notes: ** Index of total output value of society; *Index of gross national product 
Data 6.23 	China real parallel exchange rate (2000=100) - RER2000B 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 2.95 3.20 3.22 3.49 3.84 3.94 3.66 3.26 3.25 3.01 2.73 2.51 2.41 2.32 2.32 2.28 
Tianjin 2.70 2.90 2.91 3.53 3.88 4.02 3.36 3.39 3.31 3.01 2.76 2.53 2.40 2.31 2.31 2.28 
Hebei 3.25 3.47 3.45 3.76 4.08 4.18 3.87 3.44 3.36 3.06 2.77 2.52 2.39 2.31 2.30 2.28 
Shanxi 2.82 3.02 3.04 3.47 3.72 3.79 3.52 3.12 3.07 2.83 2.58 2.36 2.24 2.16 2.26 2.28 
Inner Mongolia 3.07 3.27 3.29 3.46 3.83 3.97 3.77 3.22 3.16 2.89 2.66 2.48 2.35 2.28 2.28 2.28 
Liaoning 2.84 3.04 3.01 3.41 3.77 3.89 3.53 3.18 3.08 2.83 2.64 2.49 2.37 2.30 2.30 2.28 
Jilin 2.78 3.03 3.01 3.34 3.70 3.87 3.57 3.21 3.15 2.88 2.63 2.45 2.34 2.27 2.28 2.28 
Heilongjiang 2.95 3.12 3.15 3.50 3.90 4.00 3.70 3.32 3.17 2.87 2.64 2.42 2.31 2.26 2.31 2.28 
Shanghai 2.82 3.01 3.00 3.56 4.01 4.14 3.58 3.45 3.32 3.03 2.79 2.57 2.43 2.32 2.31 2.28 
Jiangsu 3.08 3.29 3.21 3.78 4.07 4.22 3.63 3.52 3.32 2.97 2.70 2.47 2.37 2.30 2.30 2.28 
Zhejiang 3.33 3.52 3.43 3.84 4.13 4.31 3.88 3.56 3.43 3.06 2.73 2.49 2.37 2.30 2.31 2.28 
Anhui 3.09 3.25 3.20 3.46 3.85 3.96 3.71 3.41 3.34 2.99 2.62 2.42 2.28 2.20 2.24 2.28 
Fujian 3.75 3.99 3.95 4.16 4.42 4.50 4.27 3.70 3.56 3.11 2.79 2.57 2.42 2.30 2.30 2.28 
Jiangxi 3.11 3.29 3.26 3.53 3.89 3.94 3.76 3.32 3.25 2.99 2.71 2.43 2.30 2.20 2.22 2.28 
Shandong 3.28 3.51 3.47 3.85 4.11 4.21 3.78 3.42 3.37 3.01 2.71 2.48 2.37 2.30 2.30 2.28 
Henan 3.14 3.40 3.39 3.62 3.99 4.10 3.83 3.43 3.37 3.04 2.73 2.48 2.35 2.28 2.30 2.28 
Hubei 3.02 3.23 3.20 3.60 3.95 4.02 3.79 3.41 3.33 3.04 2.77 2.50 2.36 2.27 2.29 2.28 
Hunan 3.14 3.33 3.28 3.50 3.91 4.01 3.86 3.34 3.28 2.96 2.68 2.47 2.34 2.26 2.30 2.28 
Guangdong 3.44 3.72 3.68 3.95 4.17 4.28 3.94 3.54 3.38 3.06 2.77 2.49 2.39 2.31 2.32 2.28 
Guangxi 3.24 3.45 3.41 3.59 3.94 4.05 3.91 3.25 3.13 2.74 2.46 2.32 2.24 2.21 2.25 2.28 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 3.66 3.61 3.96 4.10 4.04 3.31 2.99 2.64 2.46 2.35 2.33 2.28 2.29 2.28 
Sichuan (Chq) 3.05 3.26 3.24 3.49 3.87 3.93 3.73 3.27 3.21 2.88 2.61 2.41 2.30 2.23 2.24 2.28 
Guizhou 2.93 3.12 3.10 3.21 3.61 3.72 3.67 3.07 3.06 2.81 2.59 2.43 2.34 2.28 2.28 2.28 
Yunan 3.27 3.51 3.53 3.71 4.02 4.01 3.93 3.19 3.13 2.90 2.67 2.40 2.30 2.21 2.25 2.28 
Tibet 2.94 3.29 3.49 3.37 3.88 3.96 3.84 3.24 3.32 3.16 2.96 2.73 2.55 2.38 2.31 2.28 
Shaanxi 2.14 2.33 3.14 3.39 3.74 3.84 3.65 3.12 3.13 2.87 2.65 2.46 2.36 2.30 2.30 2.28 
Gansu 2.87 3.03 3.00 3.35 3.72 3.80 3.53 3.14 3.18 2.96 2.73 2.45 2.34 2.25 2.25 2.28 
Qinghai 2.92 3.11 3.13 3.23 3.61 3.73 3.73 3.09 3.06 2.80 2.60 2.46 2.38 2.30 2.29 2.28 
Ningxia 3.06 3.20 3.16 3.38 3.76 3.81 3.62 3.15 3.12 2.83 2.59 2.49 2.32 2.26 2.28 2.28 
Xinjiang 3.41 3.58 3.53 3.67 4.02 4.10 3.88 3.27 3.19 2.90 2.66 2.49 2.40 2.31 2.34 2.28 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.24 	US Data 
Year LPC2000 LPT2000 LPN2000 LVA2000T LVA2000N LTFP2000T LTFP2000N LKT2000 LKN2000 LEMT LEMN 1-ALPHAT 1-ALPHAN LWN2000 LWT2000 LIT2000 LIN2000 
Unit N/A N/A N/A 1USD 1USD 1USD 1USD 1p 1p N/A N/A 1USD 1USD 1USD 1USD 
1985 4.24 4.50 4.13 27.84 29.14 6.30 12.50 24.83 25.89 17.03 19.23 0.42 1.39 24.78 22.52 21.83 22.90 
1986 4.27 4.49 4.17 27.84 29.17 6.34 12.40 24.84 25.85 17.01 19.25 0.43 1.38 24.81 22.56 21.82 22.90 
1987 4.29 4.48 4.21 27.91 29.19 6.31 12.50 24.84 25.81 17.01 19.29 0.42 1.40 24.85 22.59 21.84 22.90 
1988 4.33 4.50 4.25 27.97 29.24 6.32 12.60 24.82 25.78 17.03 19.32 0.41 1.41 24.90 22.63 21.86 22.90 
1989 4.36 4.55 4.29 27.96 29.27 6.32 12.40 24.78 25.75 17.03 19.35 0.41 1.39 24.93 22.62 21.86 22.90 
1990 4.40 4.58 4.33 27.97 29.29 6.35 12.40 24.75 25.72 17.02 19.36 0.41 1.39 24.95 22.62 21.78 22.90 
1991 4.44 4.59 4.37 27.94 29.29 6.42 12.20 24.73 25.68 16.99 19.36 0.42 1,37 24.94 22.61 21.66 22.80 
1992 4.46 4.61 4.40 27.95 29.31 6.46 12.20 24.71 25.66 16.97 19.36 0.42 1.36 24.97 22.62 21.68 22.80 
1993 4.48 4.62 4.44 27.98 29.33 6.44 12.10 24.70 25.64 16.97 19.39 0.41 1.35 24.98 22.64 21.75 22.90 
1994 4.50 4.63 4.46 28.04 29.36 6.41 12.10 24.71 25.64 16.99 19.42 0.40 1.35 25.00 22.68 21.89 23.00 
1995 4.52 4.62 4.49 28.09 29.38 6.43 12.20 24.73 25.63 17.00 19.44 0.40 1.36 25.04 22.73 21.93 23.00 
1996 4.54 4.64 4.51 28.12 29.43 6.42 12.20 24.73 25.64 17.00 19.46 0.39 1.36 25.08 22.75 21.98 23.10 
1997 4.56 4.63 4.54 28.16 29.47 6.49 12.20 24.75 25.65 17.01 19.49 0.40 1.36 25.13 22.81 22.07 23.10 
1998 4.57 4.62 4.56 28.20 29.53 6.56 12.40 24.79 25.67 17.01 19.51 0.41 1.39 25.19 22.88 22.15 23.20 
1999 4.58 4.60 4.58 28.25 29.57 6.55 12.60 24.83 25.69 17.00 19.54 0.40 1.42 25.24 22.93 22.23 23.30 
2000 4.61 4.61 4.61 28.28 29.62 6.61 12.80 24.86 25.71 16.99 19.56 0.40 1.45 25.30 22.98 22.29 23.30 
Continue on next page... 
Notes: 
LPC2000 US FDP deflator (2000=100); LPT2000 US tradable price deflator (2000=100) 
LPN 2000 US nontradable price deflator (200100); LVA2000T US real value added of the tradable sector (200100) 
LVA2000N US real value added of the nontradable sector (2000=100); LTFP2000T US total factor productivity of the tradable sector (2000=100) 
LTFP2000N US total factor productivity of the nontradable sector (2000=100); LKT2000 US real capital stock of the tradable sector (2000=100) 
LKN2000 US real capital stock of the nontradable sector (2000=100); LEMT US total employment of the tradable sector 
LEMN US total employment of the nontradable sector; 1-ALPHAT US returns to labour of the tradable sector 
1-ALPHAN US returns to labour of the nontradable sector; LWT2000 US real wages of the tradable sector (2000=100) 
LWN2000 US real wages of the nontradable sector (2000=100); LIT2000 US real investment of the tradable sector (2000=100) 
LIN US real investment of the nontradable sector (2000=100) 
Data 6.25 	China relative price of nontradables (2000 constant prices) - 
LpNLpT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -0.24 -0.23 -0.11 0.52 -0.29 -0.27 -0.35 -0.52 -0.51 -0.48 -0.27 -0.03 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.00 
Tianjin 0.51 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.48 0.45 -0.06 -0.45 -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 -0.22 -0.02 0.05 0.00 
Hebei 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.47 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.00 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
Shanxi 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.69 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.19 -0.17 -0.17 -0.03 0.02 0.00 
Inner Mongolia 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.12 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.14 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 
Liaoning 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.15 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.07 0.00 
Jilin 0.30 0.27 0.45 0.31 0.14 0.47 0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.17 -0.14 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
Heilongjiang 0.27 0.18 -0.05 0.25 0.32 0.39 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.18 -0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.07 0.00 
Shanghai -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.24 -0.54 -0.26 -0.29 -0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Jiangsu 0.12 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.21 -0.08 -0.04 -0.50 -0.69 -0.57 -0.52 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
Zhejiang 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.14 0.19 0.10 -0.24 -0.31 -0.33 -0.37 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Anhui 0.51 0.43 0.37 0.42 0.22 0.35 0.25 -0.11 -0.27 -0.29 -0.45 -0.20 -0.28 -0.13 -0.03 0.00 
Fujian 0.56 0.64 0.52 0.57 0.49 0.30 0.40 -0.09 0.03 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 
Jiangxi 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.12 -0.01 -0.45 -0.56 -0.75 -0.47 -0.22 -0.31 -0.19 -0.07 0.00 
Shandong 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.13 0.21 0.17 -0.40 -0.66 -0.59 -0.45 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.00 
Henan 0.66 0.69 0.58 0.68 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.00 -0.28 -0.35 -0.45 -0.20 -0.13 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 
Hubei 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.11 -0.02 -0.17 -0.23 -0.12 -0.19 -0.16 -0.06 0.00 
Hunan 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.31 0.32 0.36 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Guangdong 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.65 0.56 0.48 0.04 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.00 
Guangxi 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.20 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.09 -0.29 -0.40 -0.22 -0.27 -0.04 0.03 0.00 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.04 0.18 0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.03 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.55 -0.70 -0.79 -0.72 -0.24 -0.19 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 
Guizhou 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.31 0.19 0.23 0.18 -0.05 -0.10 -0.23 -0.33 -0.26 -0.21 -0.19 -0.03 0.00 
Yunan -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 -0.55 -0.56 -0.43 -0.57 -0.28 -0.23 -0.14 0.03 0.00 
Tibet -0.48 1.12 0.41 0.61 0.38 0.62 0.28 -0.15 -0.29 -0.45 -0.76 -0.51 -0.23 -0.07 0.13 0.00 
Shaanxi 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.34 -0.42 -0.43 -0,46 -0.26 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
Gansu 0.54 0.49 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.69 0.60 0.19 -0.08 -0.22 -0.29 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 
Qinghai 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.57 0.28 0.28 0.24 -0.03 -0.17 -0.31 -0.32 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Ningxia 0.51 0.48 0.38 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.19 -0.01 -0.23 -0.36 -0.46 -0.21 -0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.00 
Xinjiang -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 -0.11 -0.12 -0.38 -0.43 -0.48 -0.63 -0.34 -0.28 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.26 	China relative productivity of the tradable sector (2000 constant 
prices) - LtTLtN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.16 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.14 -0.77 -0.18 0.09 0.11 -0.45 -0.42 -0.44 -0.47 
Tianjin 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.30 0.38 0.75 0.71 -0.04 0.11 0.21 0.21 
Hebei 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.12 -0.28 0.79 1.05 0.78 1.05 1.21 1.27 
Shanxi -0.44 -0.44 -0.41 -0.35 -0.25 -0.27 -0.32 -0.27 0.33 0.43 0.68 0.98 0.73 0.95 0.88 0.82 
Inner Mongolia -0.82 -0.80 -0.76 -0.65 -0.65 -0.63 -0.65 -0.64 -0.20 -0.08 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.50 0.61 0.66 
Liaoning 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.46 0.54 0.27 0.59 0.62 0.64 
Jilin -0.67 -0.68 -0.61 -0.60 -0.57 -0.46 -0.58 -0.58 -0.49 -0.36 -0.13 -0.05 -0.30 0.17 0.30 0.57 
Heilongjiang -0.43 -0.41 -0.44 -0.38 -0.33 -0.28 -0.35 -0.33 -0.05 0.06 0.33 0.50 0.32 0.42 0.63 0.42 
Shanghai -0.32 -0.33 -0.35 -0.36 -0.34 -0.35 -0.34 -0.31 -0.39 -0.33 0.32 0.37 -0.34 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 
Jiangsu 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.41 0.67 0.10 0.37 1.44 1.28 0.32 0.45 0.58 0.67 
Zhejiang 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.65 0.86 0.26 0.44 1.63 1.57 0.66 0.78 0.84 1.09 
Anhui -0.18 -0.18 -0.16 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.26 0.30 1.11 1.09 0.57 0.82 0.89 1.03 
Fujian -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.18 0.47 0.50 1.72 1.91 0.69 0.96 1.12 1.10 
Jiangxi -0.90 -0.86 -0.79 -0.78 -0.72 -0.60 -0.54 -0.32 0.15 0.51 0.61 0.84 0.70 1.12 1.11 1.08 
Shandong 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.77 0.79 0.80 1.29 1.23 0.60 0.79 0.95 1.06 
Henan -0.33 -0.32 -0.30 -0.29 -0.24 -0.24 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.28 0.76 0.95 -0.30 0.73 0.86 0.99 
Hubei -0.16 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.88 0.27 0.73 0.87 0.60 0.83 1.00 1.09 
Hunan -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.30 0.79 0.99 0.81 1.24 1.33 1.45 
Guangdong 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.61 0.70 -0.91 0.31 1.84 1.90 0.65 0.66 0.76 0.82 
Guangxi 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.25 0.33 1.01 1.18 0.54 1.18 1.27 1.29 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.42 -1.56 -1.13 -035 -0.65 0.50 0.48 1.17 1.32 0.98 1.32 1.27 1.37 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.28 0.71 0.74 0.29 0.57 0.66 0.75 
Guizhou -0.25 -0.27 -0.30 -0.22 -0.20 -0.25 -0.31 -0.30 -0.23 -0.26 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.45 0.62 0.75 
Yunan -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.63 0.71 0.46 0.68 0.80 0.94 
Tibet -0.26 -0.21 -0.35 -0.25 -0.14 -0.01 0.84 0.12 1.17 0.79 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.90 0.82 
Shaanxi -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.31 -0.29 -0.30 -0.26 -0.24 -0.04 0.00 0.22 0.33 0.26 0.55 0.67 0.60 
Gansu -1.03 -1.02 -1.02 -1.01 -0.96 -0.90 -0.88 -0.80 -0.66 -0.65 -0.46 -0.24 -0.27 0.16 0.40 0.54 
Qinghai -0.77 -0.77 -0.84 -0.88 -0.88 -0.90 -0.90 -1.04 -0.27 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.19 -0.01 0.09 0.44 
Ningxia -0.72 -0.71 -0.75 -0.70 -0.60 -0.63 -0.62 -0.50 -0.12 0.06 0.17 0.49 0.40 0.58 0.70 0.85 
Xinjiang -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.51 -0.45 -0.47 -0.56 -0.72 -0.22 -0.08 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.56 0.53 0.38 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.27 	China PPP exchange rate (2000 constant prices) - LpTLPT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -1.99 -1.81 -1.74 -2.19 -1.33 -1.25 -1.13 -0.98 -0.66 -0.37 -0.39 -0.40 -0.33 -0.32 -0.24 0.00 
Tianjin -2.23 -2.06 -1.88 -1.72 -1.50 -1.44 -1.36 -1.15 -0.86 -0.61 -0.46 -0.35 -0.16 -0.20 -0.13 0.00 
Hebei -2.68 -2.50 -2.32 -2.12 -1.93 -1.81 -1.70 -1.55 -1.23 -0.84 -0.69 -0.49 -0.32 -0.22 -0.11 0.00 
Shanxi -2.17 -1.99 -1.86 -1.90 -1.55 -1.41 -1.30 -1.24 -0.89 -0.59 -0.38 -0.24 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 
Inner Mongolia -2.28 -2.12 -2.01 -1.69 -1.69 -1.56 -1.46 -1.32 -1.04 -0.79 -0.62 -0.47 -0.29 -0.21 -0.10 0.00 
Liaoning -2.34 -2.17 -1.99 -1.82 -1.67 -1.60 -1.49 -1.35 -1.01 -0.70 -0.59 -0.47 -0.32 -0.28 -0.19 0.00 
Jilin -2.06 -1.90 -1.79 -1.55 -1.48 -1.42 -1.24 -1.16 -0.92 -0.64 -0.51 -0.42 -0.30 -0.26 -0.12 0.00 
Heilongjiang -2.08 -1.88 -1.68 -1.57 -1.45 -1.41 -1.20 -1.15 -0.96 -0.67 -0.47 -0.40 -0.26 -0.27 -0.22 0.00 
Shanghai -1.98 -1.79 -1.70 -1.57 -1.44 -1.37 -1.23 -1.09 -0.82 -0.56 -0.35 -0.36 -0.24 -0.17 -0.12 0.00 
Jiangsu -2.59 -2.37 -2.12 -1.94 -1.80 -1.67 -1.60 -1.44 -0.97 -0.62 -0.40 -0.39 -0.31 -0.24 -0.14 0.00 
Zhejiang -3.10 -2.86 -2.63 -2.42 -2.27 -2.18 -2.10 -1.88 -1.48 -1.07 -0.71 -0.61 -0.43 -0.32 -0.22 0.00 
Anhui -2.43 -2.23 -2.02 -1.84 -1.72 -1.64 -1.55 -1.54 -1.16 -0.76 -0.41 -0.26 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 
Fujian -3.15 -2.96 -2.76 -2.50 -2.32 -2.15 -2.08 -1.84 -1.44 -0.97 -0.77 -0.60 -0.42 -0.25 -0.15 0.00 
Jiangxi -2.09 -1.93 -1.78 -1.57 -1.46 -1.31 -1.22 -1.12 -0.80 -0.34 -0.40 -0.33 -0.16 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 
Shandong -2.68 -2.50 -2.36 -2.10 -1.83 -1.67 -1.56 -1.40 -0.93 -0.57 -0.48 -0.40 -0.29 -0.24 -0.15 0.00 
Henan -2.49 -2.33 -2.16 -1.94 -1.76 -1.66 -1.57 -1.46 -1.06 -0.77 -0.43 -0.31 -0.20 -0.13 -0.08 0.00 
Hubei -2.46 -2.24 -2.09 -1.90 -1.78 -1.68 -1.64 -1.58 -1.28 -0.87 -0.56 -0.40 -0.20 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 
Hunan -2.43 -2.26 -2.09 -1.88 -1.78 -1.68 -1.62 -1.49 -1.22 -0.89 -0.65 -0.42 -0.26 -0.19 -0.11 0.00 
Guangdong -3.06 -2.86 -2.64 -2.38 -2.17 -2.01 -1.87 -1.64 -1.29 -0.93 -0.61 -0.49 -0.34 -0.24 -0.14 0.00 
Guangxi -2.30 -2.17 -1.98 -1.73 -1.53 -1.50 -1.38 -1.25 -0.93 -0.48 -0.21 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 
Hainan -4.50 -4.49 -4.48 -1.84 -1.74 -1.62 -1.53 -1.42 -1.03 -0.63 -0.41 -0.27 -0.23 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 
Sichuan(Chq) -2.08 -1.92 -1.78 -1.58 -1.44 -1.31 -1.24 -1.12 -0.77 -0.38 -0.25 -0.27 -0.15 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 
Guizhou -2.07 -1.90 -1.75 -1.50 -1.37 -1.29 -1.22 -1.10 -0.91 -0.67 -0.46 -0.35 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 
Yunan -2.22 -2.10 -1.98 -1.75 -1.64 -1.41 -1.28 -1.16 -0.89 -0.62 -0.35 -0.26 -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 0.00 
Tibet -1.04 -1.42 -1.60 -1.46 -1.39 -1.21 -1.00 -0.94 -0.95 -0.90 -0.42 -0.30 -0.27 -0.22 -0.09 0.00 
Shaanxi -1.99 -1.80 -1.65 -1.47 -1.33 -1.18 -1.13 -1.01 -0.76 -0.51 -0.34 -0.29 -0.21 -0.21 -0.10 0.00 
Gansu -2.18 -2.01 -1.84 -1.71 -1.56 -1.45 -1.37 -1.25 -1.03 -0.69 -0.46 -0.43 -0.29 -0.19 -0.17 0.00 
Qinghai -2.09 -1.90 -1.74 -1.51 -1.36 -1.24 -1.18 -1.12 -0.90 -0.57 -0.39 -0.46 -0.33 -0.23 -0.14 0.00 
Ningxia -2.26 -2.06 -1.88 -1.73 -1.52 -1.34 -1.24 -1.17 -0.94 -0.64 -0.41 -0.39 -0.24 -0.21 -0.13 0.00 
Xinjiang -2.27 -2.11 -1.90 -1.69 -1.53 -1.40 -1.24 -1.12 -0.86 -0.55 -0.22 -0.31 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19 0.00 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.28 	Relative TFP differential between US and China (2000 constant 
prices) - LTTNLtTN2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -5.14 -4.82 -4.93 -4.81 -4.96 -4.57 -4.28 -4.17 -3.14 -3.36 -3.74 -3.77 -3.14 -3.31 -3.50 -3.61 
Tianjin -5.33 -5.02 -5.11 -5.24 -5.07 -4.72 -4.20 -4.16 -4.21 -3.92 -4.40 -4.37 -3.55 -3.84 -4.15 -4.29 
Hebei -5.18 -4.88 -4.97 -5.05 -4.91 -4.64 -4.23 -4.23 -4.03 -3.26 -4.44 -4.71 -4.37 -4.78 -5.15 -5.35 
Shanxi -4.68 -4.38 -4.47 -4.62 -4.50 -4.21 -3.79 -3.76 -4.24 -3.97 -4.33 -4.64 -4.32 -4.68 -4.82 -4.90 
Inner Mongolia -4.30 -4.02 -4.12 -4.32 -4.10 -3.85 -3.46 -3.39 -3.71 -3.46 -3.80 -3.93 -3.81 -4.23 -4.55 -4.74 
Liaoning -5.44 -5.14 -5,21 -5.28 -5.03 -4.73 -4.29 -4.18 -3.92 -3.54 -4.11 -4.20 -3.86 -4.32 -4.56 -4.72 
Jilin -4.45 -4.14 -4.27 -4.37 -4.18 -4.02 -3.53 -3.45 -3.42 -3.18 -3.52 -3.61 -3.29 -3.90 -4.24 -4.65 
Heilongjiang -4.69 -4.41 -4.44 -4.59 -4.42 -4.20 -3.76 -3.70 -3.86 -3.60 -3.98 -4.16 -3.91 -4.15 -4.57 -4.50 
Shanghai -4.80 -4.49 -4.53 -4.61 -4.41 -4.13 -3.77 -3.72 -3.52 -3.21 -3.97 -4.03 -3.25 -3.47 -3.68 -3.83 
Jiangsu -5.30 -5.03 -5.11 -5.25 -5.09 -4.88 -4.52 -4.70 -4.01 -3.91 -5.09 -4.94 -3.91 -4.18 -4.52 -4.75 
Zhejiang -5.58 -5.31 -5.39 -5.50 -5.31 -5.08 -4.76 -4.89 -4.17 -3.98 -5.28 -5.23 -4.25 -4.51 -4.78 -5.17 
Anhui -4.94 -4.64 -4.72 -4.88 -4.72 -4.49 -4.07 -4.08 -3.65 -3.84 -4.76 -4.75 -4.16 -4.55 -4.83 -5.11 
Fujian -4.86 -4.56 -4.64 -4.85 -4.70 -4.45 -4.11 -4.21 -4.38 -4.04 -5.37 -5.57 -4.28 -4.69 -5.06 -5.18 
Jiangxi -4.22 -3.96 -4.09 -4.19 -4.03 -3.88 -3.57 -3.71 -4.06 -4.05 -4.26 -4.50 -4.29 -4.85 -5.05 -5.16 
Shandong -5.62 -5.30 -5.38 -5.46 -5.32 -5.10 -4.66 -4.80 -4.70 -4.34 -4.94 -4.89 -4.19 -4.52 -4.89 -5.14 
Henan -4.79 -4.50 -4.58 -4.68 -4.51 -4.24 -3.80 -3.95 -4.10 -3.82 -4.41 -4.61 -3.29 -4.46 -4.80 -5.07 
Hubei -4.96 -4.67 -4.78 -4.92 -4.76 -4.48 -4.11 -4.09 -3.03 -3.81 -4.38 -4.53 -4.19 -4.56 -4.94 -5.17 
Hunan -5.04 -4.74 -4.81 -4.89 -4.72 -4.45 -4.03 -4.06 -3.87 -3.84 -4.44 -4.65 -4.40 -4.97 -5.27 -5.53 
Guangdong -5.73 -5.43 -5.52 -5.64 -5.43 -5.14 -4.72 -4.73 -3.00 -3.85 -5.49 -5.56 -4.24 -4.39 -4.70 -4.90 
Guangxi -5.34 -5.05 -5.13 -5.23 -5.09 -4.87 -4.50 -4.50 -4.16 -3.87 -4.66 -4.84 -4.13 -4.91 -5.21 -5.37 
Hainan -5.12 -4.82 -4.88 -2.55 -3.19 -3.35 -3.36 -3.38 -4.41 -4.02 -4.82 -4.98 -4.57 -5.05 -5.21 -5.45 
Sichuan (Chq) -5.05 -4.74 -4.79 -4.92 -4.69 -4.39 -4.00 -4.02 -3.98 -3.82 -4.36 -4.40 -3.88 -4.30 -4.60 -4.83 
Guizhou -4.87 -4.55 -4.58 -4.75 -4.55 -4.23 -3.80 -3.73 -3.68 -3.28 -3.75 -3.84 -3.70 -4.18 -4.56 -4.83 
Yunan -5.00 -4.67 -4.74 -4.88 -4.71 -4.50 -4.09 -4.04 -4.04 -3.87 -4.28 -4.37 -4.05 -4.41 -4.74 -5.02 
Tibet -4.86 -4.61 -4.53 -4.72 -4.61 -4.47 -4.95 -4.15 -5.08 -4.33 -4.48 -4.58 -4.50 -4.67 -4.84 -4.90 
Shaanxi -4.78 -4.48 -4.54 -4.66 -4.46 -4.18 -3.85 -3.79 -3.87 -3.54 -3.87 -3.99 -3.85 -4.28 -4.61 -4.68 
Gansu -4.09 -3.80 -3.86 -3.96 -3.79 -3.58 -3.23 -3.23 -3.25 -2.89 -3.19 -3.42 -3.32 -3.89 -4.34 -4.62 
Qinghai -4.35 -4.05 -4.04 -4.09 -3.87 -3.58 -3.21 -2.99 -3.64 -3.43 -3.54 -3.63 -3.40 -3.72 -4.03 -4.52 
Ningxia -4.40 -4.11 -4.13 -4.27 -4.15 -3.85 -3.49 -3.53 -3.79 -3.60 -3.82 -4.15 -3.99 -4.31 -4.64 -4.93 
Xinjiang -4.57 -4.28 -4.33 4.46 -4.30 -4.01 -3.55 -3.31 -3.69 -3.46 -4.08 -4.07 -4.01 -4.29 -4.47 -4.46 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.29 	Relative price differential between US and China (2000 constant 
prices) - LPNTLpNT2000 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -0.13 -0.09 -0.16 -0.77 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.23 -0.21 0.00 
Tianjin -0.88 -0.83 -0.70 -0.70 -0.54 -0.73 -0.68 -0.14 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.13 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 
Hebei -0.92 -0.86 -0.74 -0.72 -0.47 -0.54 -0.48 -0.36 -0.19 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
Shanxi -0.85 -0.82 -0.79 -0.94 -0.60 -0.54 -0.49 -0.37 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 
Inner Mongolia -0.80 -0.82 -0.81 -0.63 -0.72 -0.75 -0.66 -0.33 -0.24 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 
Liaoning -0.63 -0.55 -0.55 -0.56 -0.41 -0.55 -0.44 -0.39 -0.29 -0.19 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 
Jilin -0.67 -0.59 -0.72 -0.56 -0.40 -0.72 -0.25 -0.09 -0.15 0.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Heilongjiang -0.65 -0.50 -0.22 -0.50 -0.58 -0.64 -0.21 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.00 
Shanghai -0.33 -0.29 -0.36 -0.37 -0.20 -0.29 -0.24 0.03 0.35 0.09 0.16 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 
Jiangsu -0.49 -0.39 -0.32 -0.22 -0.05 -0.17 -0.19 0.29 0.50 0.40 0.39 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 
Zhejiang -0.64 -0.52 -0.51 -0.56 -0.40 -0.44 -0.32 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.24 -0.22 -0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 
Anhui -0.88 -0.75 -0.64 -0.67 -0.48 -0.60 -0.47 -0.10 0.08 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Fujian -0.94 -0.96 -0.79 -0.82 -0.75 -0.55 -0.62 -0.12 -0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 
Jiangxi -0.55 -0.52 -0.45 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.22 0.24 0.37 0.59 0.34 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.00 
Shandong -0.92 -0.83 -0.80 -0.73 -0.39 -0.46 -0.40 0.19 0.47 0.43 0.32 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 
Henan -1.03 -1.00 -0.85 -0.93 -0.72 -0.75 -0.66 -0.21 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Hubei -0.82 -0.77 -0.73 -0.69 -0.44 -0.47 -0.45 -0.32 -0.17 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.00 
Hunan -0.83 -0.76 -0.73 -0.77 -0.57 -0.57 -0.59 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 
Guangdong -1.26 -1.18 -1.09 -1.04 -0.91 -0.81 -0.70 -0.24 -0.24 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 0.00 
Guangxi -0.62 -0.63 -0.56 -0.46 -0.22 -0.29 -0.13 -0.03 -0.09 0.13 0.27 0.09 0.18 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 
Hainan -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.54 -0.69 -0.68 -0.73 -0.25 -0.37 -0.31 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.24 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 0.35 0.51 0.63 0.59 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Guizhou -0.81 -0.80 -0.63 -0.57 -0.45 -0.48 -0.41 -0.15 -0.08 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.00 
Yunan -0.34 -0.35 -0.23 -0.09 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.34 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.00 
Tibet 0.10 -1.44 -0.68 -0.86 -0.64 -0.87 -0.51 -0.06 0.10 0.29 0.63 0.38 0.14 0.01 -0.15 0.00 
Shaanxi -0.48 -0.42 -0.32 -0.41 -0.29 -0.29 -0.30 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Gansu -0.92 -0.80 -0.88 -0.87 -0.88 -0.94 -0.82 -0.40 -0.11 0.05 0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 0.00 
Qinghai -1.05 -1.01 -0.90 -0.82 -0.54 -0.53 -0.46 -0.18 -0.02 0.15 0.19 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 
Ningxia -0.88 -0.80 -0.65 -0.63 -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 -0,19 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 
Xinjiang -0.33 -0.26 -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.14 -0.10 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.50 0.22 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.30 	China capital-output ratio of the tradable sector (100,000,000 
Yuan) - LkTLyT 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -0.40 -0.47 -0.63 -0.22 -1.10 -1.14 -1.30 -1.43 -0.54 -1.36 -1.68 -1.60 -0.98 -0.88 -0.85 -0.94 
Tianjin -0.36 -0.47 -0.60 -0.83 -0.97 -0.98 -0.96 -1.07 -1.41 -1.64 -2.11 -2.13 -1.31 -1.18 -1.16 -1.13 
Hebei -0.67 -0.77 -0.94 -1.14 -1.28 -1.32 -1.41 -1.55 -1.59 -1.22 -2.19 -2.40 -1.93 -1.97 -1.96 -1.95 
Shanxi 0.75 0.68 0.55 0.38 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.21 -1.09 -1.31 -1.59 -1.85 -1.53 -1.61 -1.41 -1.30 
Inner Mongolia 0.54 0.43 0.26 -0.12 -0.15 -0.24 -0.30 -0.36 -0.91 -1.12 -1.39 -1.50 -1.32 -1.40 -1.30 -1.26 
Liaoning -0.59 -0.71 -0.84 -1.02 -1.09 -1.08 -1.14 -1.26 -1.30 -1.39 -1.87 -1.91 -1.52 -1.62 -1.53 -1.56 
Jilin -0.37 -0.46 -0.67 -0.84 -0.94 -1.03 -1.06 -1.16 -1.11 -1.28 -1.60 -1.62 -1.23 -1.37 -1.29 -1.40 
Heilongjiang 0.15 -0.02 -0.14 -0.30 -0.43 -0.54 -0.62 -0.70 -1.04 -1.24 -1.60 -1.71 -1.47 -1.40 -1.48 -1.24 
Shanghai -0.29 -0.38 -0.47 -0.62 -0.73 -0.76 -0.90 -1.10 -1.25 -1.32 -2.01 -1.89 -1.01 -0.89 -0.83 -0.83 
Jiangsu -1.05 -1.20 -1.38 -1.62 -1.72 -1.79 -1.86 -2.15 -1.68 -2.03 -3.10 -2.97 -1.85 -1.81 -1.81 -1.85 
Zhejiang -1.23 -1.41 -1.60 -1.84 -1.94 -1.97 -2.13 -2.33 -1.87 -2.11 -3.27 -3.23 -2.16 -2.10 -2.06 -2.25 
Anhui -0.52 -0.65 -0.80 -1.02 -1.15 -1.19 -1.19 -1.37 -1.12 -1.82 -2.59 -2.57 -1.96 -2.00 -1.92 -1.91 
Fujian -0.20 -0.32 -0.52 -0.84 -1.02 -1.07 -1.21 -1.42 -1.78 -1.78 -2.89 -2.97 -1.65 -1.80 -1.87 -1.85 
Jiangxi -0.36 -0.49 -0.66 -0.90 -1.03 -1.12 -1.21 -1.37 -1.73 -2.10 -2.10 -2.21 -1.87 -1.98 -1.91 -1.83 
Shandong -0.64 -0.74 -0.93 -1.16 -1.35 -1.44 -1.55 -1.74 -1.86 -2.01 -2.53 -2.57 -1.89 -1.89 -1.89 -1.92 
Henan -0.40 -0.54 -0.74 -0.93 -1.09 -1.15 -1.22 -1.37 -1.65 -1.80 -2.32 -2.48 -1.10 -1.95 -1.92 -1.96 
Hubei -0.53 -0.66 -0.83 -1.02 -1.16 -1.21 -1.27 -1.33 -0.48 -1.68 -2.18 -2.29 -1.95 -1.98 -1.96 -1.94 
Hunan -0.94 -1.07 -1.23 -1.42 -1.51 -1.54 -1.56 -1.64 -1.54 -1.83 -2.30 -2.45 -2.14 -2.36 -2.33 -2.33 
Guangdong -0.38 -0.52 -0.76 -1.08 -1.22 -1.26 -1.41 -1.57 -0.12 -1.40 -2.88 -2.84 -1.49 -1.45 -1.50 -1.55 
Guangxi -0.59 -0.73 -0.91 -1.14 -1.31 -1.41 -1.51 -1.69 -1.55 -1.65 -2.29 -2.29 -1.46 -1.85 -1.79 -1.73 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.13 -0.19 -0.31 -0.44 -1.18 -1.25 -1.90 -1.76 -1.18 -1.22 -1.06 -1.09 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.55 -0.65 -0.80 -1.02 -1.12 -1.17 -1.23 -1.34 -1.51 -1.76 -2.18 -2.18 -1.61 -1.63 -1.54 -1.49 
Guizhou -0.35 -0.45 -0.58 -0.82 -0.92 -0.94 -0.99 -1.05 -1.16 -1.21 -1.59 -1.66 -1.42 -1.46 -1.41 -1.41 
Yunan -0.13 -0.21 -0.40 -0.66 -0.83 -1.01 -1.06 -1.15 -1.31 -1.52 -1.88 -1.92 -1.51 -1.48 -1.43 -1.40 
Tibet 0.76 0.81 0.73 0.58 0.42 0.23 0.11 0.13 -0.90 -0.77 -1.12 -1.00 -0.77 -0.69 -0.44 -0.15 
Shaanxi -0.15 -0.27 -0.42 -0.63 -0.76 -0.81 -0.89 -0.98 -1.28 -1.36 -1.60 -1.60 -1.36 -1.38 -1.28 -1.10 
Gansu -0.01 -0.13 -0.22 -0.41 -0.53 -0.60 -0.64 -0.72 -0.91 -1.16 -1.34 -1.44 -1.20 -1.38 -1.32 -1.29 
Qinghai 1.18 1.04 0.95 0.73 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.41 -0.57 -0.86 -0.90 -0.82 -0.60 -0.66 -0.60 -0.68 
Ningxia 0.86 0.72 0.63 0.36 0.14 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.66 -0.87 -1.04 -1.16 -0.93 -0.91 -0.90 -1.01 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.31 	China capital-output ratio of the nontradable sector (100,000,000 
Yuan) - LkNLyN 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing 0.30 0.18 -0.02 -0.24 -0.32 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.59 -0.78 -0.82 -0.91 -0.88 -0.87 -0.87 -0.90 
Tianjin 0.19 0.06 -0.03 -0.21 -0.21 -0.47 -0.64 -0.39 -0.23 -0.59 -0.69 -0.76 -0.71 -0.60 -0.54 -0.52 
Hebei -0.22 -0.34 -0.45 -0.68 -0.65 -0.73 -0.95 -0.87 -0.99 -0.99 -0.90 -0.93 -0.80 -0.60 -0.46 -0.40 
Shanxi 0.52 0.39 0.31 0.17 0.17 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.09 -0.31 -0.27 -0.32 -0.33 -0.24 -0.16 -0.08 
Inner Mongolia 0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.36 -0.48 -0.55 -0.72 -0.42 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.48 -0.47 -0.40 -0.27 -0.25 
Liaoning 0.28 0.14 -0.04 -0.26 -0.33 -0.36 -0.47 -0.62 -0.85 -0.91 -0.88 -0.88 -0.79 -0.66 -0.60 -0.63 
Jilin -0.64 -0.77 -0.91 -1.06 -1.09 -1.05 -1.14 -1.08 -1.04 -0.99 -1.06 -1.06 -0.99 -0.71 -0.52 -0.47 
Heilongjiang 0.12 -0.01 -0.18 -0.38 -0.58 -0.44 -0.58 -0.48 -0.55 -0.59 -0.58 -0.63 -0.61 -0.50 -0.39 -0.38 
Shanghai -0.19 -0.31 -0.54 -0.69 -0.69 -0.78 -0.90 -0.87 -0.78 -1.08 -1.07 -1.01 -0.94 -0.82 -0.69 -0.71 
Jiangsu -0.48 -0.59 -0.82 -1.00 -0.99 -1.00 -1.09 -0.82 -0.97 -1.13 -1.15 -1.39 -1.26 -1.12 -1.02 -0.97 
Zhejiang -0.40 -0.53 -0.76 -0.99 -1.01 -0.98 -1.12 -0.88 -1.04 -1.11 -1.08 -1.35 -1.20 -1.03 -0.95 -0.91 
Anhui -0.31 -0.44 -0.57 -0.74 -0.73 -0.74 -0.86 -0.60 -0.69 -0.93 -0.83 -1.02 -0.94 -0.82 -0.73 -0.61 
Fujian -0.10 -0.22 -0.38 -0.62 -0.74 -0.73 -0.90 -0.75 -0.91 -0.85 -0.71 -0.70 -0.64 -0.57 -0.50 -0.49 
Jiangxi -1.05 -1.16 -1.24 -1.49 -1.58 -1.47 -1.48 -1.08 -0.90 -0.84 -0.72 -0.81 -0.57 -0.41 -0.38 -0.38 
Shandong 0.11 -0.02 -0.18 -0.44 -0.48 -0.46 -0.73 -0.32 -0.38 -0.69 -0.74 -1.07 -1.06 -0.90 -0.76 -0.67 
Henan -0.51 -0.65 -0.83 -1.04 -1.10 -1.17 -1.33 -0.88 -0.79 -0.77 -0.78 -0.97 -0.94 -0.77 -0.63 -0.51 
Hubei -0.30 -0.42 -0.56 -0.68 -0.58 -0.71 -0.76 -0.62 -0.65 -0.68 -0.75 -0.88 -0.85 -0.71 -0.57 -0.50 
Hunan -0.72 -0.85 -1.04 -1.27 -1.24 -1.25 -1.38 -1.03 -0.95 -0.96 -0.87 -1.01 -0.91 -0.75 -0.62 -0.52 
Guangdong 0.57 0.44 0.23 -0.02 -0.14 -0.17 -0.38 -0.08 -0.21 -0.15 -0.19 -0.25 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.26 
Guangxi 0.08 -0.05 -0.21 -0.44 -0.45 -0.46 -0.60 -0.61 -0.77 -0.71 -0.62 -0.61 -0.47 -0.27 -0.20 -0.13 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.69 -1.86 -1.40 -1.13 -0.56 -0.28 -0.14 0.09 0.25 0.27 0.46 0.54 0.61 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.19 -0.32 -0.52 -0.75 -0.81 -0.92 -1.01 -0.71 -0.76 -0.83 -0.82 -1.11 -1.02 -0.80 -0.63 -0.51 
Guizhou -0.29 -0.43 -0.59 -0.74 -0.78 -0.85 -0.96 -0.78 -0.87 -0.79 -0.67 -0.66 -0.60 -0.28 -0.24 -0.14 
Yunan 0.22 0.09 -0.03 -0.25 -0.31 -0.40 -0.56 -0.39 -0.37 -0.54 -0.50 -0.70 -0.57 -0.34 -0.26 -0.07 
Tibet 1.28 1.15 1.01 0.79 0.69 0.55 0.38 1.09 1.41 1.48 1.42 1.17 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.26 
Shaanxi -0.09 -0.22 -0.36 -0.63 -0.69 -0.79 -0.84 -0.57 -0.62 -0.68 -0.66 -0.71 -0.66 -0.38 -0.22 -0.13 
Gansu -0.91 -1.03 -1.17 -1.37 -1.47 -1.47 -1.46 -1.13 -0.97 -1.04 -1.09 -1.30 -1.10 -0.86 -0.52 -0.26 
Qinghai 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.04 -0.03 0.18 0.19 0.07 -0.01 -0.18 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.28 
Ningxia 0.03 -0.10 -0.22 -0.34 -0.39 -0.46 -0.58 -0.31 -0.20 -0.14 -0.09 -0.16 -0.12 0.01 0.10 0.24 
Xinjiang 0.60 0.47 0.32 0.07 -0.09 -0.18 -0.51 -0.33 -0.34 -0.40 -0.38 -0.42 -0.30 -0.15 -0.09 -0.14 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Data 6.32 	China investment-output ratio of the tradable sector (100,000,000 
Yuan) - LiTLyT 
Region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Beijing -3.40 -3.44 -3.51 -2.89 -4.07 -4.04 -4.09 -3.62 -3.34 -3.25 -3.16 -2.92 -2.92 -2.90 -2.90 -3.47 
Tianjin -3.36 -3.36 -3.32 -3.34 -3.30 -3.25 -2.74 -2.80 -3.51 -3.33 -2.90 -3.07 -3.14 -2.97 -3.02 -3.02 
Hebei -3.66 -3.49 -3.33 -3.30 -3.58 -3.60 -3.69 -3.54 -3.63 -3.76 -3.67 -3.59 -3.53 -3.56 -3.81 -3.72 
Shanxi -2.25 -2.33 -2.43 -2.59 -2.81 -2.71 -2.51 -2.61 -2.74 -2.98 -3.42 -3.43 -3.19 -3.03 -3.04 -2.95 
Inner Mongolia -2.46 -2.64 -2.88 -3.02 -2.90 -2.79 -2.62 -2.37 -2.28 -2.41 -2.63 -2.74 -2.77 -3.01 -3.59 -3.28 
Liaoning -3.59 -3.42 -3.23 -3.29 -3.29 -3.21 -3.21 -3.29 -3.20 -3.35 -3.40 -3.57 -3.69 -3.86 -4.09 -4.04 
Jilin -3.36 -3.29 -3.27 -3.30 -3.66 -3.69 -3.41 -3.17 -3.02 -3.00 -2.74 -2.72 -2.93 -3.32 -3.44 -3.39 
Heilongjiang -2.84 -2.88 -2.80 -2.93 -3.19 -3.17 -3.23 -3.16 -3.09 -3.31 -3.24 -3.16 -2.80 -3.32 -3.43 -3.54 
Shanghai -3.28 -3.21 -3.06 -2.98 -3.11 -3.17 -3.48 -3.72 -3.48 -3.60 -3.28 -2.95 -2.96 -2.86 -3.15 -3.43 
Jiangsu -4.05 -3.91 -3.77 -3.87 -4.25 -4.37 -4.27 -4.34 -4.57 -4.65 -4.69 -4.31 -4.14 -4.02 -4.34 -4.38 
Zhejiang -4.23 -4.27 -4.26 -4.25 -4.34 -4.38 -4.49 -4.40 -4.57 -4.49 -4.51 -4.10 -4.02 -4.03 -4.19 -4.33 
Anhui -3.51 -3.50 -3.44 -3.59 -3.79 -3.80 -3.59 -3.54 -3.66 -3.81 -3.86 -3.82 -3.93 -3.94 -3.99 -4.16 
Fujian -3.20 -3.01 -2.88 -3.28 -3.67 -3.60 -3.54 -3.59 -3.75 -3.90 -3.79 -4.03 -3.94 -3.75 -3.82 -3.93 
Jiangxi -3.35 -3.46 -3.55 -3.68 -3.68 -3.68 -3.70 -3.77 -3.73 -3.96 -3.74 -3.76 -4.06 -4.02 -3.79 -3.60 
Shandong -3.64 -3.44 -3.30 -3.38 -3.69 -3.73 -3.85 -3.91 -4.13 -4.06 -4.00 -3.89 -3.85 -3.86 -3.91 -3.94 
Henan -3.40 -3.48 -3.56 -3.43 -3.50 -3.71 -3.39 -3.55 -3.76 -3.60 -3.61 -3.57 -3.55 -3.59 -3.75 -3.69 
Hubei -3.53 -3.58 -3.61 -3.58 -4.01 -3.84 -3.77 -3.34 -3.22 -3.15 -3.05 -3.17 -3.41 -3.40 -3.53 -3.45 
Hunan -3.93 -3.93 -3.87 -3.90 -3.90 -3.82 -3.66 -3.54 -3.85 -3.81 -3.81 -4.08 -4.14 -4.39 -4.29 -4.14 
Guangdong -337 -3.25 -3.19 -3.75 -3.52 -3.24 -3.43 -3.41 -3.37 -3.04 -3.45 -3.54 -3.83 -3.81 -3.74 -4.05 
Guangxi -3.59 -3.69 -3.77 -3.78 -3.95 -4.07 -3.91 -3.72 -3.40 -3.45 -3.64 -3.94 -4.10 -3.63 -3.46 -3.29 
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.02 -2.59 -2.72 -2.75 -2.57 -2.23 -2.04 -1.96 -2.15 -2.51 -2.68 -2.50 -2.57 
Sichuan (Chq) -3.55 -3.50 -3.44 -3.51 -3.49 -3.47 -3.34 -3.40 -3.50 -3.58 -3.56 -3.40 -3.29 -3.35 -3.48 -3.44 
Guizhou -3.34 -3.26 -3.14 -3.29 -3.36 -3.17 -3.09 -3.04 -3.06 -3.11 -3.32 -3.03 -3.01 -3.28 -3.54 -3.30 
Yunan -3.13 -3.24 -3.42 -3.59 -3.68 -3.68 -3.42 -3.24 -3.24 -3.21 -3.21 -3.30 -3.32 -3.42 -3.28 -3.27 
Tibet -2.24 -2.36 -2.70 -2.79 -2.83 -2.44 -2.10 -1.82 -1.75 -1.48 -1.47 -1.85 -1.69 -1.86 -2.03 -1.83 
Shaanxi -3.15 -3.14 -3.09 -3.14 -3.16 -3.14 -3.24 -3.28 -3.12 -3.16 -3.18 -3.31 -3.15 -3.04 -3.07 -3.04 
Gansu -3.01 -2.94 -2.76 -2.71 -2.94 -2.93 -2.86 -2.94 -3.29 -3.25 -3.19 -2.85 -2.90 -3.01 -3.08 -3.08 
Qinghai -1.81 -1.66 -1.42 -1.53 -2.08 -2.18 -2.13 -2.03 -1.86 -2.20 -2.27 -1.67 -1.75 -1.75 -1.95 -2.18 
Ningxia -2.14 -2.04 -1.83 -2.41 -2.69 -2.52 -2.39 -2.61 -2.85 -2.83 -108 -2.68 -2.57 -2.69 -2.47 -2.52 
Xinjiang -2.37 -2.46 -2.53 -2.54 -2.68 -2.33 -2.33 -1.82 -1.84 -2.00 -2.34 -2.14 -2.18 -2.01 -1.87 -1.94 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
Table 8.1 	Unit Root Tests for China's Relative Prices of Nontradables 	ln( P N ) 
PT 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -7.16 -2.05 -2.10 -2.52 	4 
Tianjin -3.10 -1.53 -1.41 -1.42 	0 
Hebei -2.10 -1.54 -1.41 -1.42 	0 
Shanxi -2.09 -1.22 -1.56 -1.13 	0 
Inner Mongolia -0.95 -0.64 -2.36 -0.59 	0 
Liaoning -2.98 -1.39 -2.51 -1.28 	0 
Jilin -5.29 -1.88 -2.96 -1.74 	0 
Heilongjiang -6.57 -2.24 -2.38 -2.08 	0 
Shanghai -5.51 -1.82 -1.75 -1.69 	0 
Jiangsu -4.28 -1.68 -1.26 -1.55 	0 
Zhejiang -4.34 -1.75 -1.51 -1.62 	0 
Anhui -2.66 -1.60 -0.98 -1.49 	0 
Fujian -3.02 -1.47 -2.11 -1.37 	0 
Jiangxi -2.82 -1.41 -0.85 -1.30 	0 
Shandong -3.03 -1.57 -0.92 -1.45 	0 
Henan -1.79 -1.24 -0.94 -1.15 	0 
Hubei -1.75 -1.29 -1.33 -1.20 	0 
Hunan -2.66 -1.37 -1.85 -1.27 	0 
Guangdong -1.60 -1.34 -0.93 -1.24 	0 
Guangxi -3.40 -1.64 -0.81 -1.51 	0 
Hainan -3.91 -1.56 -2.89 -1.42 	0 
Sichuan (Chq) -3.36 -1.33 -1.01 -1.23 	0 
Guizhou -1.93 -1.53 0.00 -1.41 	0 
Yunan -2.89 -1.17 -0.20 -2.03 	3 
Tibet -7.55 -2.39 -4.24 ** -1.47 	3 
Shaanxi -3.34 -1.49 -1.03 -2.53 	3 
Gansu -1.99 -1.10 -1.43 -1.37 	3 
Qinghai -2.23 -1.59 -0.72 -2.14 	3 
Ningxia -2.50 -1.70 -0.35 -1.88 	3 
Xinjiang -3.69 -1.46 -0.68 -2.00 	3 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.47 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 	 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 	5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.2 	Unit Root Tests for China's Relative TFP in -L. 
 BN -- 










Beijing -10.40 -2.69 -3.79 ** -0.50 3 
Tianjin -9.72 -2.68 -2.66 -2.50 0 
Hebei -2.18 -0.82 -2.60 -0.76 0 
Shanxi -0.92 -0.69 -2.14 -0.64 0 
Inner Mongolia 0.36 0.36 -2.26 0.34 0 
Liaoning -4.80 -1.43 -2.08 -1.33 0 
Jilin 1.70 0.85 -1.42 0.79 0 
Heilongjiang -0.93 -0.66 -2.48 -0.61 0 
Shanghai -8.95 -2.54 -2.72 -2.36 0 
Jiangsu -9.57 -2.70 -3.15 -1.59 2 
Zhejiang -9.55 -2.62 -3.30 -1.41 2 
Anhui -2.27 -0.96 -2.68 -0.40 2 
Fujian -3.50 -1.46 -2.67 -0.96 2 
Jiangxi -0.17 -0.20 -2.22 -0.73 2 
Shandong -5.77 -1.83 -3.13 -1.05 2 
Henan -5.34 -1.61 -4.26 ** -0.20 2 
Hubei -4.03 -1.33 -2.91 -0.46 2 
Hunan 0.79 0.58 -1.85 0.63 2 
Guangdong -10.90 -2.92 -3.02 -2.24 2 
Guangxi -3.39 -1.16 -3.58 0.56 2 
Hainan -2.43 -2.77 -1.78 -1.80 2 
Sichuan (Chq) -1.45 -0.66 -2.69 -0.21 2 
Guizhou 1.99 1.19 -0.99 1.96 2 
Yunan 0.51 0.36 -2.50 0.37 2 
Tibet -4.75 -1.83 -3.69 -1.39 2 
Shaanxi 0.35 0.30 -2.45 1.32 2 
Gansu 2.13 2.39 -0.85 9.64 ** 2 
Qinghai -0.06 -0.03 -2.31 -0.07 2 
Ningxia 0.79 0.88 -2.40 0.22 2 
Xinjiang -1.14 -0.72 -2.03 -1.14 2 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -0.89 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 	 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 	5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 










































t „ ( PP ) 
P 




In ' 	= 	+ fi In -7  pT e 
A 
T(p- 1) 
-7.81 -2.30 -3.61 ** 4 
-4.47 -1.78 -1.72 0 
-4.82 -1.98 -1.88 0 
-5.69 -1.82 -1.76 0 
-6.40 -1.75 -1.74 0 
-4.87 -1.82 -1.76 0 
-8.29 -2.38 -2.30 ** 0 
-10.70 -2.95 -2.84 ** 0 
-6.24 -1.96 -1.90 0 
-4.85 -1.74 -1.67 0 
-5.28 -1.89 -1.82 0 
-5.32 -1.84 -1.73 1 
-9.67 -2.73 -2.64 ** 0 
-2.95 -1.08 -1.08 0 
-6.29 -2.03 -2.21 ** 1 
-7.23 -2.14 -2.06 ** 0 
-4.64 -1.77 -1.69 0 
-4.43 -1.68 -1.61 0 
-1.70 -1.37 -1.29 0 
-4.72 -1.73 -1.66 0 
-12.07 -3.29 -3.18 ** 0 
-3.18 -1.21 -1.19 0 
-2.34 -1.27 -1.57 4 
-3.07 -1.32 -2.26 ** 4 
-16.48 -5.21 ** -1.80 4 
-3.52 -1.38 -1.54 4 
-3.51 -1.36 -1.49 4 
-4.01 -1.67 -2.56 ** 4 
-2.91 -1.26 -1.29 4 
-3.05 -1.15 -1.51 4 
With constant With constant With constant, trend 
and trend and time dummy 
0.48 -1.39 -0.71 0 
0.10 2.64 ** -0.45 0 
-0.78 2.03 ** -5.59 ** 0 
0.12 3.57 ** -5.06 ** 0 
2.32 ** 4.34 ** 1.63 0 
0.74 3.52 ** -5.14 ** 0 
1.97 ** 5.27 ** -4.11 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t ;.,  (PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: A 
Z a 	5%=-20.4935 	Z1 	5%=-3.3654 
3. The t,, (ADF) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5%=-1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%=1.65. 
Table 8.4 	Test for Unit Roots in y =ln /2-1-1nL T  N 
P 	0 










Beijing -8.40 -2.22 -2.95 -2.07 0 
Tianjin -4.16 -1.70 -1.60 -1.58 0 
Hebei -0.89 -0.47 -3.35 -0.44 0 
Shanxi -1.22 -0.93 -1.63 -0.87 0 
Inner Mongolia 0.24 0.28 -2.40 0.26 0 
Liaoning -2.44 -0.97 -2.31 -0.90 0 
Jilin 0.03 0.02 -3.80 ** 0.02 0 
Heilongjiang -0.44 -0.33 -2.06 -0.30 0 
Shanghai -6.99 -2.14 -2.18 -1.99 0 
Jiangsu -7.04 -2.31 -2.27 -2.15 0 
Zhejiang -7.38 -2.34 -2.69 -2.18 0 
Anhui -2.08 -1.21 -2.00 -1.22 3 
Fujian -2.29 -1.17 -2.42 -1.13 3 
Jiangxi -0.97 -0.96 -0.99 -1.21 3 
Shandong -3.21 -1.57 -1.48 -2.26 3 
Henan -2.69 -1.21 -2.86 -0.95 3 
Hubei -2.47 -1.06 -3.23 -0.99 0 
Hunan 0.11 0.09 -2.94 -0.27 3 
Guangdong -8.06 -2.39 -3.15 -1.50 2 
Guangxi -2.72 -1.24 -3.62 -0.78 2 
Hainan -1.91 -3.20 ** -0.31 -2.32 2 
Sichuan (Chq) -2.80 -1.30 -1.71 -1.30 2 
Guizhou -0.39 -0.32 -3.24 0.18 2 
Yunan -2.27 -1.45 -1.36 -1.82 2 
Tibet -3.48 -1.40 -2.51 -1.31 0 
Shaanxi -0.35 -0.28 -2.20 -0.26 0 
Gansu 0.70 0.71 -2.30 0.66 0 
Qinghai -1.18 -0.83 -1.78 -0.77 0 
Ningxia -0.66 -0.72 -1.39 -0.67 0 
Xinjiang -1.88 -1.14 -1.62 -1.06 0 
lPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.05 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
BT 
Table 8.5 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 	In 1=- a+ fin-A-, pT 
Region 
OLS 
t(8 ois =1) 13  FMOLS 1) 
  
t( I (3 FM°1-S =  
No. of 
lags 
Beijing -0.30 -5.10 ** -0.24 -3.65 ** 3 
Tianjin -0.50 -3.68 ** -0.33 -2.31 ** 3 
Hebei -0.26 -11.70 ** -0.11 -7.48 ** 3 
Shanxi -0.42 -20.03 ** -0.39 -12.97 ** 3 
Inner Mongolia -0.45 -24.25 ** -0.38 -16.54 ** 3 
Liaoning -0.15 -7.12 ** 0.05 -3.85 ** 3 
Jilin -0.27 -9.84 ** -0.16 -6.50 ** 3 
Heilongjiang -0.22 -12.19 ** -0.17 -10.18 ** 3 
Shanghai -0.15 -5.93 ** 0.04 -3.67 ** 3 
Jiangsu -0.14 -6.29 ** 0.04 -3.80 ** 3 
Zhejiang -0.13 -7.58 ** 0.09 -4.27 ** 3 
Anhui -0.38 -10.91 ** -0.23 -6.96 ** 3 
Fujian -0.27 -18.61 ** -0.21 -14.06 ** 3 
Jiangxi -0.20 -13.95 ** -0.14 -8.57 ** 3 
Shandong -0.85 -5.68 ** -0.63 -3.75 ** 3 
Henan -0.55 -10.78 ** -0.51 -7.58 ** 3 
Hubei -0.27 -12.59 ** -0.15 -7.85 ** 3 
Hunan -0.25 -14.35 ** -0.09 -8.41 ** 3 
Guangdong -0.08 -6.48 ** 0.05 -3.75 ** 3 
Guangxi -0.16 -8.86 ** -0.04 -5.47 ** 3 
Hainan -0.01 -39.56 ** -0.01 -30.18 ** 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.07 -5.20 ** 0.19 -2.59 ** 3 
Guizhou -0.30 -6.99 ** 0.05 -3.42 ** 3 
Yunan 0.10 -5.73 ** 0.32 -2.91 ** 3 
Tibet -0.50 -7.34 ** -0.78 -9.22 ** 3 
Shaanxi -0.17 -7.88 ** 0.06 -4.15 ** 3 
Gansu -0.37 -9.90 ** -0.21 -5.64 ** 3 
Qinghai -0.44 -9.57 ** -0.26 -5.92 ** 3 
Ningxia -0.31 -12.53 ** -0.14 -7.36 ** 3 
Xinjiang -0.07 -10.50 ** 0.04 -6.36 ** 3 
Panel Tests of fi =1 
13  PANEL 
	 VTV t ;13 
All provinces 	 -0.14 
	 -40.05 ** 
Panel Tests of /3  =1 with Common Time Dummies 
A 
13 PANEL 	 VTV 
All provinces 	 -0.19 -48.82 ** 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
	
5% = 2.145 	10%=1.761 
3. Nri rt i3  is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	5% = 1.96 
Table 8.6 	Unit Root Tests for China Black Market Exchange Rate lnXRb 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -4.85 -3.19 6 -2.30 -2.72 	1 
Tianjin -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Hebei -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Shanxi -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Inner Mongolia -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Liaoning -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Jilin -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Heilongjiang -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Shanghai -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Jiangsu -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Zhejiang -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Anhui -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Fujian -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Jiangxi -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Shandong -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Henan -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Hubei 4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Hunan -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Guangdong -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Guangxi -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Hainan -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Sichuan (Chq) -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Guizhou 4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Yunan -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Tibet -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Shaanxi -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Gansu -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Qinghai -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Ningxia 4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
Xinjiang -4.85 -3.19 -2.30 -2.69 	4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.78 6 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 1%=-3.75 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
6. Insignificant at 4% level 
Table 8.7 	Unit Root Tests for China Official Exchange Rate lnXR 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -1.56 	0 
Tianjin -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -1.56 	0 
Hebei -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -1.56 	0 
Shanxi -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -1.56 	0 
Inner Mongolia -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -1.56 	0 
Liaoning -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Jilin -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Heilongjiang -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Shanghai -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Jiangsu -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Zhejiang -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Anhui -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Fujian -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Jiangxi -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Shandong -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Henan -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Hubei -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Hunan -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Guangdong -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Guangxi -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Hainan -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Sichuan (Chg) -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Guizhou -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Yunan -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Tibet -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Shaanxi -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Gansu -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Qinghai -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Ningxia -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
Xinjiang -1.80 -1.67 -1.51 -2.09 	4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.56 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.8 	Unit Root Tests for the China PPP exchange rate ln( PT  ) \ 
PT 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -1.65 -1.12 -2.77 -1.03 	0 
Tianjin -0.63 -1.45 -1.00 -1.34 	0 
Hebei -0.18 -0.51 -1.62 -0.47 	0 
Shanxi -0.45 -0.75 -1.85 -0.69 	0 
Inner Mongolia -0.17 -0.38 -2.27 -0.35 	0 
Liaoning -0.44 -1.03 -1.32 -0.96 	0 
Jilin -0.35 -0.78 -1.99 -0.72 	0 
Heilongjiang -0.74 -1.53 -1.48 -1.41 	0 
Shanghai -0.46 -1.00 -1.20 -0.92 	0 
Jiangsu -0.69 -1.32 -1.22 -0.93 	1 
Zhejiang -0.25 -0.58 -1.36 -0.71 	1 
Anhui -0.44 -0.73 -1.43 -0.81 	1 
Fujian -0.18 -0.45 -1.60 -0.79 	1 
Jiangxi -0.73 -1.10 -1.97 -0.96 	1 
Shandong -0.67 -1.39 -0.79 -1.24 	1 
Henan -0.38 -0.81 -1.31 -0.95 	1 
Hubei -0.13 -0.26 -1.47 -0.60 	1 
Hunan -0.09 -0.23 -1.44 -0.72 	1 
Guangdong -0.37 -1.17 -0.76 -1.24 	1 
Guangxi -0.75 -1.19 -0.92 -1.32 	1 
Hainan -2.59 -1.81 -2.02 -2.26 	1 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.64 -1.15 -1.26 -0.99 	1 
Guizhou -0.49 -1.46 -1.40 -0.99 	1 
Yunan -0.45 -1.12 -0.73 -1.27 	1 
Tibet 0.36 0.23 -5.46 ** -0.44 	1 
Shaanxi -0.74 -1.84 -1.01 -0.98 	1 
Gansu -0.45 -1.00 -1.41 -0.86 	1 
Qinghai -0.80 -1.51 -2.00 -1.05 	1 
Ningxia -0.70 -1.73 -1.16 -1.18 	1 
Xinjiang -0.94 -1.77 -0.58 -1.52 	1 
IPS t-bar panel unit uoot test with constant 




1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 
	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 
	 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 
	
5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.9 









































t „ (PP) 
P 




ln XRb = a + fi 	p' T  
A 
T(p-1) 
-4.79 -2.25 -3.57 ** 2 
-4.39 -2.11 -2.35 ** 1 
-4.43 -2.18 -2.34 ** 1 
-4.41 -2.21 -2.66 ** 4 
-4.46 -2.19 -3.11 ** 4 
-4.39 -2.14 -2.75 ** 4 
-4.41 -2.13 -2.88 ** 4 
-4.41 -2.08 -2.52 ** 4 
-4.44 -2.17 -2.59 ** 4 
-4.33 -2.09 -2.96 ** 4 
-4.45 -2.21 -2.68 ** 4 
-4.38 -2.21 -3.23 ** 4 
-4.48 -2.21 -2.78 ** 4 
-4.43 -2.12 -2.65 ** 4 
-4.34 -2.10 -2.94 ** 4 
-4.39 -2.19 -3.12 ** 4 
-4.39 -2.24 -2.90 ** 4 
-4.46 -2.23 -2.99 ** 4 
-4.46 -2.16 -2.73 ** 4 
-4.47 -2.19 -2.86 ** 4 
-5.56 -2.10 -4.43 ** 4 
-4.38 -2.13 -2.84 ** 4 
-4.31 -2.06 -2.78 ** 4 
-4.52 -2.19 -3.18 ** 4 
-5.53 -3.19 -2.70 ** 4 
-4.27 -2.02 -2.81 ** 4 
-4.42 -2.15 -2.49 ** 4 
-4.19 -1.98 -2.40 ** 4 
-4.28 -2.03 -2.57 ** 4 
-4.44 -2.07 -2.59 ** 4 
With constant With constant 
and trend 
With constant, trend 
and time dummy 
1.92 ** -2.86 ** -3.19 ** 0 
-0.67 3.21 ** -3.41 ** 0 
-2.90 ** 0.39 -20.36 ** 0 
-1.78 ** 1.77 ** -15.24 ** 0 
2.14 ** 5.15 ** -0.59 0 
-1.44 2.11 ** -20.16 ** 0 
-0.13 3.59 ** -14.64 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t . ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: 
A 
Za  5%=-20.4935 Zt 5%=-3.3654 
3. The t . (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5%=-1.95. 









































Test for Cointegration of China Official Exchange Rate and the PPP Exchange Rate 
In X R = a + 13 ln PT  
T (pA - 1) t „ (PP ) P 




-18.02 * -4.68 ** -3.77 ** 4 
-10.76 -2.71 -1.97 ** 4 
-7.01 -1.98 -2.37 ** 4 
-11.26 -2.96 -2.13 ** 4 
-7.19 -2.02 -1.94 4 
-8.54 -2.17 -1.86 4 
-8.08 -2.09 -2.02 ** 4 
-8.35 -2.06 -2.08 ** 4 
-10.52 -2.62 -1.50 4 
-11.39 -2.80 -1.50 4 
-7.41 -2.03 -1.94 4 
-7.35 -2.18 -2.44 ** 4 
-7.30 -2.04 -1.93 4 
-8.44 -2.26 -1.89 4 
-12.79 -3.12 -1.51 4 
-9.89 -2.64 -1.93 4 
-5.59 -1.80 -2.64 ** 4 
-6.20 -1.88 -2.43 ** 4 
-9.65 -2.49 -1.85 4 
-11.40 -3.05 -2.50 ** 4 
-8.35 -2.40 -2.35 ** 4 
-11.28 -2.89 -1.52 4 
-7.76 -2.11 -2.40 ** 4 
-11.15 -2.90 -1.63 4 
-10.22 -4.14 ** -1.26 4 
-10.40 -2.57 -1.96 ** 4 
-7.59 -2.01 -1.98 ** 4 
-7.77 -2.00 -2.10 ** 4 
-9.27 -2.33 -2.21 ** 4 
-15.19 -3.61 ** -1.48 4 
With constant With constant With constant, trend 
and trend and time dummy 
0.60 -4.00 ** -1.82 ** 0 
-3.80 ** -0.09 -9.86 ** 0 
-4.81 ** -4.34 ** -27.13 ** 0 
-4.50 ** -4.09 ** -24.36 ** 0 
-0.84 2.36 ** -6.31 ** 0 
-4.04 ** -2.97 ** -28.86 ** 0 
-3.53 ** -2.21 ** -24.88 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t 
P  
,, ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: A 
A 
Z a 	5%=-20.4935 	Z t 	5%=-3.3654 
3. The t. (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5%=-1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%=1.65. 
Table 8.11 	Test for Unit Roots in C =1n XRb-ln PT  Fa' 










Beijing -1.63 -0.77 -2.54 -4.56 ** 3 
Tianjin -0.17 -0.12 -2.12 -0.83 2 
Hebei 0.40 0.35 -2.24 -0.72 2 
Shanxi -0.12 -0.09 -2.22 -1.32 2 
Inner Mongolia 0.19 0.13 -2.21 -0.52 2 
Liaoning 0.01 0.01 -2.11 -0.66 2 
Jilin 0.00 0.00 -2.20 -0.45 2 
Heilongjiang -0.65 -0.39 -2.02 -0.67 2 
Shanghai -0.41 -0.26 -2.12 -0.79 2 
Jiangsu -0.01 -0.01 -1.91 -0.49 2 
Zhejiang 0.26 0.24 -1.97 -0.52 2 
Anhui -0.06 -0.05 -1.92 -0.74 2 
Fujian 0.36 0.35 -2.20 -0.84 2 
Jiangxi -0.40 -0.26 -2.15 -1.00 2 
Shandong 0.09 0.08 -2.13 -0.83 2 
Henan 0.09 0.08 -2.12 -0.68 2 
Hubei 0.19 0.16 -2.01 -0.82 2 
Hunan 0.22 0.17 -2.13 -0.75 2 
Guangdong 0.24 0.24 -2.14 -0.50 2 
Guangxi -0.40 -0.30 -1.95 -1.09 2 
Hainan -2.39 -1.42 -2.90 -1.78 1 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.20 -0.14 -2.12 -1.16 1 
Guizhou -0.06 -0.04 -2.16 -0.93 1 
Yunan -0.21 -0.15 -2.27 -1.17 1 
Tibet -2.84 -1.32 -4.07 ** -1.12 1 
Shaanxi -0.14 -0.09 -2.12 -0.96 1 
Gansu -0.29 -0.20 -2.12 -1.08 1 
Qinghai -0.12 -0.08 -2.12 -0.84 1 
Ningxia -0.03 -0.03 -2.15 -0.87 1 
Xinjiang -0.56 -0.38 -2.01 -1.13 1 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -0.13 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.12 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
	
ln XRb = a + ln P
T  
Region 















































































































































: 76.2823 *** 
-1:653..2106 ****** 
-4.73 ** 
























All provinces 	 0.20 	-32.55 ** 
Panel Tests of /6 = lwith Common Time Dummies 
23 PANEL 
All provinces 	 -0.001 	-9.35E+15 ** 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% = 2.145 	10%=1.761 
34TV t ;iis the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	5% = 1.96 
Table 8.13 	Test for Unit Roots in 
T 
6. = in XR - ln P pT 










Beijing -4.92 -1.66 -4.64 ** -0.58 4 
Tianjin -0.88 -0.64 -3.65 0.44 3 
Hebei 0.33 0.43 -2.26 1.31 4 
Shanxi -0.56 -0.42 -3.86 ** -0.18 4 
Inner Mongolia 0.28 0.21 -2.27 2.12 4 
Liaoning -0.16 -0.14 -2.93 1.69 4 
Jilin 0.31 0.20 -2.49 4.89 ** 4 
Heilongjiang -1.05 -0.69 -3.01 1.29 4 
Shanghai -0.52 -0.34 -3.61 1.32 4 
Jiangsu -0.65 -0.60 -3.07 0.41 4 
Zhejiang -0.01 -0.01 -2.15 0.60 4 
Anhui -0.47 -0.40 -2.01 0.61 4 
Fujian 0.16 0.25 -2.41 0.70 4 
Jiangxi -0.50 -0.47 -3.01 1.20 4 
Shandong -0.65 -0.69 -3.22 -0.57 4 
Henan -0.45 -0.39 -2.90 0.43 4 
Hubei 0.17 0.17 -1.63 0.60 4 
Hunan 0.32 0.30 -1.83 0.52 4 
Guangdong -0.19 -0.26 -3.30 0.54 4 
Guangxi -1.05 -0.88 -2.18 -0.21 4 
Hainan -3.59 -1.93 -2.26 -1.17 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.47 -0.41 -3.19 0.37 3 
Guizhou -0.54 -0.36 -2.41 1.52 4 
Yunan -0.52 -0.49 -3.94 ** 0.18 4 
Tibet -6.37 -1.95 -4.22 ** 0.24 4 
Shaanxi -0.64 -0.43 -3.31 1.55 4 
Gansu -0.38 -0.32 -2.64 0.86 4 
Qinghai -0.80 -0.54 -2.67 2.45 4 
Ningxia -0.61 -0.55 -3.55 1.04 4 
Xinjiang -1.57 -1.21 -3.43 -0.49 4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -0.44 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 
	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 
	 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 
	5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.14 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
	ln XR =cr-Ffiln pP, 
13  OLS 
Region No. 
t(13  OLS = 1) d./3  FMOLS 0 FMOLS = 1) 
of 
lags 
Beijing 0.54 -11.27 ** 0.54 -14.90 ** 3 
Tianjin 0.51 -14.68 ** 0.53 -11.84 ** 3 
Hebei 0.41 -18.72 ** 0.42 -13.28 ** 3 
Shanxi 0.49 -16.40 ** 0.50 -13.07 ** 3 
Inner Mongolia 0.49 -12.62 ** 0.49 -9.10 ** 3 
Liaoning 0.50 -14.77 ** 0.51 -11.01 ** 3 
Jilin 0.55 -10.88 ** 0.56 -7.99 ** 3 
Heilongjiang 0.58 -11.14 ** 0.62 -7.46 ** 3 
Shanghai 0.57 -12.19 ** 0.58 -9.51 ** 3 
Jiangsu 0.44 -20.91 ** 0.45 -17.30 ** 3 
Zhejiang 0.36 -22.43 ** 0.36 -16.16 ** 3 
Anhui 0.43 -16.22 ** 0.43 -11.38 ** 3 
Fujian 0.35 -25.30 ** 0.35 -18.50 ** 3 
Jiangxi 0.53 -16.34 ** 0.54 -12.58 ** 3 
Shandong 0.42 -24.73 ** 0.43 -24.08 ** 3 
Henan 0.43 -18.31 ** 0.44 -14.00 ** 3 
Hubei 0.43 -14.76 ** 0.42 -10.06 ** 3 
Hunan 0.45 -14.15 ** 0.44 -10.00 ** 3 
Guangdong 0.36 -25.71 ** 0.38 -19.72 ** 3 
Guangxi 0.45 -19.82 ** 0.45 -17.57 ** 3 
Hainan 0.22 -26.35 ** 0.18 -19.33 ** 3 
Sichuan (Chq) 0.52 -16.75 ** 0.53 -13.94 ** 3 
Guizhou 0.55 -10.55 ** 0.58 -7.11 ** 3 
Yunan 0.48 -17.83 ** 0.50 -14.52 ** 3 
Tibet 0.62 -3.84 ** 0.53 -5.49 ** 3 
Shaanxi 0.58 -11.73 ** 0.60 -8.90 ** 3 
Gansu 0.53 -13.28 ** 0.55 -9.07 ** 3 
Qinghai 0.57 -11.11 ** 0.59 -7.72 ** 3 
Ningxia 0.51 -15.37 ** 0.55 -10.71 ** 3 
Xinjiang 0.51 -18.84 ** 0.52 -19.58 ** 3 
All provinces 
All provinces 
Panel Tests of 13 =1 
PANEL 	1,11V t 
	
0.49 	-70.46 ** 
Panel Tests of fi = lwith Common Time Dummies 
13  PANEL 	T N 
0.001 -7.98E+15 ** 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% = 2.145 	10%=1.761 
3. IN Ci3  is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	 5% = 1.96 
Table 8.15 	Unit Root Tests for the China Real Parallel Exchange Rate 
	
qb 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -0.18 -0.11 -2.66 -0.99 	1 
Tianjin -1.45 -0.70 -2.37 -0.65 	0 
Hebei 0.09 0.07 -2.56 -1.81 	4 
Shanxi -0.58 -0.36 -2.48 -1.59 	4 
Inner Mongolia -0.24 -0.16 -2.44 -1.45 	4 
Liaoning -0.56 -0.33 -2.39 -1.72 	4 
Jilin -0.60 -0.35 -2.51 -1.83 	4 
Heilongjiang -0.34 -0.22 -2.33 -2.18 	4 
Shanghai -0.90 -0.48 -2.26 -1.79 	4 
Jiangsu -0.52 -0.30 -2.38 -1.91 	4 
Zhejiang -0.03 -0.02 -2.32 -1.85 	4 
Anhui -0.19 -0.13 -2.18 -2.11 	4 
Fujian 0.27 0.23 -2.59 -1.36 	4 
Jiangxi -0.13 -0.09 -2.36 -2.32 	4 
Shandong -0.03 -0.02 -2.57 -1.76 	4 
Henan -0.02 -0.01 -2.59 -2.31 	4 
Hubei -0.14 -0.09 -2.42 -2.33 	4 
Hunan -0.18 -0.12 -2.29 -1.56 	4 
Guangdong 0.23 0.19 -2.82 -2.22 	4 
Guangxi -0.39 -0.27 -2.22 -1.27 	4 
Hainan -0.67 -0.53 -1.80 -30.15 ** 	4 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.24 -0.16 -2.41 -2.22 	4 
Guizhou -0.63 -0.36 -2.32 -1.18 	4 
Yunan -0.29 -0.19 -2.61 -1.31 	4 
Tibet -0.54 -0.28 -2.99 -1.40 	4 
Shaanxi -2.49 -1.25 -2.98 -1.87 	4 
Gansu -0.51 -0.30 -2.30 -2.00 	4 
Qinghai -0.64 -0.36 -2.38 -1.04 	4 
Ningxia -0.26 -0.17 -2.26 -1.29 	4 
Xinjiang -0.06 -0.04 -2.36 -1.33 	4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -0.21 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.16 	Unit Root Tests for China Real Official Exchange Rate q 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing 0.14 0.07 -2.71 0.06 	0 
Tianjin -2.52 -0.81 -2.68 1.00 	1 
Hebei 0.37 0.27 -2.97 0.23 	1 
Shanxi -0.82 -0.42 -3.36 -0.19 	1 
Inner Mongolia -0.59 -0.33 -3.23 1.44 	4 
Liaoning -0.13 -0.07 -3.18 1.87 	4 
Jilin -0.53 -0.24 -2.74 0.22 	4 
Heilongjiang 0.18 0.11 -2.64 -0.15 	4 
Shanghai -0.10 -0.04 -2.14 -0.28 	4 
Jiangsu -0.51 -0.25 -3.53 -0.16 	4 
Zhejiang 0.15 0.11 -2.81 0.06 	4 
Anhui -0.37 -0.24 -2.04 0.25 	4 
Fujian 0.21 0.22 -3.30 0.22 	4 
Jiangxi -0.32 -0.21 -2.43 0.38 	4 
Shandong 0.28 0.22 -3.73 -0.01 	4 
Henan 0.25 0.17 -2.65 0.18 	4 
Hubei 0.53 0.34 -2.12 -0.26 	4 
Hunan -0.19 -0.12 -2.43 0.66 	4 
Guangdong 0.06 0.05 -4.14 ** 0.39 	4 
Guangxi -0.88 -0.61 -3.10 0.05 	4 
Hainan -3.18 -1.89 -3.15 -2.50 	4 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.16 -0.11 -2.81 0.38 	4 
Guizhou -2.31 -0.96 -3.04 1.21 	4 
Yunan -0.89 -0.55 -4.42 ** 1.28 	4 
Tibet -1.76 -0.60 -2.75 0.67 	4 
Shaanxi -6.38 -2.02 -3.14 -0.35 	4 
Gansu -0.33 -0.17 -2.02 0.19 	4 
Qinghai -2.53 -0.97 -3.15 1.37 	4 
Ningxia -0.77 -0.47 -3.01 1.46 	4 
Xinjiang -0.59 -0.43 -3.93 ** 1.08 	4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 




1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.17 	Unit Root Tests for Relative TFP Difference between US and China 
ln 0 -1n 0 - (ln - ln ) 











Beijing -2.98 -1.62 -2.07 -1.50 0 
Tianjin -4.14 -1.94 -2.10 -1.80 0 
Hebei -5.51 -1.75 -1.41 -1.63 0 
Shanxi -5.07 -1.58 -1.86 -1.47 0 
Inner Mongolia -2.31 -0.78 -0.74 -0.72 0 
Liaoning -3.45 -1.85 -0.63 -1.72 0 
Jilin -3.19 -1.18 0.03 -1.09 0 
Heilongjiang -4.87 -1.88 -1.32 -2.01 3 
Shanghai -5.07 -2.18 -2.26 -1.82 3 
Jiangsu -8.61 -2.65 -3.00 -1.52 3 
Zhejiang -8.54 -2.61 -2.63 -1.68 3 
Anhui -6.19 -1.86 -1.61 -1.38 3 
Fujian -11.11 -2.84 -3.19 -1.29 3 
Jiangxi 0.23 0.09 -1.57 -0.07 3 
Shandong -6.39 -2.35 -2.01 -1.70 3 
Henan -11.13 -2.78 -2.54 -1.45 3 
Hubei -5.27 -1.69 -1.39 -1.34 3 
Hunan -1.77 -0.66 -0.58 -1.29 3 
Guangdong -8.27 -2.53 -2.61 -1.78 2 
Guangxi -6.25 -1.97 -1.51 -1.13 2 
Hainan -5.48 -1.74 -2.70 -1.20 2 
Sichuan (Chq) -5.36 -2.01 -1.14 -1.75 3 
Guizhou -3.15 -1.36 -0.12 -2.16 4 
Yunan -4.16 -1.53 -0.53 -1.30 4 
Tibet -23.28 ** -7.08 ** -7.13 ** -6.59 ** 0 
Shaanxi -3.61 -1.53 -0.62 -1.42 0 
Gansu -1.20 -0.44 0.14 -1.88 4 
Qinghai -4.49 -1.45 -0.57 -1.35 0 
Ningxia -1.13 -0.38 -0.55 -0.85 4 
Xinjiang 4.47 -1.70 -1.46 -1.83 4 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.73 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 
	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 
	 5%= -3.066 
t-test with intercept and trend 
	
5%= -3.735 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	 5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 







































Difference between US and China 
T (pA - 1) 
qb = 0( + fi[(ln OT  -1n ON ) - On or - In om 
t , ( PP ) 	 t ,(ADF ) 
P 	 P 
No. of 
lags 
-4.46 -1.70 -1.62 0 
-2.99 -1.31 -3.22 ** 4 
-0.21 -0.15 -1.99 ** 4 
-3.02 -1.28 -1.24 0 
-1.60 -0.89 -1.82 4 
-1.01 -0.52 -2.17 ** 4 
-0.62 -0.36 -2.41 ** 4 
-0.42 -0.27 -2.28 ** 4 
-2.12 -0.98 -4.02 ** 4 
-2.00 -0.83 -2.57 ** 4 
-0.85 -0.40 -1.83 4 
-0.88 -0.57 -1.95 ** 4 
-2.78 -1.18 -1.10 4 
-5.26 -1.72 -1.41 4 
-1.45 -0.59 -1.41 4 
-0.56 -0.36 -2.00 ** 4 
-0.57 -0.37 -2.18 ** 4 
-1.38 -0.85 -2.07 ** 4 
-0.63 -0.33 -2.37 ** 4 
-0.29 -0.18 -1.94 4 
-14.62 -4.43 ** -0.46 4 
-0.21 -0.13 -3.01 ** 4 
-0.57 -0.32 -1.85 4 
-0.10 -0.07 -1.94 4 
-1.60 -0.69 -1.62 4 
-2.53 -1.22 -1.84 4 
-1.47 -0.82 -2.25 ** 4 
-1.43 -0.77 -1.79 4 
-2.32 -1.17 -2.21 ** 4 
-0.40 -0.28 -1.82 4 
With constant With constant With constant, trend 
and trend and time dummy 
-1.42 -1.50 -1.00 0 
3.05 ** 2.80 ** -0.99 0 
3.53 ** 0.39 -6.46 ** 0 
5.47 ** 2.11 ** -5.93 ** 0 
5.40 ** 4.81 ** 1.06 0 
5.92 ** 2.16 ** -6.42 ** 0 
8.51 " 3.95 ** -5.10 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t A ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: 
Z a 	5%=-20.4935 	
Z 5%=-3.3654 
3. The t (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 570=-1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%=1.65. 
Table 8.19 	Test for Cointegration of China Real Official Exchange Rate and Relative TFP Difference 
between US and China q = a + fi[(ln 0 T - in 0 N ) - On- In A OT 	ON 
t „ ( PP ) Region 	 T (p - 1) 	 P 
Beijing 	 -4.29 	 -1.20 
Tianjin -5.20 -1.41 
Hebei 	 0.06 	 0.06 
Shanxi -2.39 -1.34 
Inner Mongolia 	 -1.84 	 -1.31 
Liaoning 	 -0.54 -0.18 
Jilin 	 -0.83 	 -0.40 
Heilongjiang 	 0.14 0.09 
Shanghai -2.06 	 -0.67 
Jiangsu 	 -2.52 -0.79 
Zhejiang -0.86 	 -0.34 
Anhui 	 -1.35 -0.92 
Fujian -2.04 	 -1.14 
Jiangxi 	 -5.88 -2.44 
Shandong -1.83 	 -0.54 
Henan 	 -0.27 -0.19 
Hubei -0.73 	 -0.41 
Hunan 	 -1.82 -1.38 
Guangdong 	 -0.82 	 -0.37 
Guangxi -0.76 -0.43 
Hainan 	 -13.71 	 -4.33 
Sichuan (Chq) 	 -0.03 -0.01 
Guizhou 	 -2.31 	 -0.94 
Yunan -0.62 -0.31 
Tibet 	 -4.01 	 -1.26 
Shaanxi -6.47 -2.02 
Gansu 	 -2.04 	 -1.34 
Qinghai -2.87 -1.21 
Ningxia 	 -2.77 	 -2.14 
Xinjiang -0.61 -0.45 
With constant 
	 With constant 
and trend 
panel v-stat 	 -3.00 ** 	 7.28 
panel rho-stat 3.80 ** -1.03 
panel pp-stat 
	 4.59 ** 	 -8.00 
panel adf-stat 4.78 ** -7.35 
group rho-stat 
	 6.00 ** 	 1.54 
group pp-stat 6.85 ** -7.83 
group adf-stat 
	 6.99 ** 	 -6.68 


































With constant, trend 
and time dummy 
** -0.94 0 
-1.14 0 
** -6.64 ** 0 
** -6.08 ** 0 
1.04 0 
** -6.32 ** 0 
** -5.09 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t A ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: 
A 
Z a 	
5%=-20.4935 Z t 	5%=-3.3654 
3. The t. (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5%=-1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%.1.65. 
Table 8.20 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
q = a + Min OT - ln ON ) - (ln -ln )1 
Region 
:8 OLS 0 °Ls = 0) '1 3 FMOLS 41 3 FMOLS = 0) 
No. of 
lags 
Beijing -0.29 -3.55 ** -0.23 -1.89 * 3 
Tianjin -0.23 -1.89 * -0.2 -1.1 3 
Hebei 0.11 0.53 0.01 0.03 3 
Shanxi 0.40 2.03 * 0.29 0.99 3 
Inner Mongolia 0.34 1.58 0.1 0.29 3 
Liaoning -0.17 -1.52 -0.08 -0.44 3 
Jilin 0.06 0.40 -0.1 -0.4 3 
Heilongjiang 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.21 3 
Shanghai -0.24 -1.62 -0.16 -0.65 3 
Jiangsu -0.36 -1.90 * -0.32 -1.05 3 
Zhejiang -0.32 -1.43 -0.28 -0.77 3 
Anhui 0.22 1.02 0.17 0.48 3 
Fujian 0.53 1.59 0.44 0.9 3 
Jiangxi 0.68 5.69 ** 0.56 4.03 ** 3 
Shandong -0.57 -2.43 ** -0.53 -1.4 3 
Henan 0.11 0.50 -0.04 -0.12 3 
Hubei 0.14 0.81 0.08 0.3 3 
Hunan 0.30 1.67 0.12 0.42 3 
Guangdong -0.24 -1.48 -0.13 -0.5 3 
Guangxi -0.16 -0.63 -0.27 -0.66 3 
Hainan 0.11 0.52 0.08 0.4 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.15 -0.65 -0.11 -0.26 3 
Guizhou -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.13 3 
Yunan -0.20 -0.65 -0.38 -0.72 3 
Tibet 0.39 1.11 0.52 1.03 3 
Shaanxi 0.29 1.59 0.16 0.61 3 
Gansu 0.25 1.84 * 0.07 0.34 3 
Qinghai 0.09 0.52 -0.05 -0.18 3 
Ningxia 0.34 1.82 * 0.13 0.51 3 
Xinjiang 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.08 3 
Panel Tests of fi = 0 
lA8 PANEL 	1IN ti3 
All provinces 	 -0.001 	0.06 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% = 2.145 	10%.1.761 
3. FT t i3 is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	 5% = 1.96 
Table 8.21 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
qb = a + /3[(ln OT 	ON ) -(ln - 0, )] 
Region A 
/3 OLS 0)6 °Ls = 0) 113 FMOLS 
, 
t( I3  FMOIS = 0) 
No. of 
lags 
Beijing -0.50 -3.15 ** -0.55 -2.42 ** 3 
Tianjin -0.43 -1.74 -0.54 -1.41 3 
Hebei 0.14 0.44 -0.25 -0.42 3 
Shanxi 0.77 2.04 * 0.26 0.41 3 
Inner Mongolia 0.55 1.50 -0.21 -0.33 3 
Liaoning -0.29 -1.25 -0.34 -0.82 3 
Jilin 0.01 0.03 -0.57 -1.04 3 
Heilongjiang 0.08 0.18 -0.18 -0.22 3 
Shanghai -0.40 -1.33 -0.43 -0.85 3 
Jiangsu -0.50 -1.48 -0.66 -1.18 3 
Zhejiang -0.41 -1.15 -0.58 -0.93 3 
Anhui 0.38 1.03 -0.08 -0.12 3 
Fujian 0.80 1.79 * 0.55 0.77 3 
Jiangxi 1.12 5.47 ** 0.74 2.58 ** 3 
Shandong -0.76 -1.97 * -0.98 -1.49 3 
Henan 0.21 0.58 -0.24 -0.37 3 
Hubei 0.23 0.78 -0.16 -0.3 3 
Hunan 0.51 1.69 -0.07 -0.13 3 
Guangdong -0.25 -1.04 -0.26 -0.61 3 
Guangxi -0.17 -0.43 -0.62 -0.88 3 
Hainan 0.50 2.94 ** 0.56 2.9 ** 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.12 -0.31 -0.38 -0.5 3 
Guizhou -0.06 -0.22 -0.39 -0.79 3 
Yunan -0.19 -0.40 -0.83 -0.94 3 
Tibet 0.30 0.50 0.28 0.27 3 
Shaanxi 0.31 0.80 -0.16 -0.25 3 
Gansu 0.34 1.23 -0.28 -0.56 3 
Qinghai 0.28 0.88 -0.21 -0.35 3 
Ningxia 0.64 1.98 * -0.06 -0.11 3 
Xinjiang 0.20 0.46 -0.06 -0.08 3 
Panel Tests of 16= 0 
	
13 PANEL 	t 
All provinces 	 -0.22 	-1.86 * 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% = 2.145 	10%=1.761 
is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	 5% = 1.96 	1070=1.64 
Table 8.22 	Unit Root Tests for Relative Price Difference between US and China 
in P - in P 	On P In P T ) 





w/ intercept & trend 
ADF t-test 	No. of 
w/intercept 	lags 
Beijing -7.55 -2.24 -2.18 -4.80 	3 
Tianjin -2.49 -1.49 -1.49 -1.38 	0 
Hebei -1.53 -1.56 -1.62 -1.44 	0 
Shanxi -1.49 -1.14 -1.62 -1.05 	0 
Inner Mongolia -0.51 -0.45 -2.33 -0.41 	0 
Liaoning -1.36 -1.03 -2.59 -0.95 	0 
Jilin -3.27 -1.48 -3.19 -1.37 	0 
Heilongjiang -4.47 -1.94 -2.60 -1.80 	0 
Shanghai -4.19 -1.70 -1.86 -1.58 	0 
Jiangsu -4.23 -1.98 -1.41 -1.83 	0 
Zhejiang -3.53 -1.75 -1.69 -1.62 	0 
Anhui -2.23 -1.65 -1.19 -1.53 	0 
Fujian -2.12 -1.31 -2.30 -1.21 	0 
Jiangxi -2.47 -1.50 -0.94 -1.39 	0 
Shandong -2.79 -1.69 -1.00 -1.56 	0 
Henan -1.53 -1.25 -1.02 -1.16 	0 
Hubei -1.28 -1.30 -1.49 -1.21 	0 
Hunan -1.82 -1.22 -2.01 -1.13 	0 
Guangdong -1.34 -1.38 -1.06 -1.28 	0 
Guangxi -2.69 -1.77 -0.99 -1.64 	0 
Hainan -3.39 -1.28 -2.18 -1.19 	0 
Sichuan (Chq) -3.36 -1.55 -1.12 -1.43 	0 
Guizhou -1.62 -1.70 -0.22 -1.58 	0 
Yunan -3.48 -1.91 -0.44 -1.77 	0 
Tibet -5.98 -1.99 -4.29 ** -1.84 	0 
Shaanxi -2.80 -1.60 -1.17 -1.48 	0 
Gansu -1.54 -1.00 -1.50 -0.93 	0 
Qinghai -1.93 -1.70 -0.85 -1.58 	0 
Ningxia -2.20 -1.91 -0.53 -1.77 	0 
Xinjiang -3.48 -1.87 -0.97 -1.73 	0 
IPS t-bar panel unit root test with constant 
All provinces 	 -1.52 
	 0 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Phillips-Perron unit root test critical value: 
t(phro-1) test with intercept 	5%=-12.5 
t-test with intercept 	 5%= -3.082 
t-test with intercept and trend 	5%= -3.761 
3. We put 0 lags in all three Phillips-Perron unit root tests. 
4. ADF t-test critical value: 	5%=-3.00 
5. IPS panel unit root test critical value: 5%=-1.74 
Table 8.23 	Test for Cointegration of China Real Parallel Exchange Rate and Relative Price 







































T(p-1) t „ (PP ) P 




-0.16 -0.10 -0.93 1 
-3.79 -1.56 -1.49 0 
-3.48 -1.68 -4.00 ** 4 
-3.87 -1.74 -2.74 ** 4 
-3.83 -2.00 -2.59 ** 4 
-5.73 -2.54 -2.36 ** 4 
-3.64 -1.63 -4.02 ** 4 
-5.62 -2.40 -2.37 ** 4 
-2.04 -0.93 -2.40 ** 4 
-0.88 -0.47 -2.67 ** 4 
-1.99 -0.94 -2.05 ** 4 
-2.51 -1.23 -3.41 ** 4 
-2.93 -1.42 -2.62 ** 4 
-0.83 -0.46 -2.61 ** 4 
-1.24 -0.64 -3.08 ** 4 
-2.46 -1.21 -2.45 ** 4 
-3.29 -1.56 -3.19 ** 4 
-3.14 -1.49 -3.65 ** 4 
-3.01 -1.60 -2.71 ** 4 
-2.45 -1.14 -1.63 4 
-9.51 -3.83 ** -0.93 4 
-0.31 -0.19 -6.41 ** 4 
-2.94 -1.44 -2.34 ** 4 
-0.30 -0.18 -2.36 ** 4 
-2.90 -1.01 -2.17 ** 4 
-3.25 -1.67 -2.09 ** 4 
-3.97 -1.69 -1.55 4 
-2.63 -1.25 -3.46 ** 4 
-2.38 -1.15 -2.74 ** 4 
-0.31 -0.15 -1.70 4 
With constant With constant With constant, trend 
and trend and time dummy 
-0.03 -2.63 ** -0.32 0 
1.58 2.94 ** -0.86 0 
1.38 0.04 -6.02 ** 0 
3.58 ** 1.57 -5.46 ** 0 
3.98 ** 4.88 ** 1.17 0 
3.20 ** 1.63 * -5.54 ** 0 
5.89 ** 3.23 ** -4.49 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t ; ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: 
A 
5%=-20.4935 Z Z a 	i 5%=-3.3654 
3. The t, (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5% = -1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%=1.65. 
Table 8.24 	Test for Cointegration of China Real Official Exchange Rate and Relative Price Difference 







































T ( j; -1) t , (PP ) P 
t , (ADF ) 
No. of 
lags 
0.10 0.05 -0.16 0 
-4.63 -1.36 -1.35 0 
-3.67 -1.28 -1.25 0 
-3.13 -1.12 -1.11 0 
-6.09 -1.64 -1.63 0 
-8.23 -2.28 -2.20 ** 0 
-4.39 -1.36 -1.34 0 
-6.30 -1.81 -1.77 0 
-0.42 -0.18 -1.32 4 
-0.84 -0.36 -0.70 4 
-1.84 -0.73 -0.99 4 
-1.50 -0.60 -1.14 4 
-5.51 -1.72 -1.61 4 
-1.23 -0.50 -1.03 4 
-0.42 -0.20 -0.91 4 
-1.57 -0.60 -1.48 4 
-2.24 -0.79 -1.99 ** 4 
-2.76 -1.02 -1.41 4 
-5.21 -1.63 -1.75 4 
-4.15 -1.31 -0.85 4 
-10.39 -3.91 ** -1.04 4 
-0.01 0.00 -0.62 4 
-5.49 -1.51 -1.91 4 
0.19 0.10 -1.37 4 
-3.68 -1.10 -1.67 4 
-6.53 -2.08 -1.98 ** 4 
-3.07 -1.08 -2.22 ** 4 
-5.28 -1.54 -1.64 4 
-1.72 -0.62 -2.01 ** 4 
0.52 0.22 -0.65 4 
With constant With constant With constant, trend 
and trend and time dummy 
-0.83 3.51 ** -0.30 0 
2.32 ** -1.51 -0.88 0 
3.43 ** -8.17 ** -6.08 ** 0 
4.73 ** -7.41 ** -5.49 ** 0 
4.37 ** 0.80 1.10 0 
5.37 ** -8.29 ** -5.69 ** 0 
7.05 ** -7.11 ** -4.69 ** 0 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. The T (p - 1) and t; ( PP ) statistics are Phillips-Perron tests applied to the residuals from 
the first regression and are computed with 0 lags. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) critical values for residual based tests for cointegration with constant 
and one explanatory variable are: 
a 	5%=-20.4935 	Z t 5%=-3.3654 
3. The t ,, (ADF ) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with no constant or trend. 
P 
The MacKinnon critical values for rejecting of the hypothesis of a unit root is: 5%=-1.95. 
4. The panel cointegration tests are those proposed by Pedroni (1995), which is the source of the critical value: 
5%=1.65. 
Table 8.25 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
q = a + fi[(In FIN -ln PT ) - PN -In PT )] 
Region 23 OLS t(13 ° Ls = 0) 13  FMOLS t(13  FAlors = 0) 
No. of  
lags 
Beijing 0.20 0.67 0.33 0.71 3 
Tianjin -0.26 -1.55 -0.12 -0.47 3 
Hebei -1.07 -6.41 ** -0.93 -3.53 ** 3 
Shanxi -0.62 -5.23 ** -0.53 -2.84 ** 3 
Inner Mongolia -0.83 -8.02 ** -0.84 -6.09 ** 3 
Liaoning -1.04 -6.91 ** -1.01 -4.92 ** 3 
Jilin -0.62 -3.70 ** -0.63 -2.41 ** 3 
Heilongjiang -0.90 -3.49 ** -0.78 -2.1 * 3 
Shanghai -0.43 -1.15 -0.18 -0.29 3 
Jiangsu -0.32 -0.96 0 0.01 3 
Zhejiang -0.91 -2.61 ** -0.58 -0.98 3 
Anhui -0.64 -3.61 ** -0.44 -1.48 3 
Fujian -1.47 -6.25 ** -1.38 -3.71 ** 3 
Jiangxi -0.50 -2.10 * -0.31 -0.79 3 
Shandong -0.54 -2.55 ** -0.28 -0.75 3 
Henan -0.58 -4.08 ** -0.47 -2.03 * 3 
Hubei -0.79 -4.73 ** -0.64 -2.41 ** 3 
Hunan -0.89 -5.00 ** -0.78 -2.69 ** 3 
Guangdong -0.90 -6.39 ** -0.8 -3.65 ** 3 
Guangxi -1.21 -4.84 ** -1 -2.47 ** 3 
Hainan -1.37 -2.10 * -1.09 -1.96 * 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.34 -1.10 -0.18 -0.36 3 
Guizhou -0.58 -4.13 ** -0.47 -2.35 ** 3 
Yunan -0.73 -1.65 -0.68 -0.87 3 
Tibet -0.19 -1.21 -0.3 -1.4 3 
Shaanxi -0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.24 3 
Gansu -0.38 -2.73 ** -0.28 -1.34 3 
Qinghai -0.46 -3.57 ** -0.32 -1.66 3 
Ningxia -0.60 -4.05 ** -0.37 -1.49 3 
Xinjiang -1.20 -3.00 ** -0.83 -1.25 3 
Panel Tests of fi =-- 0 
	
13 PANEL 	,FAT 
All provinces 	 -0.53 	-10.19 ** 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% = 2.145 	10%=1.761 
3.-FV rie is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	5% = 1.96 
Table 8.26 	Estimates of the Cointegrating Slope Coefficient of 
qb = a + fi[(ln PN - In PT ) - On PN -In PTA 
il\  8 OLS 
Region No. 
t(le pis = 0) 'le FMOLS t(/' FMOLS = 0) 
of 
lags 
Beijing 0.36 0.67 -0.07 -0.08 3 
Tianjin -0.61 -1.83 * -0.59 -1.23 3 
Hebei -1.40 -3.79 ** -1.32 -2.48 ** 3 
Shanxi -0.99 -3.47 ** -1.07 -2.64 ** 3 
Inner Mongolia -1.36 -6.41 ** -1.54 -5.72 ** 3 
Liaoning -1.84 -4.32 ** -2.25 -4.76 ** 3 
Jilin -1.11 -2.91 ** -1.38 -2.45 ** 3 
Heilongjiang -1.79 -4.01 ** -2.25 -3.85 ** 3 
Shanghai -0.83 -1.13 -0.96 -0.8 3 
Jiangsu -0.33 -0.57 -0.05 -0.05 3 
Zhejiang -1.27 -2.22 ** -1.15 -1.15 3 
Anhui -1.00 -3.18 ** -0.95 -1.88 * 3 
Fujian -1.84 -4.67 ** -1.86 -2.93 ** 3 
Jiangxi -0.84 -2.16 ** -0.78 -1.16 3 
Shandong -0.65 -1.79 * -0.43 -0.67 3 
Henan -0.90 -3.59 ** -0.9 -2.31 ** 3 
Hubei -1.17 -3.31 ** -1.13 -2.25 ** 3 
Hunan -1.31 -3.73 ** -1.38 -2.54 ** 3 
Guangdong -1.18 -4.60 ** -1.15 -2.89 ** 3 
Guangxi -1.46 -2.93 ** -1.23 -1.48 3 
Hainan -2.60 -7.09 ** -2.54 -6.68 ** 3 
Sichuan (Chq) -0.60 -1.15 -0.67 -0.73 3 
Guizhou -0.95 -3.34 ** -0.93 -2.15 ** 3 
Yunan -0.54 -0.74 -0.61 -0.45 3 
Tibet -0.51 -2.20 ** -0.69 -1.91 * 3 
Shaanxi -0.53 -0.96 -0.75 -0.95 3 
Gansu -0.88 -3.66 ** -0.96 -2.76 ** 3 
Qinghai -0.66 -2.45 ** -0.5 -1.11 3 
Ningxia -0.88 -2.84 ** -0.7 -1.38 3 
Xinjiang -1.62 -2.53 ** -1.41 -1.24 3 
Panel Tests of /3 = 0 
) PANEL 471\T ti3 
All provinces 	 -1.07 	-11.44 ** 
Notes: 
1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater are signified by **. 
2. Critical values of the t-values with n-k=16-2=14 degrees of freedom 
5% .-= 2.145 	10%=1.761 
3-J* is the group mean t-ratio which is distributed as standard normal under the null. 
Panel test critical value: 	 5% = 1.96 
Table 8.27 	Pool (Total) regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 
Coefficient Equation (I) Coefficient Equation (II) Coefficient Equation (111) 







-0.78** -- - - 
82 
(0.00) - - - 
- - - - 71 
-0.15** 
- - - - 
1 (0.00) 







7, -0.07 (0.16) 713 
-0.10** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.79** Constant 0.37** Constant 0.13 
(0.00) (0.045) (0.41) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 4.04** AR(1) test 4A4** AR(1) test 4.29** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) test 3.97** AR(2) test 4.14** AR(2) test 4.03** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.28 	OLS on differences regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 
Coefficient Equation (I) Coefficient Equation (II) Coefficient Equation (111) 
Si 0.44 11 
0.70** - - 
(0.32) (0.045) - - 
M.88** - - 
S2 (0.00) -- - - 
- - - - 0.19** 
- - - - 
qi 
(0.01) 














Constant M.02** Constant -0.003 Constant M.01** 
(0.01) (0.69) (0.01) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test -1.89* AR(1) test -1.61 AR(1) test -1.23 
(0.06) (0.11) (0.22) 
AR(2) test 1.96 AR(2) test 0.67 AR(2) test 0.61 
(0.05) (0.51) (0.54) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.29 LSDV regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 
Coefficient Equation (I) Coefficient Equation (11) Coefficient Equation (DI) 
(51 1.19** 71 
0.95** - 
(0.00) (0.00) - - 
-0.68** - - - - 
82 (0.00) - - - - 
- - - -Th 
0.09 
- - - - (0.16) 
1.05** 0.75** -0.36** 










Constant 0.54** Constant 0.07 Constant 0.86** 
(0.00) (0.67) (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 3.70** AR(1) test 4.19** AR(1) test 4.27** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) test 3.21** AR(2) test 3.76** AR(2) test 3.15** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.30 Within-Groups regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 























































Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 3.70** 
(0.00) 
AR(1) test 4.19** 
(0.00) 
AR(1) test 4.27** 
(0.00) 
AR(2) test 3.21** 
(0.00) 
AR(2) test 3.76** 
(0.00) 
AR(2) test 3.15** 
(0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.31 Between-Groups regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 


















































Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test - 
- 
AR(1) test - 
- 
AR(1) test - 
- 
AR(2) test - 
- 
AR(2) test - 
- 
AR(2) test - 
- 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.32 GLS using Within/Between-Group regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 











-0.70** - - - - 
82 (0.00) - - - - 
- - - 11 -0.01 









M.88** M.18** M.13** 
84 (0.00) 
73 (0.00) 
77 3 (0.00) 
Constant 0.65** Constant 0.31** Constant 0.69** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 13.96** AR(1) test 17.94** AR(1) test 15.64** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) test 9.22** AR(2) test 10.64** AR(2) test 7.33** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.33 	GLS using OLS residuals regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 











-0.70** - - - - 
82 (0.00) - - - - 
- - - 171 -0.01 
- - - - (0.65) 














Constant 0.65** Constant 0.31** Constant 0.66** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 14.22** AR(1) test 18.00** AR(1) test 15.84** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) test 9.49** AR(2) test 10.70** AR(2) test 7.58** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.34 MLE regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 
Coefficient Equation (I) Coefficient Equation (II) Coefficient Equation (111) 
1.15** 0.88** - - 
81  
(0.00) 
Y1 (0.00) - - 
-0.69** - - - - 
82 (0.00) - - - - 
- - 771 
0.04 
- - - - (0.26) 
1.01** 0.68** M.35** 
83  72 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 






Constant 0.64** Constant 0.30** Constant 0.84** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test 13.44** AR(1) test 16.15** AR(1) test 14.51** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) test 8.68** AR(2) test 8.66** AR(2) test 5.99** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.35 One-step or two-step GMM regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 













M.95** 2 - - - - - 
62 (0.00) - - - - - 
- - - - - - 711 0.21** 1 














1 Y3 M.31** 
(0.00) 
1 173 M.19** 
(0.068) 
2 
Constant 0.03 - Constant -0.002 - Constant 0.01 - 
(0.75) - (0.99) - (0.74) - 
Trend no - Trend no - Trend yes - 
1 or 2-step 2-step 1 or 2-step 2-step 1 or 2-step 1-step 
Sargan test 25.19 Sargan test 28.55 Sargan test 104.00 
(1.00) (1.00) (0.481) 
AR(1) test -1.62* AR(1) test -1.234 AR(1) test -2.254** 
(0.10) (0.22) (0.024) 
AR(2) test 1.41 AR(2) test -0.02 AR(2) test -1.426 
(0.16) (0.98) (0.154) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
Table 8.36 	One-step or two -step combined GMM regression of nontradable price 
on investment-output and capital-output ratios 
Coefficient Equation (I) Lags Coefficient Equation (II) Lags Coefficient Equation (III) Lags 
81 0.150 1 71 0.49 1 - - 
- 
(0.56) (0.13) - - - 
-0.64** 1 - - - - - - 
(0.00) 8 2 - -- - - - 
- - - - - - qi 0.20** 1 

























Constant 0.22** - Constant 0.013 - Constant 0.15** - 
(0.02) - (0.86) - (0.001) - 
Trend yes - Trend no - Trend yes - 
1 or 2-step 1-step 1 or 2-step 1-step 1 or 2-step 1-step 
Sargan test 337 Sargan test 495.3 Sargan test 272.6 
(1.00) (0.194) (1.000) 
AR(1) test -1.631* AR(1) test -1.233 AR(1) test -1.788* 
(0.10) (0.21) (0.07) 
AR(2) test 0.823 AR(2) test 1.034 AR(2) test 0.5849 
(0.41) (0.301) (0.559) 
Statistical significance at 95% and 90% level are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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